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Abstract
The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in
the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each
of the chapters besides Chapter 1, which puts each the chapters to follow
into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area
of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and
whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared mean-
ing, between the classicist and deviant’s respective uses of ‘not’. If there is
not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and pro-
vide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number
of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of
FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics,
LP (Priest’s dialetheic “Logic of Paradox”), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued
logics with either “exclusion” or “choice” negation, and intuitionistic logic.
Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an em-
pirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form ‘A is undecided
at present’ or ‘A may never be decided’ the latter of which has been argued
to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of
various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (ver-
sus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or “algebraic”) value, in
formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes
such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of
the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth
vii
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exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics
representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic,
from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is
developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed
therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation
as “absolute” impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in
question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily de-
finable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in
the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfac-
tual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language
with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give




This chapter sets up the background for the chapters to follow. It
includes historical references, puts the problems discussed in the
forthcoming chapters into context, and ties together a number of
the main themes and problems.
1.1 Introduction
Plato’s beard and contemporary issues
When one takes a close look at “new” problems in philosophy one may often
find that they are really old problems in modern guise. This is not a bad thing.
The old problems that are truly central to philosophy take on new form and
become amenable to solutions involving a host of new tools and insights. There
may be a lot to learn by viewing the same problem in different contexts. It is
important, however, that one sees the connection between the old and the new
so that an appreciation of the insights garnered centuries, indeed thousands,
of years ago may likewise be appreciated in modern light.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. NEGATION IN CONTEXT
Some of the problems that I have in mind concern negation and falsity.
For instance, Plato’s discussion (in the Sophist, Theaetetus, and Parmenides)
of the problem of speaking about that which is not, a problem labeled Plato’s
beard by Quine in [W. 61]1, recurred in numerous forms throughout history.
The problem was arguably the primary motivation of Russell’s theory of de-
scriptions, a theory which provided a more ontologically amenable solution to
Plato’s beard than Russell’s earlier solution which distinguished existence from
being, attributing only the latter to Pegasus. Today the problem takes shape
as that of finding truthmakers for negative truths, in particular, for negative
existentials. There is no doubt it will take on yet other shapes in the future.
Let us take a look at two particular cases, one already alluded to, where
the old and new coincide; the old being Plato’s beard and the new coming
from two disparate areas of philosophy—contemporary metaphysics, on the
one hand, and constructive mathematics on the other. The two new turn out
to be the one old. But first let me briefly describe the old, Plato’s beard, before
the connections are drawn.
Plato’s beard concerns the puzzle of how we can make sense of statements
that involve so-called empty names. For if the application of a predicate to a
term is to make any sense then, as the reasoning goes, it must be presupposed
that the term refers, i.e. to an existing entity. For example, how can ‘Pegasus
does not exist’ have sense if ‘Pegasus’ does not refer? Are we not then speaking
of nothing, and isn’t that equivalent to not speaking at all, or at best, saying
something without meaning? Plato struggled with this problem in various
places and it has been attributed to him (contra [Dur98]) that because of it he
was led to the view that Pegasus has being in some sense. Prior to his theory
1It is claimed, e.g. by Read [Rea94, ch. 5], that Quine actually used the label ‘Plato’s
beard’ to denote what he thought was Plato’s solution to what I’ve called the problem. But
it’s not clear whether Quine meant the problem or a particular solution. Quine says “This
is the old Platonic riddle of nonbeing. Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is
it that there is not? This tangled doctrine might be nicknamed Platos beard; historically it
has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge of Occam’s razor” [W. 61, pp. 1–2]. Notice
that he speaks of the “doctrine” as a “riddle” and says that it has proved “tough” which
better applies to problems than solutions. In any case, the point is merely terminological.
Like Read, I prefer to call the problem ‘Plato’s beard’ even if that is not how Quine used it.
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of descriptions, Russell was led to the same conclusion on precisely the same
grounds.
Now consider the problem negation posed for the constructive mathemati-
cian G. F. C. Griss.2 The problem, according to Griss, is that from a con-
structivist point of view, it makes no sense to speak of that which is false and
hence it makes no sense to deny truths, at least if we assume that denying
truths is equivalent to asserting falsehoods. For Griss, a statement has mean-
ing only insofar as each of its terms refers. Notice that this problem regarding
the reference of terms is a constructivist rehashing of Plato’s beard. However
for Griss, Quine and Russell’s purported solution to the problem will not work.
Their solution was to analyze singular terms as definite descriptions and to
thereby eliminate empty singular terms such as ‘Pegasus’ in favor of empty
predicates such as ‘Pegasizes’, e.g. the sentence ‘Pegasus does not exist’ being
parsed as ‘Nothing Pegasizes’. This solution does not work for Griss since he
regards empty predicates as meaningless on the grounds that the null class,
their purported extension, fails to exist.
Griss’ views led to negationless mathematics, a reconstruction of a signif-
icant part of constructive mathematics without negation. The motivation for
the strong negation of Nelson (which he called ‘constructible falsity’) may be
seen as deriving from Griss’ stringent requirement that truth depend on a pos-
itive construction and hence not on any construction involving an absurdity, a
notion in terms of which intuitionistic negation is typically defined.
Finally, a more obvious connection between old and new is found in contem-
porary metaphysics concerning the problem of finding truthmakers for negative
truths. Russell grappled with a close cousin of this problem, eventually—
though cautiously—caving in and accepting the existence of “negative facts”.
He amusingly stated:
When I was lecturing on this subject at Harvard [in 1914] I argued
that there were negative facts, and it nearly produced a riot: the
2See [Gri46].
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class would not hear of there being negative facts at all. [Rus10, p.
42]
But he was cautious. He goes on:
I am still inclined to think that there are [negative facts]. However,
one of the men to whom I was lecturing at Harvard, Mr. Demos,
subsequently wrote an article in Mind to explain why there are no
negative facts. . . I think he makes as good a case as can be made for
the view that there are no negative facts. It is a difficult question.
I really only ask that you should not dogmatize. I do not say
positively that there are, but there may be. [Rus10, p. 42]
The problem of finding truthmakers for negative truths, i.e. truths equiv-
alent to negations, is roughly this. If truth is grounded in the world, that is,
for every truth there corresponds a truthmaker, then even negative truths have
truthmakers. But exactly what could count as a truthmaker for truths such as
‘Pegasus does not exist’? Surely not Pegasus, since he does not exist. Nor does
any other wordly entity seem a good candidate unless among those entities are
counted things such as negative facts (Russell), reified absences (e.g. [Kuk06]),
totalities (Armstrong), or any of the other myriad ontological repugnances that
have been posited for solutions to the truthmaker worry. These types of so-
lution give being to nonbeing. They are solutions to yet another recasting of
Plato’s beard (especially as the problem appears in the Sophist) that Quine so
vehemently rejected.
Outline
These and other problems concerning negation are the topic of this essay. Each
of the subsequent chapters brings to light some significant problems negation
poses to different areas of contemporary philosophy, primarily to current de-
bates in philosophical logic, the philosophy of logic and metaphysics.
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The rest of this chapter is sectioned into headings corresponding to the
chapters to follow:
2. What is negation?
3. Constructivism and empirical negation
4. Rejection, denial and other negative speech acts and attitudes
5. Negation, truth and falsity
6. The definability of negation as impossibility
The following sections of the present chapter are intended to give the reader
some introductory background to the chapter to which the section corresponds.
When possible, I have attempted to avoid overlap between this chapter and the
others.
1.2 What is negation?
Negation enjoys a rich history. Various proposals of the notion, as it occurs
in various forms from subsentential to sentential, have been put forward which
raises an important question: Do any of all of these proposals, or the proposed
“negations”, have some core features in common? If they do not, then their
similarities, if they have any, are at best family resemblances. That may not
seem so bad. The problem, however, is that forming a mere family is not enough
to overcome the Quinean “change of subject” objection. According to Quine, as
soon as the deviant’s ‘not’ is non-classical, she is no longer expressing negation,
and if she is no longer expressing negation then the deviant and classicist are
merely speaking past each other when they purport to disagree about negation;
for one is talking about negation and the other about “negation”. The Quinean
objection is simple and yet strikes at the core of logical revisionism, the idea
that a theory of logical consequence is revisable.
I regard as revisable a theory of correct inference and not the object of
that theory. I call the former ‘logic’ and the latter ‘logic’. The two are
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important to distinguish. For instance, early Quine held that “no statement
is immune to revision” ([Qui51, p. 40]) and, in particular, that “[r]evision
even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means
of simplifying quantum mechanics” ([Qui51, p. 40]). While later Quine held,
apparently to the contrary, that when the deviant logician “tries to deny the
doctrine he only changes the subject” [Qui70, p. 81]. One way to interpret
earlier Quine consistently with later Quine is to take ‘logic’ in the mouth of the
latter as meaning logic (hence unrevisable) and in the mouth of the former
as meaning logic (hence revisable).
It is then absolutely crucial to the project of logical revisionism, if it is to
even have a starting chance, that disagreement between classicist and deviant
be possible. One way to accomplish this is to argue that there is enough shared
meaning or content in their respective uses of the relevant vocabulary to allow
for disagreement. In particular, if the only relevant vocabulary is negation, then
all that has to be argued for is that there is enough shared meaning in their
respective uses of ‘not’. In fact, in a number of important cases one may view
the difference between classical and deviant, such as the intuitionist, as one
concerning solely negation.3 But even if there is more to their differences than
negation, one must still account for shared content between their respective
uses of ‘not’.
It is commonly held that a contradictory-forming operation is a negation.
There is no reason to think that contradictory-forming operations are unique.
Indeed, on a compelling view of contradictoriness, defined as the intersection
of contrariety and subcontrariety, the classical and deviant assign the same
meaning to ‘not’. One may even hold the stronger view that each logic gives
rise to different yet genuine contradictory-forming operations and hence to
different negations. This sort of view might be held by a logical pluralist. One
account of contradictoriness according to which the meaning of ‘not’ is shared
by deviant and classicist is defended in chapter 2 and compared with other
3A suggestion to this effect may be found in section 1.3.
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popular accounts that fare poorly from a deviant’s perspective.
1.3 Constructivism and empirical negation
Introduction
The difference between classical and intuitionistic propositional logic may be
summed up as follows. Let each logical connective (e.g. ∧, →, etc.) be associ-
ated with what might be considered its most natural family of rules consisting
of its introduction and elimination rules.4 Suppose the most natural family
of rules associated with a given connective are just those of Gentzen’s system
NK. Then the only difference between classical and intuitionistic logic is that
only the former is associated with the rule of double negation elimination and
only the latter with ex falso quodlibet (EFQ).5 In other words, the difference
between the two logics is merely a difference of negation.
This is not the only way to draw the difference between the two rivals. For
instance, Read [Rea00, pp. 144–148] argues that the difference between the
two logics is not one of negation but rather one of implication, with (the rules
for) classical implication being stronger than those of its intuitionistic rival.
Indeed there are numerous ways to draw the difference between the two (e.g.
one might also point to disjunction), but drawing it in terms of negation seems
more natural than drawing it in terms of any other connective, at least from
the point of view of natural deduction and also, in a number of cases, from a
semantical point of view as well.
Read [Rea00] disagrees, arguing that the difference between intuitionistic
and classical logic has to do with the conditional. He holds that a correct
natural deduction system formulation of classical logic is one which strength-
4I say ‘family’ instead of ‘pair’ since rules for a connective typically do not come in
pairs, e.g. ∨ is often associated with a pair of introduction rules and a single elimination
rule. Of course, this depends on what one means by ‘rule’. For instance, we might think
of A1 ∧ A2 # Ai for i ≤ 2 as a single elimination rule for ∧ but such an interpretation of
‘rule’ would be nonstandard though not entirely absent from the literature (e.g. see fn 18 of
chapter 6).
5Of course if we consider derived rules along with the primitive ones then classical nega-
tion too will be associated with EFQ.
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ens rules for the conditional by allowing “disjoined parameters”, essentially a
multiset of formulae to be thought of as a disjunction of its elements, to oc-
cur in the conclusion of the introduction rule → I of the conditional.6 He is
therefore endorsing multiple conclusions for natural deduction either implicitly
or explicitly. However there is much to be said for the naturalness of single
conclusions and the unnaturalness of multiple conclusions (on which see, e.g.,
[Rum00, pp. 795–796]), whether multiple conclusions are disguised or not.7
Multiple conclusions are also objected to for reasons not associated with nat-
uralness; see, e.g. [Ten97], which is criticized implicitly by [Rea00, p. 145]
as begging the question, who claims that multiple conclusions smuggle in the
law of excluded middle through the back door. This may be taken as reason
enough for not preferring to draw the distinction between intuitionistic and
classical logic in terms of the conditional, at least insofar as the distinction is
drawn in [Rea00]. There may be less contentious ways of drawing it in terms of
the conditional that, for example, do not appeal to multiple conclusion natural
deduction systems.
From a semantic perspective, we also see the distinction being drawn in
terms of negation. Algebraic semantics for intuitionistic logic (in particular
when the class of algebras under consideration is the class of Heyting algebras)
and classical logic marks the distinction between the two in terms of comple-
mentation, the operation assigned to their respective negations. In particular,
Heyting algebras are a generalization of boolean algebras in the sense that
boolean complementation must satisfy more properties than the “pseudocom-
plementation” of Heyting algebras.
Precisely, a Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice (A,∧,∨,⊥,%) (where
⊥ and % are the bottom and top elements, respectively) satisfying the property
that for all a, b ∈ A there exists an element a → b ∈ A such that for every
6As a matter of convention I shall use ⊗I and ⊗E to denote the introduction and elimi-
nation rules for a connective in the setting of natural deduction. In the usual cases, e.g. as
with ∧ and ∨, when there is more than one introduction and elimination rule for a given
connective, I shall use ⊗I or ⊗E to ambiguously denote either one when the ambiguity is
harmless. For instance ∧E may denote either A ∧B # A or A ∧B # B.
7They may be thought of as disguised in [Kne56].
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c ∈ A we have
c ≤ a→ b ⇐⇒ a ∧ c ≤ b.
We can define the pseudocomplement ¬a of a as a → ⊥. We call the just
defined complementation operation, ¬, pseudocomplementation.
A boolean algebra is a Heyting algebra (A,∧,∨,⊥,%) whose complementa-
tion ¬, called boolean complementation, also defined as a→ ⊥ for ¬a, satisfies
the following:
a ∧ ¬a = ⊥ a ∨ ¬a = %.
Clearly every complementation is a pseudocomplementation but not conversely,
and so the class of boolean algebras is a subclass of the class of Heyting algebras.
One sees the analogous result holding for Kripke semantics for classical
and intuitionistic logic where the class of “sheer reflexive frames”, i.e. frames
where the accessibility relation is the identity relation on the class of worlds,
characterizing classical logic is a subclass of the class of preorders character-
izing intuitionistic logic.8 However the difference between Kripke semantics
for classical and intuitionistic logic does not obviously have anything to do
with negation since the truth conditions for negation on both semantics are
the same, viz. those given by
M,a |= ¬A ⇐⇒ ∀b ≥ a,M, b ,|= A.
The only difference is that the semantics is given relative to different classes
of structures, e.g. the class of preorders for intuitionistic logic and the class of
sheer reflexive frames for classical logic.
In any case, whether the difference between the two logics is more naturally
viewed as one of negation is not, as far as I can see, a matter of significant
philosophical interest. But it is at least telling about how people have thought
about the difference between the two logics and also why negation has been a
8A semantics, or the class of structures with respect to which the semantics is given,
characterizes a logic if the logic is sound and complete with respect to that semantics.
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recurring problem in manifest forms for constructivism. In what follows I wish
to illustrate the significance of these problems for constructivism generally and
for more narrow programs which may be broadly construed as constructivist
in spirit.
Problems with intuitionistic negation
According to the standard intuitionistic (i.e. BHK) interpretation, a negation
¬A, defined as A→ ⊥, is true just in case there is a procedure transforming any
proof of A into a proof of an absurdity ⊥. Now supposing that A is (logically
or necessarily) false, there is no proof of A in which case it is vacuously true
that there is a procedure transforming any proof of A into a proof of ⊥. Indeed
every procedure would qualify as one transforming any proof of a falsehood
into a proof of anything.
However this interpretation of negation may seem unsatisfying for a number
of reasons. For one, a common intuitionistic interpretation regards a propo-
sition as a particular kind of construction such as the canonical construction
which is its proof under some given notion of canonicity according to which a
canonical proof is unique (modulo some congruence relation). Now if propo-
sitions just are canonical constructions then no sense can be made of a con-
tradictory or absurd proposition required in the understanding of negation as
implication to absurdity. For the purported proposition expressed by ⊥ would
not exist since there is no proof, let alone a canonical one, of ⊥, i.e. ⊥ fails
to express a proposition and is hence meaningless. An objection of this form,
not against negation directly but against contradictories more generally, was
raised by Hans Freudenthal in [Fre36].
This is admittedly not the only substantive intuitionistic interpretation of
a proposition and those that have become more favorable after the latter part
of the twentieth century take a proposition to be a possibly null collection,
e.g. of proofs (the Curry-Feys-Howard interpretation), of solutions to e.g. word
problems (the Kolmogorov interpretation), or of methods of fulfilling intensions
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(the Heyting 1931 interpretation). On these more favorable interpretations
there is nothing problematic about the absurd proposition since it is identified
with the null class and so there is, at least in this respect, nothing problematic
about negation defined as implication to absurdity.
However, the problems with interpreting negation intuitionistically do not
stop here. The meaning of absurdity has been and still is a problem for in-
ferentialists. If the meaning of a connective is bestowed on it by some set
of inferential rules, e.g. its introduction and elimination rules in some natu-
ral deduction system satisfying certain meaning-theoretic constraints such as
harmony, then what meaning, if any, is attached to ⊥? There are two main
answers to this question.
To avoid vicious circularity we cannot give the meaning of negation in terms
of absurdity and conversely give the meaning of absurdity in terms of negation.
This makes the obvious candidate for an introduction rule for absurdity, viz.
A ¬A ⊥I⊥




since then the meaning of each would depend on the other. We should be
able to provide an introduction rule for absurdity that does not involve in an
essential way any other connective.
Notice that there is no problem concerning an elimination rule for absurdity
and that the following standard elimination rule for ⊥, viz.
⊥ (EFQ)
A
proves unproblematic from an inferentialist point of view at least when taken
in conjunction with the usual rules associated to the other connectives where
circularity does not arise.
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Dummett denies that there is any problem of meaning-circularity concern-
ing negation and that ⊥ may be given harmonious rules by taking EFQ as its
elimination rule and the following as its introduction rule:
p1 p2 . . . ⊥I⊥
where the pi exhaust the class of atomic sentences. Indeed he says “The con-
stant sentence ⊥ is no more problematic than the universal quantifier: it is
simply the conjunction of all atomic sentences” [Dum91, p. 295]. But clearly
it is more problematic. For one, it is infinitary assuming, as it is usually as-
sumed, that the language contains infinitely many atomic sentences. We cannot
assume that only a potential infinity is demanded since any finite set of atomic
sentences might just as well be consistent. What is prima facie required in
specifying the rule is that the actual infinity of atoms be taken as premises
unless there are independent grounds for holding that there are only finitely
many atomic sentences.
There are grounds for holding that there are only finitely many atomic
sentences but Dummett himself never held this. For instance one might pro-
mote the atomic sentences to having a special status which implies there being
only finitely many of them. One way to do so is to defend atomic sentences
as expressing fundamental facts such that a complete description of “reality”
may be given by the conjunction of all atomic sentences, a view central to the
atomism of Wittgenstein. But, again, Dummett did not construe them this
way and, moreover, this response to the infinitary objection invokes a lot of
contentious semantic and metaphysical machinery that should not complicate
an introduction rule for ⊥ especially if our understanding of ⊥ is supposed to
be manifestable.
But more importantly, even assuming its being infinitary is not a problem,
there is the problem of its being dynamic. If the language under considera-
tion, i.e. the one for which Dummett’s proposed ⊥I is to be sound, is a natural
language, then the rule must be construed as being open-ended in the sense
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that its soundness is preserved under both extensions and contractions of the
language. For natural language expressions both come and go. The problem
is that, while soundness may be preserved under extensions, it is certainly not
under contractions, a point which Dummett acknowledges but fails to appreci-
ate. While it is unlikely that English will ever contract to the point where its
atomic sentences, if we are able to distinguish such a class in the first place,
form an intuitionistically consistent set, the possibility surely cannot be ruled
out on a priori grounds, and that is enough to undermine Dummett’s proposed
⊥I.
In other words, Dummett’s proposed ⊥I rule is language-dependent in a
serious way.9 There are infinitely many languages for which the conjunction
of all atomic sentences is consistent and so should not yield ⊥. Indeed most
logical languages are like this. In richer languages such as that of Heyting
arithmetic this is obviously not the case since even atoms by themselves, such
as 0 = 1, may be inconsistent. As one of Dummett’s programs was to extend
verificationism (a` la intuitionism) in mathematics to verificationism in natural
languages such as English, it might only be fair to read ⊥I as being given
relative to English or appropriately similar languages in which case the set of
atomic sentences, at least if those are delineated in a straightforwardly syntactic
fashion, will be inconsistent. But then Dummett needs an argument to the
effect that his proposed ⊥I is indeed open-ended.
But Dummett’s way is just one as an answer to the the question of whether
⊥ has meaning according to the inferentialist. Another answer is given by
Prawitz who holds either that the introduction rule for ⊥ is the “empty rule”
or that there is no introduction rule for ⊥. These answers are not equivalent.
An inferentialist who holds that only the introduction rules confer meaning on
expressions may have no problem with ⊥’s lacking an introduction rule, but
an inferentialist who thinks that both the introduction and elimination rules
together confer meaning on an expression can only opt for the former answer,
9He says that negation lacks the ‘invariance’ property. See [Dum91, p. 296] for more
discussion.
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that the introduction rule for ⊥ is the empty rule. While this likely will not
be problematic for modern inferentialists, it will be for those sympathetic to
Griss and his rejection of the existence of the null class, the extension of the
empty rule if we construe functions class-theoretically. The null class was the
source of considerable worry before modern set theory accepted its existence
as following from the usual set or class theories such as ZF.10
Negationless mathematics
On liberal forms of constructivism an object or property exists only if there
is a possible construction of it, and on more conservative forms the object or
property has to have been actually constructed, i.e. a merely possible construc-
tion will not do. Suppose meaning is constrained by existence in the sense that
a sentence A has meaning only if every property and object mentioned in A
exists. We then have to reject as meaningful what is ordinarily taken to be
perfectly meaningful. For instance, the sentence
(*) There are no square circles
will have no meaning since the property of being a square circle cannot be
constructed and, hence, cannot exist.
More generally suppose that A(t) is a false mathematical statement. Since
A(t) is mathematical, it is necessarily false. Thus not only is there no construc-
tion of the property λx.〈A(t)〉 expressed by A(t), there could be no construction
of the property and so A(t) is meaningless. In other words no false mathemat-
ical statement is meaningful.
The view just sketched was first propounded by Griss11, mentioned already
in section 1.1, who held essentially all of Brouwer’s views regarding intuition-
istic mathematics except for one important one, viz. that false or refutable
sentences are meaningful and that the negation of a statement can be estab-
10An interesting discussion concerning the history of the reluctance to grant the existence
of the null class (e.g. by Russell and Dedekind) can be found in [Kan03].
11See e.g. [Gri46].
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lished by deducing from the statement an absurdity. For Griss only true sen-
tences are meaningful. He gave a negationless reconstruction of a reasonable
fragment of intuitionistic mathematics. In fact some proposed first-order con-
structive negationless theories of arithmetic have been shown intertranslatable
with Heyting arithmetic.12
Let be # the “positive” concept of apartness which, in the context of nega-
tionless theories, is used as a substitute for inequality, ,=.13 For instance, a
negationless recasting of (*) is
(**) “If S is a square and P any point, then we can find points Q and R on
the boundary of S, such that PQ#PR”14
A simpler example is the positive recasting of x ,= y in the theory of strict
linear orders by the statement x < y ∨ y < x. Indeed the relation just so
defined, viz. x < y ∨ y < x, is an apartness relation.
One apparent oddity of negationless systems from a semantical point of view
is that the class of meaningful propositions is not closed under conjunction. For
even if ‘x is square’ and ‘x is circular’ are meaningful, their conjunction is not
since there is no way to construct a square circle. Another way of putting
this is to say that in the negationless theory of classes where the null class
fails to exist, the intersection of two classes is not guaranteed to yield another
class. The problem of developing syntactical systems adequate to the intended
semantics of negationless theories has proved notoriously difficult.
12See [Vic00a] and [Vic00b]. It’s not clear that translational equivalence in the foregoing
sense carries much currency. Certainly it does not by itself show that two theories are
equivalent as regards what they are intuitively able to express.
13Apartness is used also outside of negationless theories of mathematics where x#y is
strictly stronger than x &= y. On apartness, see [Hey71, §2.2.3] and [vD08, pp. 175–177].
14This example is taken from [Hey71, p. 124] but he works through the contradiction
only antecedently in [Hey55, p. 92]: “[i]n this example it is easy to deduce the contradiction,
for let S be a square and P any point, a one of the sides of the square, Q the foot of the
perpendicular from P to a, R a point on a different from Q, then the distances PQ and PR
are unequal; but if S were a circle, we could take its centre for P and PQ would be equal to
PR. The contradiction is found”.
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Strong negation
Where does this leave negation if the negation ¬A of a sentence A is true iff
A is false and all false statements are meaningless? Nelson’s [Nel49] may be
regarded as having generalized the notion of apartness as a positive substitute
for inequality to a positive notion of constructible negation. The generalization,
then, was from a positive notion of negation applied only to equality formulae
to that same positive and constructible notion of negation applied to arbitrary
formulae. In the theory of linear orders to say that x is apart from y is to
say that there is a method which tells us whether x < y or y < x. The
method gives us a procedure for determining the falsity of the identity of x
with y without recourse to absurdity. Likewise there exist positive procedures
for determining the falsity of other kinds of statements and whenever we have
such a procedure, say for determining the falsity of A, we should be able to
assert ¬A in the constructivist spirit envisaged by Griss. For what ¬A asserts
in such a case is not the meaningless A → ⊥ but that e.g. there exist, in the
intuitionistic sense, numbers realizing the falsity of A.15
In Kripke semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic IPC, strong nega-
tion ⇁ can be modeled by distinguishing verification at a point in the model
from falsification at a point. Let M = (W,≤, V +, V −) be a Kripke model with
W a non-empty set, ≤ a preorder on W and V + and V − valuations assign-
ing upsets of W to atoms. X is an upset of W iff b ∈ X whenever a ∈ X
and a ≤ b. Valuations must satisfy the restriction that for each atomic p,
V +(p) ∩ V −(p) = ∅; in other words, atomic sentences are never both verfied
and falsified. This restriction holds for arbitrary formulae given the verification
and falsification conditions listed below, a proof of which is omitted here.
The logical vocabulary of the language is given by the following verification
and falsification conditions. We write M,a |=+ A for ‘A is verified under M at
a’ and M,a |=− A for ‘A is falsified under M at a’ where a ∈ W . This gives
15The sense of realizability is that of [Kle45] and is employed in the interpretation of
constructible negation in [Nel49]. Strictly speaking, then, the constructive interpretation
given to the language in [Nel49] diverges from the intuitionistic interpretation.
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us the following (suppressing M):
• a |=+ p iff a ∈ V +(p)
• a |=− p iff a ∈ V −(p)
• a |=+ ⊥ never holds
• a |=− ⊥ always holds
• a |=+ A ∧B iff a |=+ A and a |=+ B
• a |=− A ∧B iff a |=− A or a |=− B
• a |=+ A ∨B iff a |=+ A or a |=+ B
• a |=− A ∨B iff a |=− A and a |=− B
• a |=+ A→ B iff ∀b ≥ a, if a |=+ A then a |=+ B
• a |=− A→ B iff a |=+ A and a |=− B
• a |=+ ⇁A iff a |=− A
• a |=− ⇁A iff a |=+ A
An argument (Γ, A) is valid on the semantics, written Γ |= A, iff for all models
M and a of M , if M,a |=+ B for all B ∈ Γ then M,a |=+ A. If (Γ, A) is a
valid argument we write Γ |= A.
An axiomatization of the class of arguments valid on the semantics is got
by taking an axiomatization of IPC and adding to it the following axioms:
1. ⇁A→ (A→ B)
2. ⇁(A→ B)↔ (A ∧⇁B)
3. ⇁(A ∧B)↔ (⇁A ∨⇁B)
4. ⇁(A ∨B)↔ (⇁A ∧⇁B)
5. ⇁⇁A↔ A
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6. ⇁¬A↔ A
It should be noted that the logic thereby obtained is not closed under substi-
tution of provable equivalents only when the formulae involved contain occur-
rences of strong negation.
Besides providing a strongly constructivist interpretation to negation, strong
negation has been put to other uses. It has been, for example, used in solutions
to the knowability (or Fitch’s) paradox according to which the verificationist
principle,
(VP) A→ ♦KA
implies what might be taken to be the implausible claim that no truth is
unknown, i.e. that ¬(A∧¬KA) (assuming A is taken schematically). In VP, ♦
is a possibility modal closed under provable implications (if A 2 B then ♦A 2
♦B) and 2 ¬♦⊥ for ⊥ an arbitrary IPC-contradiction, and K is a knowledge
operator satisfying distribution over conjunction (K(A∧B) 2 KA∧KB) and
factivity (KA 2 A). A proof runs as follows:
1. A ∧ ¬KA hypothesis
2. ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) 1,VP by →E (modus ponens)
3. ♦(KA ∧K¬KA) 2 by K-distribution and closure of ♦ under 2
4. ♦(KA ∧ ¬KA) 3 by factivity and closure of ♦ under 2
5. ¬(A ∧ ¬KA) 1,4 by ¬I and 2 ¬♦⊥
Dummett [Dum09] finds nothing wrong with the “implausible” conclusion
taken on an intuitionistically acceptable reading of negation (on which more
later). In the original formulation of the paradox by Fitch (see [Fre63]), the
conclusion was the stronger A→ KA which classically but not intuitionistically
follows from ¬(A ∧ ¬KA). Intuitionstically we still have the contrapositive
¬KA → ¬A following from ¬(A ∧ ¬KA) which can look at least as bad as,
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and if not worse, than ¬(A ∧ ¬KA).16 Since the conclusion A → KA is
not available intuitionistically and since verificationism may be more plausibly
held in an intuitionistic light, for present purposes it is best to ignore the less
plausible original “classical” formulation of the paradox.
One way to block the foregoing derivation (‘the derivation’ for short) is
to give up ¬I. Since strong negation fails to satisfy ¬I one might think that
a possible solution to the paradox is to employ strong negation in place of
intuitionistic negation in the derivation. This solution is proposed by Wansing
[Wan02] but he notices that there is still an additional worry. Even if
(1.1) ¬♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
is postulated as an additional hypothesis, where ¬ denotes strong negation17,
since then
(1.2) (A ∧ ¬KA)→ (♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) ∧ ¬♦K(A ∧ ¬KA))
would be derivable. However, it is not clear this is really a problem since
one is never in a position to assert (any instance of) the antecedent of (1.2)
(definitely if the knowledge norm for assertion holds and given the assumption
(1.1)), being (an instance of) a Moorean sentence such as ‘It’s raining but I
don’t know it’. In fact, if ¬ is strong negation then A ∧ ¬KA would be for a
verificationist holding (1.1) something of a contradiction in which case it should
come to no surprise to her that (1.2) hold, a theorem reminiscent of EFQ.18
In any case, there is another problem with this strategy that is independent
of whether or not we accept (1.1) and the assertibility of Moorean sentences.
16The contrapositive looks worse since it is not the negation of a Moorean sentence,
and negations of Moorean sentences strike us as entirely assertible. Of course what is not
assertible is the negation of the existential ∃A(A∧¬KA). A fair formalization of the paradox
should make the propositional quantifiers explicit.
17Recall that (1.1) is intuitionistically derivable by just the properties of ♦ and K previ-
ously mentioned together with ¬I which does not hold for strong negation.
18While I do not think an acceptance of (1.2) is problematic, Wansing does. To over-
come the problem, he endorses a relevant implication on which the problematic (1.2) is not
derivable.
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Not every instance of ‘It is not known that A’ can be given a faithful translation
using just strong or intuitionistic negation (and the other positive intuitionis-
tic connectives) that is due to the following two considerations. The first is
that, if the derivation is formalized using intuitionistic or stronger negation,
Dummett’s response to the paradox in [Dum09] stands. For ¬(A ∧ ¬KA), the
supposedly abhorrent conclusion following intuitionistically from VP, would
assert that “It is in principle impossible for us to be in a position to assert
both that A and that it is impossible for us to be in a position to assert KA”
which is entirely reasonable for a verificationist to hold. (In the case of strong
negation, ‘impossible’ in Dummett’s quote would be given an even stronger,
though intuitionistically palatable, reading.)
The second is that both strong and intuitionistic negation are generally
too strong. The claim that the proposition that A is unknown at present
will, in many cases, be weaker than the claim that an assumption of KA leads
intuitionistically to an absurdity. For there will be cases in which A is verifiable
and unknown even though it is not definitely or otherwise refutably unknown,
each of which is asserted by the respective intuitionistic negation ¬A of A and
its strong negation ⇁A.
While strong negation might have nice proof-theoretic properties for ward-
ing off the knowability paradox, its intended interpretation does not always
provide a faithful translation of sentences of the form ‘It is unknown that A’.
(In interesting cases it does. If we read ⇁A as ‘It is definitely not the case
that A’, where ‘not’ has a constructive flavor, then it is reasonable to formal-
ize ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is unknown’ using strong negation, for we definitely
know that the conjecture has not yet been proved and is hence unknown.) For
an assertion of the strong negation of A is an assertion that there is a procedure
which provides suitable evidence (in the case of arithmetic, natural numbers)
demonstrating the falsity of A. For instance if A is ‘Everything is not red’ then
the procedure would yield red objects, or if one thinks evidence is propositional,
the proposition describing the existence of any such object.
1.3. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EMPIRICAL NEGATION 21
One might also think that if a statement or proposition “says” that A and
that A logically implies that B, then the statement also, at least implicitly, says
that B. If I assert that 3 is prime and odd then I have asserted that it is odd.
But then we have another easy argument against formulating the knowability
derivation using strong negation on the supposition that intuitionistic negation
is already too strong in general to formulate the derivation since ⇁A 2 ¬A
(though this implication fails in the logic N4 employed in [Wan02] and hence
this easy argument does not apply there).
One might not care for the intended semantics of strong negation, opting
instead to care only about what proof-theoretic properties it has. But then
there are plenty of equally good ways out of the paradox: just select your
favorite negation that fails to possess the properties required for the derivation
to go through. The problem with this sort of “solution” to the paradox is that
one does not want to merely block the derivation, one wants to know why the
alleged negation appealed to in a solution of this sort should be taken seriously
from a verificationist point of view. The point, to reemphasize, is that any
good solution to the paradox that blocks the derivation via negation should be
such that the intended semantics of the negation gives a faithful translation of
the ordinary language instances involved in the derivation. While intuitionistic
and strong negation work fine for certain instances of A of (certain instances
of) the derivation, they are not suitable in general, e.g. when it has not been
determined whether or not A is in fact known).
Now suppose we formulate the paradox using just an empirical negation
construed broadly along intuitionistic lines. Then it is far from clear that the
derivation would go through. Indeed, if empirical negation has the properties
proposed in chapter 3 then the derivation does not go through and, moreover,
it is argued that the proposed negation provides a faithful formalization of the
derivation in its most general setting.
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Empirical negation
I argued that the negation employed in the knowability paradox can be neither
intuitionistic nor strong negation if (i) in agreement with [Dum09], the pur-
ported air of paradoxicality is to be genuine, and (ii) sentences of the form ‘It
is unknown that A’ are to be faithfully regimented into a language acceptable
to a constructivist or verificationist given the intended meaning of the respec-
tive negations (extended in some na¨ıve way to empirical discourse). A faithful
translation of such sentences requires a weak empirical negation ∼ according
to which ∼A says merely that A is unwarranted at present. But there are
additional related and pressing reasons for providing an adequate analysis of
empirical negation that are brought to light by Williamson in [Wil94].
In [Wil94], Williamson poses a problem for verificationism by arguing that
statements of the form
(*) A may never be decided
are intuitionistically inconsistent on some suitable extension of intuitionistic
semantics to empirical discourse. (Notice that statements of the form (*) are
empirical, even when A is mathematical.) For example the statement ‘For all
we know, Goldbach’s conjecture will never be decided’ turns out intuitionisti-
cally equivalent to ‘1 = 0’. This is quite obviously unpalatable to any sort of
constructivist.
Williamson’s argument is somewhat overstated since there are statements
that are provably, even by constructive means, undecidable. It follows that it
is intuitionistically consistent to say that such sentences may never be decided.
For let A (e.g. a Go¨del sentence) be such a sentence. Then we have, and hence
know, a proof of the undecidability of A, i.e. that neither A nor its negation is
provable. Assuming that once we know a proof of a statement this knowledge
persists indefinitely into the future, it follows that ‘A will never be decided’
is consistent with what we know. But that is just to say ‘A may never be
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decided’ is intuitionistically consistent.19 Williamson’s argument must then be
restricted to sentences that are in fact presently undecided, such as Goldbach’s
conjecture.20
Williamson offers a simplification of his argument according to the follow-
ing reasoning. If we can show the inconsistency of a non-epistemic claim ‘A
will never be decided’, then we know it to be inconsistent, and so the weaker
epistemic claim ‘A may never be decided’ must also be inconsistent. Moreover
the converse is obviously true: the inconsistency of the weaker claim implies
the inconsistency of the stronger one. This allows us to simplify the consistency
question by ignoring the epistemic noise introduced by the (*) version, so that
we may focus solely on its non-epistemic variant.
I do not think Williamson’s argument is convincing for some of the reasons
I give below, but I do think it is instructive for thinking about some of the
problems associated with intuitionistic negation and empirical discourse. One
problem is that there is no way to express that a statement lacks warrant. The
closest the intuitionist can get is to express that any warrant for asserting A
is just as much a warrant for asserting an absurdity, and clearly this is much
stronger than simply claiming that A lacks warrant. Now how does this relate
to Williamson’s argument? The statement that A will never be decided just is
the statement that it will always be the case that A lacks warrant which the
intuitionist is at a loss to express without recourse to empirical negation.
Williamson’s argument
The following is Williamson’s argument. Assume intuitionistic semantics has
been extended to empirical discourse, and let KA mean ‘at some past, present
or future time someone possesses a warrant to assert A’. Then a statement of
the form
19Non-temporal modalities are always to be read as epistemic.
20One may object to the overstatement point here by holding that the intuitionistic notion
of proof is informal and not proof in L for any given formal system L in which case it is
arguable that there in fact is a proof, in the informal sense, that arithmetic, taken as an
informal theory, is incomplete. The point is well-taken.
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(**) A may never be decided
may be formalized as ¬(KA ∨ K¬A) which is intuitionistically equivalent to
¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A. But ¬KA implies ¬A (shown in a moment) which, together
with ¬KA∧¬K¬A, yields ¬A∧¬¬A. For suppose A∧¬KA could be warranted
(at some time), i.e. K(A ∧ ¬KA). As warrant distributes over conjunction,
KA∧K¬KA. By the “factivity” ofK we obtainKA∧¬KA and so ¬(A∧¬KA).
It follows intuitionistically that ¬KA → ¬A. But then (¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A), ex-
pressing that A will (or equivalently, may) never be decided, implies ¬A∧¬¬A,
an intuitionistic contradiction. We may thus conclude that sentences having
the form (**) are intuitionistically inconsistent. A more detailed discussion of
these points is found in chapter 3, section 3.7.
Expanding K to explicitly reveal its temporal nature will not help the
intuitionist. If we introduce temporal operators P (‘it was the case that’)
and F (‘it will be the case that’) into our language, then KA is equivalent to
PA ∨ A ∨ FA on Williamson’s reading of A as ‘A is warranted (at present)’,
and so ¬(KA∨K¬A) is equivalent to ¬((PA∨A∨FA)∨ (P¬A∨¬A∨F¬A).
But this too is intuitionistically inconsistent on straightforward extensions of
intuitionistic logic to include temporal operators having properties validated
on either linear or branching time semantics.21
Williamson suggests that one way out of the problem is to formulate unde-
cidability claims of the (**) form using strong negation. He rejects the move
given a particular reading of K according to which KA and A have the same
verification, but different falsification, conditions. This is itself quite puzzling.22
But for reasons mentioned earlier, we saw that both strong and intuitionistic
negation are too strong in any case to act as the sort of empirical negation
21One way to see this is to show that K, as we have abbreviated it in terms of P and F ,
still distributes over conjunction, which is all Williamson’s argument requires.
22His discussion in the earlier part of [Wil94] strongly indicates that the verification condi-
tions of the two are distinct with the verification conditions for A being strictly more difficult
to satisfy than those for KA. For if the two have equivalent verification conditions then in
the context of his earlier discussion, the formalization of (**) as ¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A would turn
out as essentially an abbreviation for ¬A∧¬¬A which is unsatisfactory as a fair intuitionistic
formalization of the claim.
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required in making claims of the form (**). Thus a weak empirical negation
provides a more plausible solution to Williamson’s objection that claims of the
form (*) are intuitionistically inconsistent.
We see there are a number of convincing reasons for the intuitionist to be
able to express empirical negation. The semantics and logic for such a negation
is given and motivated in chapter 3 and the logic is proved sound and complete
with respect to the semantics.
1.4 Consequence relations for speech acts and
propositional attitudes
The speech act of denial and the propositional attitude of rejection have gained
renewed importance in the philosophy of logic. One reason for this comes from
the literature on truth. One initial reaction to the liar paradox is to say that
the liar sentence,
(λ) This sentence (i.e. λ) is false,
is gappy, that is, neither true nor false. The solution works just fine for this
particular case of the liar but when we consider the strengthened liar,
(λ∗) This sentence (i.e. λ∗) is not true,






hold unrestrictedly (i.e. for arbitrary A), where "A# is a quote name or Go¨del
number for A and consequence is classical.23 To see this, assume T"λ∗#. By
TE we have ¬T"λ∗#, whence ¬T"λ∗# follows by ¬I from no assumptions. It
follows by T I and the definition of λ∗ that T"λ∗#. By ¬I and double negation
23The rules are sometimes labeled T -IN and T -OUT respectively, but I see no reason to
break standard rule-naming conventions in this particular case even if an application of TE
results in a conclusion containing more occurrences of T than occurs in the premise.
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elimination we obtain T"λ∗# from no assumptions. Assuming any logic for
which EFQ holds in the form A,¬A 2 B, triviality ensues.
The gap theorist is still open to holding that λ∗ is gappy but if she does so
she will have to adjust either her logic or else her truth principles accordingly
in order to block triviality. One popular approach is to take up the former
by weakening one’s logic, for example, by adopting a gappy logic, a move that
seems natural for a gap theorist to make. However, this sort of approach, of
which Kripke’s is a prime example, is open to a prima facie difficult challenge.
For since the gap theorist admits that λ∗ is neither true nor false, what λ∗ says
is the case. The problem is that ‘is the case’ must mean something different
from ‘is true’ and it is difficult to see what that might be. One reading is that it
means ‘is assertible’. But then the gap theorist must hold that λ∗ is assertible
while knowing at the same time that it is not true. Such a concession flies
in the face of the usual non-pragmatic conception of assertibility according to
which A is unassertible by S if it is regarded by S to be untrue, a condition that
is considerably weak as far as constraints on assertibility and unassertibility
go. (Notice that this is not equivalent to what might at first glance appear
to be its contrapositive, viz. “If A is regarded by S to be true, then A is
assertible”. Indeed this would-be contrapositive is implausibly strong though
not clearly on a non-pragmatic view of assertibility according to which that
notion is constrained by rationality rather than pragmatic factors. For that A
is assertible does not imply that it ought to be asserted.)
The gap theorist typically responds to this challenge by claiming that her
utterance of λ∗ is not an assertion of that sentence (or the proposition expressed
by that sentence, supposing that assertions act on propositions rather than
sentences, but more on this just below), rather it is a denial of that sentence
(or, again, the proposition expressed by the sentence). The gap theorist now
has to take each assertion and denial as primitive, where the “Fregean” needs
only one (and indeed, it does not matter which though Frege took assertion
as the primitive speech act) by holding that a denial that A is an assertion
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that ¬A.24 In other words, the gap theorist has to deny that there is a close
connection between negation and denial.
Now positing two speech acts as primitive instead of just one of them is not
necessarily a problem provided doing so is grounded in reasons independent of
merely addressing the above challenge. Otherwise the positing of the additional
primitive looks ad hoc; there has to be some worthy additional payoff for the
theoretical cost of positing the additional primitive. The gap theorist can avoid
ad hocery by endorsing the very same theory of assertion and denial the Fregean
endorses under some intuitive notion of sameness. For instance, each can hold
that
(Assert) A is assertible iff A is true;
(Deny) A is deniable iff A is untrue.
But since a sentence is not untrue iff its negation is true according to the gap
theorist, Deny can no longer be seen as a special instance of Assert and this
explains why the two need to be taken as primitive for the gap theorist.
However, Deny is extremely implausible for a gap theorist to hold, at least
when taken to hold for arbitrary sentences. One reason that a sentence may be
untrue is because it is not truth-apt, for example, it might be a command such
as ‘Take out the garbage’. If denials act on propositional contents which are
themselves necessarily truth-apt, then it makes no sense to deny the content of
‘Take out the garbage’ since whatever that content is, it is not a proposition.
Moreover, even if we restrict ourselves to truth-apt sentences, Deny still seems
implausible according to some widely-defended gap theories as the following
considerations bring to light.
Consider the gap theorist who denies that λ∗ is either true or false because
it fails to express a proposition. Such a gap theorist cannot deny that λ∗ since,
again, λ∗ fails to express a proposition and denials act on propositions. Where
24Frege famously held the view that the denial that A just is the assertion that ¬A. See
[Fre60].
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there’s no content, there’s no denial. Unless denials act on something other
than propositions or unless a denial of λ∗ is not a straightforward denial of
the content of λ∗ but the denial of some other proposition, e.g. the proposition
that λ∗ is true, the gap theorist will have to reject Deny in favor of something
like the obvious variant:
(Deny′) A is deniable iff A is false.
I think this is the most intuitive and plausible position for the gap theorist to
take, though I consider the aforementioned options—that is, the idea that a
denial of A may involve more than just the content of A—in chapter 4, section
4.2 and find them wanting.25
With an endorsement of Deny′ comes the need for a distinction between two
notions of consequence, viz. consequence taken as (i) the preservation of truth
from premises to conclusion and (ii) the preservation of falsity from premises
to conclusion. In classical logic each is definable in terms of the latter for if the
truth of each member of Γ implies the truth of A then at least one member
of Γ is false if A is false. Likewise if the falsity of each member of Γ implies
the falsity of A then the truth of A implies the truth of at least one member
of Γ. In other words, classical logical truth preservational consequence anti-
preserves falsity and its converse preserves falsity. However in a gappy logic
(more precisely a gappy semantics, though we may think of logics as coming
with a semantics, and we shall do so sometimes for convenience) each of the two
notions of consequence is not definable in terms of the other. For consequence
as truth preservation anti-preserves untruth, not falsity, the notion figuring
centrally in Deny′.
As it turns out there are a variety of speech acts and propositional attitudes
other than assertion, acceptance, denial and rejection that may be character-
ized or rationally constrained by various notions of consequence distinct from
25One standard objection to thinking that the denial of λ∗ is the denial of the content of
Tλ∗ is that the attribution of different properties of λ∗ are being denied in the respective
denials of λ∗ and Tλ∗—in the former it is untruth and in the latter it is truth. They must
therefore be different acts.
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consequence as truth preservation. One of those is doubt or dubitability. Con-
sider a three-valued semantics where the values correspond to truth, falsity and
some notion of indeterminacy. Then one might think the following characteri-
zation of dubitability ought to hold:
(Doubt) A is dubitable iff A is indeterminate
where A may be restricted to truth-apt sentences. This suggests the following
principle concerning the rationality of doubting:
(DC) If each member of Γ is indeterminate implies that A is indeterminate
then A is dubitable if each member of Γ is.
Clearly the principle can be formulated only if we have at our disposal a notion
of consequence as indeterminacy preservation. More importantly, we cannot
hold people hostage to the principle if there are no rules they can follow which
take them from indeterminate sentences (or whatever the truthbearers are,
primarily or derivatively) to other indeterminate sentences. We should be able
to hold someone as being rationally irresponsible for doubting each member of
Γ on the grounds of their indeterminacy while believing A if the indeterminacy
of each member of Γ implies the indeterminacy of A just as we would hold them
account if they believed each member of Γ on the grounds of their being true
while rejecting A even though Γ implies A in the truth-preservational sense.
With a marked separation of negation and falsity comes a need for distin-
guishing various notions of consequence and the role they play in rationally
constraining various speech acts and attitudes. Various of these relationships
are explored in chapter 4 with a focus on consequence as indeterminacy preser-
vation and its relation to the attitude of dubitability. A natural deduction
system for indeterminacy and falsity preservation over Kleene’s matrix K3 is
given and proved sound and complete with respect to the class of K3 matrices.
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1.5 Negation, truth and falsity
In [Fre48], Frege argued that truth values are sui generis objects. He called one
the true and the other the false. Besides their being regarded as referents of
sentences, he said little more about their nature. The only thing he said in this
regard, which is too vague to be of much interest, is that “by the truth value
of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false” [Fre48, p.
216]. According to Church (Introduction to Mathematical Logic, p. 25, 1956),
the only person before Frege to have explicitly mentioned truth values, taken in
its modern sense, was C. S. Peirce in 1885 in a paper On the Algebra of Logic:
A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation. It is duly noted in [SW10],
however, that ‘truth value’ was used nine years earlier in 1882 by Windelband
in his paper What is Philosophy?, though he did not mean by it the reference
of a sentence or sentential function.
Over one hundred years later and we find investigation into the nature of
truth values regarded as objects rather than properties to be rather sparse. (Of
course one might hold that properties themselves are objects, in which case by
‘object’ understand me to mean “first-order” object.) This is surprising given
the intimate connection between truth, falsity and negation and the fact that
each of these three notions has been intensely investigated over those hundred
and some odd years. It is nearly standard, and not just in a classical setting, to
define negation as a toggle between truth and falsity (an account called ‘TC’ in
chapter 2 to which the reader is referred for details): a negation ¬A is true iff A
is false. So there is a close link between falsity and negation or contradictories;
a negation being true in virtue of some corresponding sentence being false. But
we may also turn the dependence on its head since it is also standard affair,
and not just in a classical setting, to define falsity in terms of truth of negation.
Concerning the latter reduction of falsity to truth and negation, however, such
a reduction must be accompanied by an account of the truth of negations, the
so-called “negative truths”, without any vicious recourse to falsity, explicit or
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otherwise, if it is to be even minimally adequate.
Providing a theory of negative truths has proved notoriously difficult. In-
deed, an upholding of the distinction between “positive” and “negative” truth-
bearers (I’ll use ‘statement’ to refer to whatever entity the primary truthbearers
are) has proved difficult. (A syntactic distinction is unproblematic but it also
bears no philosophical weight.) A renewed interest in correspondence theory in
the modern form of truthmaker theory has brought renewed interest in provid-
ing purely negative-free accounts—by which I mean accounts that do not posit
negative entities such as totalities—of truthmakers for negations. The problem
is that none of these accounts, barring those of the atomists, are particularly
compelling from an ontological point of view and even atomism appears to be
too strong. It is all too easy positing the ontological atrocities that are negative
entities in order to endorse a theoretically driven principle such as truthmaker
maximalism. The alleged payoff just isn’t worth it.
Of course, one need not posit, like Russell, negative facts nor, like Wittgen-
stein, only facts corresponding to atomic truths. One way out of the tension
Russell felt regarding negative facts, the seeds of which are already present in
[Rus10], is to posit just positive facts but two ways of corresponding to those
facts. Russell appears to suggest this in the following but he intends something
quite different since he feels the pressure to ultimately posit negative facts:
The essence of a proposition is that it can correspond in two ways
with a fact, in what one may call the true way or the false way. . . Sup-
posing you have the proposition “Socrates is mortal”, either there
would be the fact that Socrates is mortal or there would be the
fact that Socrates is not mortal. In the one case it corresponds
in a way that makes the proposition true, in the other case in a
way that makes the proposition false. That is one way in which a
proposition differs from a name. [Rus10, p. 38]
However, while it appears we have eliminated the need for negative facts, we
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have simply traded one problem for another, for now we have to explain what
the difference between the two ways of correspondence is, and it is highly
dubious that an account more satisfactory than one which posits a single way
of correspondence and two types of facts such as Russell’s is forthcoming.
So the question is: Can a plausible and ontologically modest reduction of
falsity to truth of negation be given? I think it certainly can. I also think
that such an account can be useful for other reasons. One of those is by
illuminating the nature of truth-value-as-object. If we are reducing falsity to
truth and negation then it should turn out that falsity-as-object does not exist,
at least not as a sui generis object, just as the mental does not exist as a sui
generis substance if it is reducible in the relevant sense to the physical. Perhaps
it is best to say that, here, we have an elimination rather than a reduction of
truth.26
Now think about what this says for semantical theories representationally
construed. From the looks of it we should only have one truth value, viz. truth.
But the intended semantics of most logics come equipped with more than one
value. What should we say, then, about all the values distinct from truth?
What exactly can they be representing if there is nothing in reality to which
they correspond? The simple answer: nothing.
This looks like a problem but it is not. Every logic for which A 2 A holds
(and even some for which it fails) can be given a one-valued semantics (on which
see chapter 5). From a purely formal standpoint, this justifies the elimination
of falsity. In fact, it justifies the elimination of any logical value distinct from
truth. But this purely formal fact is also justified by the philosophical defense of
truth as the maximal truthmaker, a view defended in chapter 5. So justification
feeds in both directions, from the formal to the philosophical and conversely.
26As with any “reduction” or “elimination” given via a biconditional, here it goes in both
directions: one may “reduce” or “eliminate” truth in terms of falsity and likewise assertion
in terms of denial (a point ignored by Frege in his famous reduction of denial to assertion
of negation). I will not have anything to say about this here, though I do think there is
good reason to favor one reduction over the other not simply because genuine reductions
and eliminations are unidirectional and hence there must be something which breaks the
symmetry.
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One conclusion to draw from these considerations is that, in terms of priority,
negation comes first, falsity—taken as truth of negation—last. This priority
was rejected by Russell based upon the confusion that “we may safely treat
“false” and “not” as synonyms” ([Rus40, p. 78]), a confusion duly noted in
[Ros72].
1.6 The definability of negation as impossibility
To claim that some state of affairs is possible or impossible is a common philo-
sophical affair. It would come as shocking news, then, if philosophers found
out that it is impossible to express impossibility! How they might ever come
to understand the forgoing sentence, if it even expresses anything meaningful,
would appear to go beyond the limits of language. This sounds incredible. But
it is not if the language we employ, e.g. English, has the kind of semantics one
typically finds in the philosophical literature. By way of analogy, let us first
consider definability and expressibility in first-order languages.
It is well known how inadequate first-order languages are at defining cer-
tain classes of structures. For example, one can demonstrate a sentence true
on only infinite models, but one cannot demonstrate a sentence true on only
infinite models of some fixed cardinality. If we allow identity a fixed seman-
tic interpretation, then we get something of the reverse for finiteness: one can
demonstrate a sentence true on only finite models of some fixed cardinality, but
one cannot demonstrate a sentence true on only finite models generally. The
same sorts of considerations carry over to modal languages. The basic modal
language, on its usual interpretation, is ill-equipped at defining a number of
important frame properties including one central to interpreting negation as
impossibility in the broadest sense. The reason for this is due to the indefin-
ability of the modality that has come to be called in the literature the “global”
or “universal” modality (see [Gor90], [GP92], and [BdRV02]). The global inter-
pretation of necessity has been around a long time. It was reflected in the work
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of Carnap in the forties, out of which arose a reinvention of the modal system
S5. His idea was to model a possible world as a maximal set of atomic letters,
a “state-description”, and to then define necessity as truth in all worlds. An
atomic sentence is true in a world (state-description) just in case it is a member
of the world and truth for complex formulas is extended from the atomic case
in the usual way. If a sentence is not true in every world then its necessitation
is false in all of them, an interpretation familiar in the so-called Henle matrices
for S5 (see e.g. [DH01]).
An interesting question arises: What familiar modal languages are capable
of defining the global modality and hence “absolute” impossibility? In an at-
tempt to answer this question, I focus attention on just a few languages I find
the most interesting. The first concerns conditional logic and propositional
quantification, and the second a modality investigated in [GPT87] as a “suf-
ficiency operator”, in [Hum83] and [Gor90] as a “complementary” modality,
and in [Gol74] and [Dun93] as a negation. There are other interesting ways of
defining the global modality which, unfortunately, I have no space to survey
here.
The philosophical importance of the global modality
In the usual base modal language (defined in chapter 6, section 6.1) it makes
no difference to a modal theory (taken as the set of sentences valid over a class
of frames) whether the box is interpreted by the universal relation (or equiv-
alently, by no relation) or by an arbitrary equivalence relation. The same is
not true when we enrich such an impoverished language. In the propositional
case, consider languages with “nominals”, a propositional letter true at pre-
cisely one world. If @ is a nominal, then $@ is valid over the class of frames
with a universal alternative relation, but it is not valid over frames with a mere
equivalence relation (or some fixed non-universal equivalence relation). These
considerations play an important role also from a philosophical point of view.
The differences between different S5 interpretations of box are brought out
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more clearly in the case of theories over classes of models rather than frames.
The philosophical interest of this is especially highlighted in the setting of
first-order modal languages. Consider the oft-discussed Barcan formula (BF),
(BF) $∃xA(x)→ ∃x $A(x)
which says, roughly, that all possible things are actual—i.e. that possibilism,
the thesis that there exist non-actual possibilia, is false. If one gives an inter-
pretation of the modal language according to which $ is not global, then (BF)
may be valid over a class of models in which the domain of each alternative
of the actual world is a subset of the domain of the actual world, even though
there are inaccessible worlds for which this inclusion fails. But then the valid-
ity of the Barcan formula does not, after all, imply the falsity of possibilism,
for there exist non-actual possibilia at inaccessible worlds. However, if one is
in the business of making controversial metaphysical claims, one had better
do so in an appropriately interpreted language, and in this case that means
interpreting the modal operators globally. In practice, one simply does this by
stipulation—indeed, in such cases one should do this by stipulation. In chap-
ter 6 we shall make no stipulations and instead make do with what we have,
defining the global modality in terms of other “naturally-occurring” operators.
Let us consider one final property of the global modality which makes it
philosophically interesting: viz., being the only (in a certain sense) non-trivial
modality that is invariant under permutations of (the set of worlds of) Kripke
models. (The trivial operator satisfying A ↔ $A is also permutation invari-
ant in this sense, being governed by the identity relation, as is the modality
satisfying $A for all A, being governed by the empty relation.) Other modal
operators, viewed as quantifiers inherently restricted by alternative relations
that are not permutation invariant, do not share this property. Why is permu-
tation invariance important? Most significantly, because it is thought (e.g. by
Tarski) to provide a criterion of—or perhaps more plausibly either necessary
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or sufficient conditions for—being a logical constant. Under this criterion the
S5 modal operators (box and diamond) turn out to be logical and essentially
all others (e.g. all those strictly weaker than S5’s) come out non-logical.
So the global modality is philosophically interesting and yet it is not de-
finable in the standard languages one typically encounters. The interest of
chapter 6 lies in exploring some languages familiar in the literature that have
just enough expressive power for defining negation as impossibility which, tak-
ing boolean negation for granted, reduces to the problem of determining which
languages have the resources for defining the global modality.
Final remarks
The chapters to follow are essentially self-contained. Reference is made to
other chapters but ignoring these would not cause any serious detriment to
understanding.
Let us recap. Chapter 2, What is negation?, discusses the problem of
characterizing negation and why it is important to projects such as logical
revisionism. Chapter 3, Constructivism and empirical negation, discusses
the problem of empirical negation for intuitionism and provides an account
of empirical negation amenable to the intuitionist. Chapter 4, Consequence
relations for speech acts and propositional attitudes, highlights the importance
of nonstandard notions of consequence, such as consequence as indeterminacy
preservation, required in formulating rationality constraints on various speech
acts and attitudes such as denial and doubt. Chapter 5, Truthmaking, neg-
ative truths and truth values, provides both an ontological account of truth
values regarded as objects and, in part using this account, a solution to the
problem of truthmaking for negative truths. Finally, Chapter 6, The defin-
ability of negation as impossibility, investigates various languages capable of
defining negation in its strongest sense, viz. as impossibility where the modal-




Logical revisionism is the doctrine that logic is revisable. Quine’s
famous objection to the possibility of logical revision is discussed
and a response to that objection is given. The version of the objec-
tion I consider is restricted to negation in particular and contends
that the notion of logical negation is not revisable. My response to
that objection provides an analysis of negation according to which
there is genuine disagreement between classicist and deviant on the
nature of logical negation.
2.1 Introduction
What is negation? Seuren claims that it is “[j]ust about the most central
operator in any logical system” ([Seu10, p. 31]) and Heinemann that it is
one of the most primitive elements of human thought. There is
no language without symbols, like no, not, none, etc. There is
no system of logic, mathematics, science, philosophy or theology
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in which negation does not play a fundamental role. Generally
speaking, no system, i.e., a coherent series of propositions referring
to a specific subject, is possible without it, because its omission
would destroy this very coherence. [Hei43, p. 127]
We need not go as far as Heinemann to appreciate the importance of negation
and its figuring prominently throughout the history of logic and philosophy.
The importance of characterizing negation—and here I do not presuppose there
is but one such operation or expression deserving of the title—was made es-
pecially prominent when Quine famously claimed “Change of logic, change of
subject”. A lot of the time, differences between logics can be viewed as differ-
ences between their (alleged) negations in which case Quine’s motto reduces
to “Change of negation, change of subject”. Disagreement between classicist
and deviant would be impossible if (i) each party gives different semantic anal-
yses of negation, (ii) analyses differing in certain respects must be analyses of
different things, and (iii) dialetheic and classical analyses of negation differ in
just these respects. This raises two questions:
1. Do the deviant and classicist give different analyses of negation?
2. If so, do those analyses differ in respects that would preclude disagree-
ment?
Before I attempt an answer to these questions—(1) in the affirmative and
negative (or if one prefers, neither) and (2) in the negative—there are two
important things that must be said about analyses. The first is that an analysis
may fail to uniquely determine whatever it is intended to be an analysis of
(e.g. a meaning, concept, object, etc.). I’ll call such analyses non-uniquely
determining. Non-unique determination does not in itself make an analysis
defective. A typical proof-theoretic analysis of negation in terms of natural







Yet there is a clear sense according to which such an analysis determines, if it
determines anything at all, more than one propositional, and not necessarily
truth, function. The intended classical one obeys the usual recursive truth
conditions, viz.
• v(¬A) = t iff v(A) = f
and others do not; in particular, there is a propositional function consistent
with the above analysis such that for some valuation vt, vt(A) = t for all A
whence, in particular, vt(⊥) = vtA = vt¬A.1 In other words, (¬E) and (¬I) are
sound when ¬ is interpreted as the usual truth function ¬1 such that ¬1(t) = f
and ¬1(f) = t and also when it is interpreted as the constant truth function ¬2
such that ¬2(x) = t for x ∈ {t, f} under the important assumption that ⊥ be
given a nonstandard interpretation, namely one that allows it to take the value
t under some valuation. This phenomeon has been labelled the “categoricity
problem”.2
Should we criticize the above analysis as being deficient? Matters are sub-
tle, and I shall not go into the details here, but unique determination is not
typically held to be a necessary condition for the adequacy of analysis. Con-
sider (first-order) Peano arithmetic, PA. That it fails to uniquely pin down its
intended model does not make it inadequate. Rather (on the assumption that
categoricity is desirable) it is not so much a fault of the analysis as a fault of
the language. For given the expressive power of a first-order language (in the
sense of Lindstro¨m theorem), PA is the best we could hope for as an analysis
1What does it mean for an object, in this case a propositional function, to be consistent
with an analysis? An answer could be given in detail but for present purposes it suffices to
give the bare essentials. Here all that is meant is that any consequence relation closed under
(¬I) and (¬E) is characterized by (i.e. sound and complete with respect to) a semantics
defined relative to a class of valuations including vt.
2See e.g. [Smi96], [Rum97], [Rum00], and [Hum00].
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of informal arithmetic (save for the desire to, e.g., capture soundness internally
by the inclusion of reflection principles).
Moreover, non-categoricity need not pose a problem for inferentialism since
the meaning of a connective will not be given by a model-theoretic semantics.
The fact that the proof theory does not link up with the model theory will not
be a worry for an inferentialist who denies that any such link is desirable. What
would be troubling is if a given proof-theoretic characterization of an n-place
expression ⊗ failed to uniquely determine, relative to a formal theory L, that
expression in the sense that ⊗ and ⊗′ do not figure in the same deductions,
e.g. if ⊗(A1, . . . , An) 2L B but ⊗′(A1, . . . , An) ,2L B. This is not the case
for negation characterized according to (¬E) and (¬I) since we have, for any
two connectives ¬ and ∼ satisfying, respectively, (¬E)and (¬I) and (∼E) and
(∼I), we have ¬A 2 ∼A and conversely. In this sense the introduction and
elimination rules for negation uniquely characterize a unary operator taken in a
proof-theoretic sense. We might take this as justification of the proof-theoretic
analog of the Fregean thesis that sense uniquely determines reference.
I conclude that non-unique determination of analysis does not preclude ad-
equacy of analysis. This brings us to a second important fact about analyses:
not only are they non-uniquely determining, but distinct analyses may be anal-
yses of one and the same thing. Myriad examples abound: Turing, Go¨del and
Church’s analyses of computability provide distinct analyses of the class of
general recursive functions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 I discuss the plausibility of
a syntactic characterization of negation and conclude that such analyses are
doomed to failure. In the following section 2.3 I go on to consider semantic
characterizations, their difficulties and their advantages over a syntactic char-
acterization.
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2.2 Syntactic characterizations of negation
Let us think of negation as an expression of a given (possibly uninterpreted)
language. We may then ask what constitutes an expression’s being a negation.
One way to settle the question is to lay out (relative to some background logic)
inferential rules (under which axioms are subsumed as zero-premise rules),
admissible or derivable,3 which characterize the inferential behavior of the
expression and which, moreover, are intended to be characteristic of a negation.
If one is an inferentialist, then these rules may be said to bestow meaning, either
in part or in full, on the expression and the expression may be said to have
as its extension or intension that of a negation. Otherwise the rules may (but
need not) be thought to be those sound relative to some intended semantics
for the negation expression in question.
Nothing is assumed about the rules, e.g. that they be recursive. It is typ-
ically assumed that rules be finite and recursive, the latter in the sense that,
when the rule is taken as a set of n-tuples each of which is recursively associ-
ated with a natural number, the set of corresponding naturals is the range of
a recursive function. One might find it useful, however, to forgo the recursive-
ness assumption for a number of reasons. For example, consider rules defined
over uncountable languages even when (well-formed) formulae are always fi-
nite. In such a case even intuitively computable rules such as ‘from A∧B infer
A’ would count as non-recursive since the function, taken set-theoretically, is
uncountable and is thus not the range of any recursive function.
If we look at the history of logic one finds prominently each of the following
rules (or axioms) as being thought (partly) characteristic (or some subset as
being wholly characteristic) of a negation ¬.
3A rule is admissible if whenever each of its premises is provable from no hypotheses,
then so is the conclusion, and it is derivable if the conclusion is obtainable from the premises
by finintely many applications of the primitive rules.
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(Aristoteles)¬(A→ ¬A) A→ B (Boethius)¬(A→ ¬B)
Here MEFQ stands for ‘Minimal Ex Falso Quodlibet’, IR for ‘Intuitionistic
Reductio’, IContra for ‘Intuitionistic Contraposition’ and DeM for ‘De Morgan’.
The last two principles, Aristoteles and Boethius, are principles of connexive
logics and are inconsistent with classical logic (when taken schematically4).
The rest of the principles, on the other hand, are all classically warranted.
The list is not intended to be exhaustive but I think it is nearly so.5 More-
over some of the principles are derivable from others given certain assump-
tions regarding structural properties such as cut. (I will be assuming that the
premises are always bunched by set-theoretic union and that ‘A’ is to be read
‘{A}’.) Some of the principles, e.g. Contra, are “interaction principles” in the
4A, B, etc. are metavariables which range over sentences of an unspecified object lan-
guage. As they occur throughout this essay they are to be given the generality interpretation
in which case all of the aforementioned principles (EFQ, IR, etc.) are to be understood
schematically.
5I have left out principles involving quantification and non-truth-functional operators
such as modal ones. For instance, typically the duality of the modal operators $ and ♦ is
assumed—i.e. it is assumed that $A ≡ ¬♦¬A and ♦A ≡ ¬$¬A—and this is due partly to
the behavior of negation. There are just too many principles to consider in a sufficiently rich
language, so instead I shall focus on a propositional language containing just the usual (not
necessary truth-functional) connectives such as →, ∨ and ∧.
2.2. SYNTACTIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF NEGATION 43
sense that they describe the way negation interacts with other connectives such
as implication. Interaction principles depend just as much on the general be-
havior of each of the interacting connectives that figure in them as they do on
the general behavior of negation. This does not, however, make them any less
principles characteristic of negation.
One may find logics with so-called “negations” (and I shall not always use
quotes to distinguish alleged from genuine negations, for then I would have to
always use quotes lest I beg the question against anyone) that fail to satisfy
at least one of the principles from the list. For example, classical negation
fails to satisfy both of the connexive principles; intuitionistic negation fails to
satisfy DeM1, DNE, LEM, Contra, R; and some paraconsistent (e.g. dialetheic)
negations fail to satisfy IR, IContra, MEFQ (and hence EFQ) and LNC. If we
take this at face value, it seems that none of the conditions listed is necessary
for an operation’s being a negation. But then either we must look for necessary
conditions formulated, not in terms of rules, but in terms of failures of rules
(e.g. never should A 2 ¬A for all A), or we must forget necessary conditions
altogether and opt for a partial characterization via sufficient conditions.
Lenzen [Len96, p. 40] takes the former route (among others) and gives four
principles he deems as being “[u]nacceptable principles which a logic L must
never satisfy, if its “negation” operator ∼ is to rate as a real negation”:
A ∧B (UN 1)¬A
A ∨B (UN 2)¬A
A (UN 3)¬A
(UN 4)¬A
If ∧ and ∨ have their usual properties, then UN 1-3 are equivalent. Moreover
if EFQ holds then each is equivalent to the others. Each appears unaccept-
able since if a logic L (satisfying certain minimal conditions such as cut and
adjunction, i.e. if 2L A and 2L B then 2L A ∧ B) has any theorems, then by
UN i (i ≤ 4), L is negation inconsistent. For let A be a theorem. Then by
adjunction, A∧A is a theorem, so by UN 1 (and cut), ∼A is a theorem. Dually
one derives the same consequence using ∨ introduction and UN 2.
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There are two problems with requiring that a negation be characterized
as not satisfying any of the UN i. The first is that they appear not to be
characteristic of negation even if any negation operation must satisfy them.
Similarly, we should not think that x+ x = x+ x is characteristic of addition
even if it is a principle that any addition operation must satisfy. Now if the
hope is to amass enough necessary conditions to fully characterize negation, I
do not see that the UN i should be included among those conditions.
The second, and more pressing problem, is that there are expressions ar-
guably worthy of negative status that need not fail to satisfy some or all of the
UN i. For consider a negation ∼A := ♦¬A, considered by Lenzen himself under
the guise of “weak negation”, which applies only to contingent sentences A.6
Then for any contingent sentences A, B, it holds that A∧B 2 ∼A, A∨B 2 ∼A
and A 2 ∼A. In other words, satisfying either UN 1, UN 2, or UN 3 do not
appear to be necessary for being a negation, at least if we have not applied
sufficient constraints on the interpretation of our language.
Now if the UN i are to be taken unrestrictedly such that the metavariables
range over arbitrary sentences or propositions rather than e.g. contingent ones,
then in the example just considered one may take as axiom A→ (♦A∧♦¬A) to
ensure that each formula, including tautologies and contradictions, is provably
“contingent” if true. A more radical view, taken up by certain conventionalists,
is to hold that ♦A for each A. For instance Mortensen [Mor89] advocates
the thesis of possibilism, by which he means “the group of theses that all
propositions are possible, or possibly true, that all propositions are contingent,
that no proposition is necessary”. For such conventionalists a definition of
negation as ∼A := ♦¬A will come with an endorsement of UN 1-3. Thus there
are theories (e.g. some forms of conventionalism) according to which certain
6See also [Be`z02] in which the same negation, in the context of S5, is taken to be
paraconsistent and so S5 is argued to be, at least implicitly, a paraconsistent logic. The logic
of the negation defined by ∼A := ♦¬A for S5-♦ is not closed under provable implications
(and hence equivalents). Compare this with the empirical negation of chapter 3 which may
be thought of in a similar light as being defined in a hybridized S5 as s(@,¬A) where s is a
satisfaction operator having the following truth conditions: M,a |= s(b, A) iff M, b |= A. It
too fails to be closed under provable implications.
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UN i hold unrestrictedly and so they ought not to be taken as always failing.
Here are two more examples that pose considerable strain on the idea that
negation can be given a purely syntactic characterization. Consider a dialethe-
ist such as Priest who argues (e.g. in [Pri99]) that the (purported) negation
¬LP of LP (from hereon I shall denote the purported negation of a logic L by
¬L when the logic contains exactly one negation) is a contradictory-forming
operation on sentences or propositions. Clearly, given his semantics, it is not
a contrary-forming operation, so how then can it be a contradictory-forming
(i.e. contrary- and subcontrary-forming) one? His claim rests on the fact that
¬LP satisfies both LNC and LEM. But is that enough? Let ¬A be read ‘It is
such that 1 = 1 or A—i.e. ¬ is a “trivial operator” in the sense that ¬A for
all A. Then ¬ satisfies most of the negation properties from our list above,
including LNC and LEM. But, I claim, there is no plausible sense according to
which ¬ so defined is a contradictory-forming operation and this speaks against
Priest’s claim that the mere satisfaction of LNC and LEM is constitutive of an
operation’s being contradictory-forming.7
Finally consider the “negation” of minimal logic defined by ¬A := A →
φ for a given φ assigned no special property. In effect, φ behaves just like
an arbitrary atom. The mere fact that minimal “negation” satisfies certain
“negation rules” such as IR (Intuitionistic Reductio) does not by itself make
it a negation. There is just no reason, for instance, to think that ‘If snow is
white then Socrates is male’ is a, let alone the, negation of ‘Snow is white’.
While implication to an “unwanted” formula may constitute the negation of
that formula depending on what is meant by ‘unwanted’, there is no reason
to think that φ, in the context of minimal logic, is unwanted in the required
7Priest does maintain (in personal communication) that LNC and LEM, even if not
sufficient, are at least necessary conditions on being contradictory-forming but I have yet
to see any convincing argument for the claim. Certainly an intuitionist who holds that
falsity is refutability (rather than unprovability which may be undecidable relative to a given
formal system L) would disagree, for on such a view both A and ¬A cannot be refutable
(i.e. false) and so ¬ would be subcontrary-forming even though it fails to satisfy A ∨ ¬A.
Consider also Aristotle himself who likely rejected the universal validity of LEM on account
of future contingents but who did not, as far as I can see, reject propositional negation as
being contradictory-forming and predicate negation as being at least contrary-forming.
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sense.
Gabbay and Hunter [GH99] define a negation as implication to a formula
from a given set of “unwanted” formulae. Typically, as in the case of intu-
itionistic and classical logic, the set is just {⊥} where ⊥ is a formula satisfying
EFQ. In minimal logic, the same sign ⊥ is typically used but it is not assigned
any special properties which set it apart from an arbitrary atom. There is
thus no reason to take it as an unwanted formula, and hence no reason to take
¬A := A → ⊥ as defining anything in the vicinity of negation in the sense of
[GH99]. Like considerations apply to weaker negations such as the subminimal
negation of [Haz95].
The lesson to be drawn from these three examples is that looking to char-
acterize negation purely by syntactic means seems a hopeless enterprise unless
we constrain the (possibly informal) interpretations of our language. Seman-
tic considerations will therefore need to play a role in characterizing negation
even when that characterization is mainly proof-theoretic. (Other considera-
tions may play a role too, such as adequacy to linguistic data or pragmatics.)
Note that a proof-theoretic characterization of negation may be semantic in
the required sense. By ‘syntactic’ I mean ‘completely devoid of semantic in-
terpretation’, and if one is a proof-theoretic semanticist, ‘proof-theoretic’ and
‘syntactic’ will then be far from synonymous.
2.3 Semantic characterizations of negation
The traditional conception
The traditional (or “toggle”) conception (‘TC’ for short) of negation has it that
(TC) ¬A is true iff A is false.8
On the usual assumptions about truth and falsity (and the metalinguistic bi-
conditional), TC provides a classical account of negation, and by dropping any
8This “toggle” view of negation is endorsed e.g. by Priest [Pri93] and Smiley [Smi93]. It
is the most widely endorsed definition of negation.
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of these usual assumptions we end up with different accounts. Among the usual
assumptions are the following two semantic properties:
(Bivalence) Each sentence is either true or false;
(Contravalence) No sentence is both true and false.
Dropping contravalence gives us a glutty theory of negation and dropping bi-
valence gives us a gappy theory.
Yet there is a lot more to the semantic characterization of negation than
just these three properties. For instance, if we permit more truth values than
just truth and falsity then we can distinguish two operators satisfying TC in
a language satisfying both bivalence and contravalence. So these three proper-
ties do not in themselves uniquely characterize a single operator that we might
wish to call ‘negation’. For suppose we have a language L satisfying bivalence
and contravalence and we have three truth values, truth (t), falsity (f) and
indeterminacy (i). Then, as nothing in TC, bi- and contra-valence prohibits
negation from being non-functional, we can define two distinct negations sat-
isfying TC, one, letting r ⊆ Form× {t, f, i}, which prohibits r(A, t) and r(A, i)
from holding together and the other which prohibits r(A, f) and r(A, i) from
holding together.
So if TC characterizes negation, it can only do so in part even in the presence
of relatively strong restrictions (viz. bi- and contra-valence) on the language.
This is an interesting fact given that some authors assume that these three
conditions, viz. TC, bi- and contravalence, characterize negation uniquely. For
instance, Copeland thinks they characterize classical negation:
What the classical logician means by negation is exhausted by the
statements that (1) every sentence A dealt with is either true or
false (but not both), and (2) the negation of A is a sentence which
is true whenever A is false, and false whenever A is true. Thus
an applied semantics assigns the meaning of classical negation to
a symbol ¬ just in case the semantics distributes truth values in
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accordance with (1), and embodies the condition that whenever A
is true, ¬A is false, and vice versa. [Cop86, p. 485]
Now one might have thought that Copeland was working under the back-
ground assumption that only truth and falsity are genuine logical truth values,
in which case we do not yet have a counterexample to Copeland’s claim. But
even under this assumption his claim does not hold true unless truth and falsity
are unique. While this is typically assumed it is by no means uncontentious.
One may think of designationhood and undesignationhood as truth and falsity,
respectively. Indeed Suszko held something of this view. But then there is no
reason to think that either truth or falsity is unique. We may think, instead,
that each designated value has just as much the right to being called ‘truth’
as any other, and indeed that each is truth, or that each undesignated value
has just as much the right to being called ‘falsity’ as any other. This view
is unproblematic if truth and falsity are properties rather than objects, but if
they are objects in their own right, then two values can be truth or falsity only
if ‘be’ is picking out some kind of many-one identity relation. I do not think,
however, that many-one identities have any role to play in individuating truth
and falsity.
In any case, we still run into problems even if truth and falsity are unique.
For whether there is a unique operation picked out satisfying Bivalence, Con-
travalence and TC depends on what properties ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ have and
whether the metalanguage in which the three principles are stated is classical or
not. A dialetheist who uses a dialetheic metatheory may hold that her seman-
tics is bi- and contravalent and that her negation satisfies TC even though that
negation is not recognizably classical. Or consider a dialetheist who, in some
sense, dismisses the distinction between object- and metatheory (e.g. Priest).
(One might view this equivalently as simply maintaining the distinction while
opting to use the same theory for both.) Then if she expresses ‘A is false’ by
‘¬A is true’ and her accepted logic has as theorems LEM and LNC (as e.g. LP
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does) then, at least by her own lights, she endorses bi- and contravalence.9
However the issue is whether she can convince those who do not endorse
the same metatheory that her semantics really is bi- and contravalent. Offering
up a semantics couched in a classical metatheory which refers to entities to be
regarded as truth and falsity and which includes interpretations that assign to
sentences both truth and falsity is not going to do any such convincing. While
it may help a classicist make some sort of sense of the dialetheist’s reasoning, it
will not convince the classicist that ‘not’ in the mouth of the dialetheist means
not, or that her semantics really is contravalent. The only way to do this would
be to convert the classicist over to dialetheism or to convince her that another
account of contravalence is to be preferred, one on which dialetheic negation
turns out to be genuinely contradictory-forming.
In what follows I argue for an account of contrariety and subcontrariety, and
hence contradictoriness, on which a number of non-classical negations turn out
“legitimate” when negation is regarded as a contradictory-forming operation.
Thus if there is truth in the idea that logicians of various stripes share the
core meaning of ‘not’ and are hence not speaking past each other, that idea is
supported by the following account of contradictoriness. Conversely, the idea
of shared meaning goes toward supporting the adequacy of the present account,
so support feeds in both directions.
Contrariety and subcontrariety
It is often assumed that there is only one type of negation—the contradictory-
forming type. Indeed it is thought that there is not just one type of negation,
but just one negation altogether. The alleged uniqueness of negation comes
from the uniqueness of contradictories and justifies the apparent correctness of
locutions of the form “the negation ofA”. The same is not true of contraries and
9In this case the classical three-valued functional semantics (rather than the two-valued
relational semantics) for LP would have to be discounted by the dialetheist as intended or
faithful. They might hold instead that it serves only to convince the classicist that their
view is coherent in a minimal sense. In any case the functional semantics, arguably, leads
the dialetheist into accepting trivialism (see [Smi93] for such an argument), the thesis that
everything is true, so they should prefer the relational semantics anyway.
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subcontraries which are not unique, in which case talk of the contrary or sub-
contrary of a given proposition is infelicitous.10 For these reasons, and others
to be discussed below, if negation is a unique operation on sentences (or propo-
sitions) then it cannot be a contrary- or subcontrary-forming operation. The
only plausible candidate left, then, is that negation is a contradictory-forming
operation. But since contradictories are unique, it must be the contradictory-
forming operation.
I wish to take these ideas seriously, namely, that contradictory-forming
operations are negations and that contradictories are unique. There are many
reasons to do so. First, I have never encountered anyone who rejects the unique-
ness of contradictories. Second, the view that contradictory-forming operations
are negations is widely accepted and hence uncontroversial. Moreover on a com-
pelling view of contradictoriness (viz. the “prime account” below) a whole host
of “negations” turn out genuine. This is good, as there are at least prima facie
grounds to think that the deviant and classicist are really disagreeing about
the nature of negation when, for example, the classicist endorses LEM and the
intuitionist refrains from any such endorsement.
The Aristotelian and one-sided accounts
According to the modern account,
• two sentences are contraries (of each other) if both of them cannot be
true together;
• two sentences are subcontraries if both of them cannot be false together.
This has not always been the received view. The following account was pro-
pounded by Aristotle and is not equivalent to the modern account on several
interpretations:
• the A (positive universal) and E (negative universal) form sentences are
contraries;
10Geach [Gea69] criticizes McCall [McC67] for making just this “uniqueness” mistake.
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Every A is B
A contraries




Some A is B
!
subcontraries O
Some A is not B
!
Figure 2.1: Square of opposition
• the I (positive existential) and O (negative existential) form sentences are
subcontraries.
An A form sentence is one of the form ‘Every A is B’, an E form sentence is
one of the form ‘No A is B’, an I form sentence is one of the form ‘Some A is B’
and an O form sentence is one of the form ‘Some A is not B’. They constitute
the four corners of the Aristotelian “square of opposition” (see Figure 2.1).
The “canonical” translation of Aristotle’s A and E sentences, according to
their surface structure, are ∀x(A → B) and ∀x(A → ¬B) respectively, while
those of the I and O sentences are ∃x(A ∧ B) and ∃x(A ∧ ¬B) respectively.
(Here I assume A and B contain precisely x free.) However, in classical model
theory, A and E sentences may be true together (under a model M) when e.g.
A has an empty extension (in M) and I and O form sentences may be false
together when, again, A has an empty extension. We are assuming a translation
according to surface structure and so it does not build into it the existential
presupposition of the subject term A nor of the term B. This is, of course,
controversial and building existential presupposition in does indeed circumvent
the counterexample just given showing that A and E form propositions are
simultaneously satisfiable when the subject term is empty. Circumvention is
also possible when, instead of building in existential presupposition, the notions
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of contrariety and subcontrariety are always given relative to the background
assumption that the subject term (of the A, E, I and O sentences, being the
same) has a non-empty extension.
Moreover, on the modern account two sentences may be both contraries and
subcontraries, in which case they are contradictories, in contrast to a widely
held account, propounded in numerous textbooks, which holds that
• two sentences are contraries if they cannot be true together but they can
be false together ;
• two sentences are subcontraries if they cannot be false together but they
can be true together.
I shall call this account (not to be confused with the Aristotelian or modern
account) one-sided. On this account, contradictoriness cannot be defined as
the intersection of contrariety and subcontrariety and this seems to me to be
a serious drawback since the relation between the contrariety, subcontrariety
and contradictoriness becomes unclear or unnecessarily complicated (on which
more later).
There are further complications besides. If contraries must be capable of
being false together, then nothing is the contrary of a logical truth since a
logical truth cannot be false. Similarly, nothing could be the subcontrary
of logical contradiction. This was noticed by Sanford [San68] as a problem
for the Aristotelian account according to which A and E sentences are always
contraries and I and O sentences always subcontraries. But if some A sentences
are logically true (such as ‘Every green egg is green’) then no sentence, including
its corresponding E one, is its contrary and it follows that a one-sided account
is inconsistent.
One possible emendation of the one-sided account is to hold that there is
a presupposition that the A, E, I, O form sentences figuring in the account be
logically contingent in which case the proposed counterexamples do not work.
The emended one-sided account is then
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• two sentences are contraries if (i) each is logically contingent and (ii) they
cannot be true together but they can be false together;
• two sentences are subcontraries if (i) each is logically contingent and (ii)
they cannot be false together but they can be true together.
But even such an emendation is susceptible to counterexample. An example
due to Humberstone [Hum03] runs as follows. Let the relation of accompani-
ment between x and y hold precisely when x and y are mereologically disjoint
(concrete) worldmates (in the sense of Lewis [Lew86]). Then the A form sen-
tence ‘Every table is accompanied’ can be neither true nor false together with
its corresponding E form sentence ‘No table is accompanied’ even though each
is contingent. For the falsity of the A sentence implies that some table is un-
accompanied and the falsity of the E sentence that some table is accompanied,
whence the two cannot be false together.
Humberstone’s alleged counterexample is not unproblematic. For all it
shows is that there are A and E form sentences that, under some given inter-
pretation, cannot both be false. But if we are to read “can both be false” in
the emended one-sided account as meaning “there exists an interpretation to
the non-logical vocabulary of the A and E form sentences under which they are
both false” then Humberstone’s example does not provide a counterexample.
For certainly we may interpret ‘accompanied’ and ‘table’ so that ‘Every table is
accompanied’ and ‘No table is accompanied’ both turn out false: just interpret
‘table’ to mean table and ‘accompanied’ to mean green. But is this how we
ought to read “can” in the emended account?
There are three plausible readings of ‘can’ in the emended one-sided ac-
count, the first of which was already mentioned:
1. there exists an interpretation to the non-logical vocabulary of the A and
E form sentences under which they are both true;
2. taking the A and E sentences schematically, there are instances A and B
of them that are true under some interpretation;
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3. there is a representation, i.e. possible world, in which the A and E form
sentences are true under a fixed interpretation of the vocabulary (such
that ‘table’ refers to tables and ‘accompanied’ to the accompaniment
relation) though the domain of discourse may vary, i.e. extension, but
not intension, may vary;
The first and second come to the same thing and seem to me to be the most
plausible reading of ‘can’ in the emended account since they follow from the
assumption that each corner of the square is to be read schematically.
The issue of schematicity relates to a similar question regarding Aristotelian
logic: Are the syllogistic rules schematic or not? If the widespread schematic
interpretation of the syllogistic is correct then we might think the same holds
true when interpreting the square of opposition, and this is reason to reject
Humberstone’s alleged counterexample to the foregoing emended account since
it reads ‘can’ according to (3), i.e. non-schematically, rather than (1) or (2).
So we see that the emended one-sided account (whereby contraries must
be contingent) works when the A and E sentences are taken schematically
but not when they are taken as interpreted sentences. Yet one might think it
prima facie compelling that an account of contrariety ought to apply also to
interpreted sentences, suggesting that a satisfactory account of contrariety and
subcontrariety is one that gets things right however we interpret the A and E
sentences, i.e. whether schematically or not.
But if the language under consideration is interpreted then the modal ‘can-
not’ which occurs in the accounts considered here has the force of the non-modal
‘is not’, for there would only be one interpretation to consider, viz. the one
under which the sentences have been interpreted.
A notion of contrariety and subcontrariety which applies to fully interpreted
sentences (i.e. ones which have their extension fixed) does not appear to be of
much interest then for what it amounts to is the following:
• two sentences are contraries if they are not true together (and possibly
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some other conditions);
• two sentences are subcontraries if they are not false together (and possibly
some other conditions).
But nobody should think that ‘Every flower is red’ and ‘Every tire is round’
are contraries simply because they are not true together (on account of the
former).
Aristotle, but not all of his followers, have a way out of this worry if the
worry is even worth escaping. He understands contrariety as a relation, not
just between sentences with which we have been here concerned, but between
predicates and properties (and some would think individuals and individual
terms) too. If whiteness and blackness (or ‘is white’ and ‘is black’) are con-
traries, then we can account for contrariety holding between ‘a is white’ and ‘a
is black’ in virtue of it holding between whiteness and blackness (or the pred-
icates). But moreover, we can account for contrariety failing to hold between
‘Every flower is red’ and ‘Every tire is round’ in virtue of its failing to hold
between the property of being a red flower and that of being a round tire. The
only problem with this account is that there are no established criteria which
tell us whether a given pair of properties (or predicates) are contraries—not
a problem for Aristotle, but certainly a problem for any rigorous account of
contrariety.11
We could not, for example, say that two predicates φ and ψ are contraries
when the intersection of the properties they express is empty, at least when
properties are taken extensionally. For being renate and not being cordate
would then be contraries, but it is only “by chance” that renates are cordate.
We could take properties intensionally in the sense of Lewis [Lew86], where
11Indeed things may be more complicated if Aristotle held, in opposition to the modern
account, that contraries be unique as argued in [Bog92]. For then Aristotle needs to give an
account of why whiteness rather blueness is the contrary of blackness. Roughly the account
he gives is that, on the color scale, the two are at polar ends. This might work for scales
bounded on each end but it is not general enough to cover unbounded scales (e.g. those
isomorphic to the open interval (0, 1)). The properties bigness and smallness are like this, as
there is neither a maximal bigness nor maximal smallness and, in any case, one can always
conjure up scalars denoting more extreme properties, such as ‘extremely big’, ‘larger than
extremely big’, etc.
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a property is a set of possible world-bound objects, but then we have to buy
into the metaphysical baggage of Lewis’s theory. There are other options, but
whichever one opts for, things do not appear to go as smoothly for contrariety
taken as a relation between properties as they do for contrariety taken as a
relation between sentences or propositions.12
Three accounts of contradictoriness
In providing a general account of contrariety and subcontrariety there is no
reason to think logical truths and contradictions are degenerate cases to be
excluded from the account. Indeed, there just is no reason to think that any
type of sentence is degenerate as regards an account of these three properties
which explains why the foregoing emended accounts are ad hoc.
Let us, then, take as our default account of contrariety and subcontrariety
the modern account discussed above, viz. that two sentences are
(SubCon) subcontraries if they cannot be false together;
(Con) contraries if they cannot both be true together.
McCall [McC67] adopted these definitions one year before Sanford [San68] en-
dorsed the modern account as consistent and condemned the others as inconsis-
tent, but they appear also long before both McCall and Sanford in Strawson’s
Introduction to Logical Theory (1952) and in Quine’s Methods of Logic (1950).
Priest (in personal communication) gives the following alternative account.
Two sentences are
(SubCon*) subcontraries if one is true whenever the other is not true;
12Things go smoothly if we consider contraries formed by negating a predicate as in ‘is
red’ and ‘is non-red’ but that leaves out a lot of an account of contrariety. However, it has
been said in [Hor01, p. 205] that others have claimed that the negation of a scalar term does
not yield a contradictory or contrary “opposition”. This is clearly mistaken. The examples
cited therein show only that for some pairs of sentences A and A′, where A′ is the result of
negating a scalar term in A, both may be false or that, concerning the relevant terms, there
is a “failure of the Law of Excluded Middle”. But all that shows is that the negation of a
scalar term does not always yield a subcontrary, and hence contradictory, opposition. It does
not show it does not yield a contrary. Surely it does.
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(Con*) contraries if one is false whenever the other is not false.
Intuitively SubCon* says that ∼A is the subcontrary of A in the sense that
both cannot fail to be true and Con* says that ∼A is the contrary of A in the
sense that both can’t fail to be false.
The negation ¬LP (by which I mean the truth function of the three-valued
semantics of [Pri79]) satisfies SubCon* and Con* but it fails to satisfy SubCon.
Notice that the negations of FDE and (weak and strong) Kleene logic K3 fail
both SubCon* and Con* (and so does the exclusion negation of K3).13 This
might spell bad news for Priest’s account of contrariety and subcontrariety,
for it precludes from being a negation, among others, any function that is a
fixed point for a neither true nor false value. But notice that ¬FDE also fails
both SubCon and Con each of which is satisfied by Kleene negation. So the
original account (given by SubCon and Con) classifies ¬K3 but not ¬LP as a
contradictory-forming operation, Priest’s account classifies ¬LP but not ¬K3 as
a contradictory-forming operation, and both accounts classify ¬FDE as neither
a contrary- nor subcontrary-forming operation.
There is a more encompassing account of subcontrariety and contrariety
that meshes well with traditional accounts. Let us say that two sentences are
(SubCon′) contraries if one is true whenever the other is false;
(Con′) subcontraries if one is false whenever the other is true.
On this account ¬FDE is a contradictory′-forming operation, but so too are
¬K3 and ¬LP. If there is appeal in each of these being contradictory-forming
operations, for some pretheoretic notion of contradictoriness, then SubCon′
and Con′, which I’ll call the prime accounts (of subcontrariety, contrariety and
contradictoriness), appear to be adequate where the other accounts fail.
That ¬FDE fails to be contradictory-forming on the original and star (Priest)
accounts should be especially troubling for relevantists. For negation on the
13I have in mind the usual four-valued semantics of FDE defined relative to the diamond
algebra four in which negation is a fixed point for the values n (neither true nor false) and
b (both true and false).
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“Australian plan” (i.e. Routley semantics) satisfies none of the three accounts
of contradictoriness just considered. However, when negation is conceived on
the “American plan”, according to which worlds are FDE matrices, nega-
tion turns out to be contradictory-forming only on the prime account. (Any
of the usual relevant logics that can be given a semantics on the American
plan can be given one on the Australian plan. See [Rou84] for details.) Any
relevantist who considers his negation, construed on the American plan, as
a genuine contradictory-forming operation should therefore have sympathies
with the prime account. Indeed, the account might serve as reason to prefer
the American plan!
There is more to be said about the advantages of the prime account. Prin-
cipally it classifies the “negations” of various logics as genuinely contradictory-
forming, and if contradictory-forming operations are necessarily negations, then
each these contradictory-forming operations turns out to be a genuine nega-
tion on the prime account. If this is correct then we have a solution to the
Quinean “speaking-past-each-other” problem since on the prime account the
classicist, dialetheist and gap theorist all express negation by ‘not’. The same
considerations may be used to diffuse objections of the same ilk such as those
of [Sla95].
Are there compelling grounds, then, for holding the prime account over
others? One has already been mentioned, viz. that it diffuses the Quinean ob-
jection which makes disagreement between deviant and classicist impossible.14
The prime account classifies, among others, ¬FDE, ¬LP, ¬CL, ¬K3 and the
exclusion negation ¬e of K3 and ¬IPC as contradictory-forming operations.15
Those sympathetic with the view that there is fixed meaning attached to ‘not’
in the mouth of deviant and classicist will find this fact an extremely compelling
reason to favor the prime account over others.
14The objection was given up, in any case, by later Quine, being sympathetic to logical
revisionism, who held that “no statement is immune to revision” ([Qui51, p. 40]) and, in
particular, that “[r]evision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed
as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics” ([Qui51, p. 40]). But his objection remains
forceful even if one is not a radical revisionist.
15I assume here that, for the intuitionist, truth is provability and falsity is refutability.
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Another reason to favor the prime account is that it appeals only to truth
and falsity and, importantly, not ‘not’, a virtue lacked by both Priest’s “star
account” and the original. If we wish to define negation as a contradictory-
forming operation then we are best to do so without invoking (in the meta-
language) the very concept of negation itself lest the account be charged with
vicious circularity. With this wish should come the assumption that, as it
appears in the prime account, falsity is not to be defined as truth of negation.
One might also wonder about Priest’s motivations for favoring the star ac-
count over the original. It would seem the principal reason is that it classifies
his preferred logic’s negation ¬LP as a contradictory-forming operation, and
hence a negation on most accounts, without doing serious injustice to the orig-
inal account of contradictoriness. As such it diffuses the objection raised by
Slater in [Sla95] that ¬LP is not contradictory-forming. In fact one equivalent
way of formulating the original account is given precisely by the converses of
SubCon* and Con* and the converses follow from the original account on the
assumptions of bi- and contra-valence and this might account for the reason
the two accounts feel strikingly similar. The same is true concerning the orig-
inal and the prime account. The moral is that if one is free to choose her mild
variation on the original account of contrariety and subcontrariety to fit her
tastes then that is all the more reason to think the prime account is at least as
good as the others for it more often gives us a favorable verdict on the question
of whether a given alleged negation is genuine.
What other reason might we have for favoring the original over the prime
account? One might think that its use of conjunction and negation is less
problematic than the prime account’s use of implication. But why would she
think that? Certainly truth-functional conjunction is no less problematic than
truth-functional material implication and if we are allowed to assume that the
original account invokes truth functional conjunction, rather than a “problem-
atic” intensional conjunction, then we are likewise allowed to assume that the
prime account invokes unproblematic material implication. Moreover, imagine
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a linguistic community that does not have an expression for picking out con-
junction in their language. Surely we should not think they ought to prefer
formulations of contrariety and subcontrariety in terms of conjunction or that
they lack the linguistic resources for expressing such notions as contrariety
and subcontrariety for these notions appear not to be inextricably linked to
conjunction.
2.4 Final remarks
In order for two parties to disagree on some subject matter S, it is not required
that they attach precisely the same meaning to every word concerning their
talk about S. If they did, they could not be disagreeing. All that is required
for disagreement is that there be enough shared content or meaning in their
disagreement talk. What counts as “enough” is a difficult matter to settle and
not one that needs to be settled here.
I have argued that the deviant and classicist may hold the same definition
of negation as ‘a contradictory-forming operation’. Now there are at least two
things we may conclude from this:
1. the deviant and classicist mean the same thing by ‘not’;
2. they do not mean the same thing by ‘not’ but there is enough shared
meaning between them to allow for disagreement.
The first conclusion strikes me as highly implausible. We cannot mean the same
thing by a word just by holding that the same string of symbols is its definition.
If I think ‘man’ refers to donkeys then we do not mean the same thing by
‘bachelor’ even if we both agree that the sentence ‘Bachelors are unmarried
men’ serves as a definition of ‘bachelor’. When I claim that bachelors are four-
legged and you object, we are not disagreeing, we are merely speaking past
each other.
If the lesson to be learned comes in the form of the second conclusion, I
confess I have not gone far enough in this end. For I have not argued that
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there is enough shared content or meaning for disagreement in the deviant and
classicist’s respective uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’, the key terms used in defining
negation as a contradictory-forming operation. I leave this for another occasion,
but I would like to add two further important points.
First, consider the classicist and gap theorist, the latter being one who
rejects the law of excluded middle in the form 2 A ∨ ¬A. They may disagree
about which inferences involving negation are valid without disagreeing on
truth or falsity or even the definition of negation. Even the classicist may
hold, like the gap theorist, that truth and falsity are not exhaustive, i.e. that
bivalence fails. However, they may hold that a sentence A follows from some
others Γ just in case A is never false when each of Γ is true. That is a perfectly
reasonable notion of consequence but it is one that can yield classical logic
on a non-bivalent semantics whereas the standard one, according to which A
follows from Γ just in case A is true whenever each of Γ is, would yield a gappy
logic such as K3.16
Second, one might think that the meaning of negation just is its referent
(under a direct reference theory of the meaning of logical vocabulary) and that
the classicist and deviant are able to disagree about negation—the propositional
function “out there” in the world—simply by some external relation holding
between them, the world and language. What they are disagreeing about,
then, is which one of their respective theories is getting things right. I have
not been assuming this sort of externalist picture of the meaning of logical
vocabulary because it takes too much for granted and it is much more difficult
to justify when the relevant vocabulary has abstract objects as referents whose
natures are the very thing in dispute. It seems the only plausible response
to the Quinean objection is to assume a non-externalist picture of the logical
vocabulary and hope to establish that there is some shared meaning between
deviant and classicist in the manner I have attempted here.
16Take the class of strong Kleene matrices and define consequence the first way such that
A follows from Γ just in case A is never false when each of Γ is true. Consequence is then
classical even though the semantics is not bivalent. The technical point is simple but its
philosophical importance runs much deeper.
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So there may turn out to be a number of differences on which a particular
case of disagreement hinges. I think when it is located in notions as fundamen-
tal as truth and falsity rather than the definition of negation itself, it appears
more likely that the deviant and classicist do share enough meaning to disagree
about negation when they agree on the definition but not on the fundamental





Intuitionistic negation, typically defined as implication to absur-
dity, is too strong for expressing claims with empirical content such
as ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is not decided at present’. For what is
claimed here is not that there is a procedure for taking any (pur-
ported) proof of ‘Goldbach’s conjecture is decided at present’ to a
proof of an absurdity but rather the weaker claim that the conjec-
ture has not yet been decided. Thus an extension of constructivism
to empirical discourse, a project most seriously taken up by Dum-
mett and Tennant, requires an empirical negation lying somewhere
between classical negation (‘It is unwarranted that. . . ’) and in-
tuitionistic negation (‘It is refutable that. . . ’). I put forward one
plausible candidate for empirical negation that has a close affinity
to classical negation. The present proposal is compared favorably
to some others that have been propounded in the literature.
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3.1 Introduction
In mathematical discourse a uniform treatment of negated and unnegated state-
ments can be given by defining the former in terms of the latter. If A is a
mathematical statement then its negation may be defined as A→ ⊥ where ⊥
is either taken as primitive or as an abbreviation of some fixed absurdity such
as 0 = 1. What counts as an “absurdity” will depend on the background formal
theory. Notice that in the usual arithmetical setting, defining the negation of
A as A→ 0 = 1 gives us the constructive properties of negation we expect. For
example, ex falso quodlibet—that from A and ¬A anything follows—is derivable
from modus ponens and the fact that 0 = 1 implies everything. Negation intro-
duction and elimination are then just special cases of implication introduction
and elimination.
However, there are issues concerning the choice of absurdity. If a theory does
not contain sufficient arithmetic then obviously 0 = 1 will not do; i.e. there may
be no single sentence able to play the role of absurdity across all mathematical
discourses. Instead we shall have to choose, for a given mathematical theory,
some sentence able to assume the role of absurdity. In practice this poses no
problem on the assumption, and this assumption seems safe enough, that we
can effectively choose a suitable absurdity for any given theory we are likely to
care about. For example in arithmetic we may choose 0 = 1, in the theory of
strict linear orders 0 < 0, and so on.
Constructively there is nothing problematic about implication interpreted
according to the familiar BHK clauses nor of an absurdity such as 0 = 1, so
negation turns out unproblematic in mathematical discourse.1 Is the same true
for empirical discourse? Dummett thinks not, stating:
Negation . . . is highly problematic. In mathematics, given the mean-
ing of if . . . then, it is trivial to explain “Not A” as meaning “If A,
then 0 = 1”; by contrast, a satisfactory explanation of “not”, as
1It should be mentioned in passing that some (e.g. [CC00]) have objected to the use of
0 = 1 in a definition of negation, though I shall not enter into this debate here.
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applied to empirical statements for which bivalence is not, in gen-
eral, taken as holding, is very difficult to arrive at. Given that the
sentential operators cannot be thought of as explained by means of
the two-valued truth-tables, the possibility that the laws of classi-
cal logic will fail is evidently open: but it is far from evident that
the correct logical laws will always be the intuitionistic ones. More
generally, it is by no means easy to determine what should serve
as the analogue, for empirical statements, of the notion of proof
as it figures in intuitionist semantics for mathematical statements.
[Dum96, p.473]
A blanket term for the analogue of proof for empirical statements is warrant
or verification. One need not spell out a precise theory of warrant in formulating
a semantics whose primary semantic values are warrants. Indeed there has been
no precise spelling out of proof for the constructivist, since proof for them is
taken as intuitive and not relative to a given formal theory, though this has
not prevented the formulation of numerous semantics for constructive logics.2
A similar point is made by Kleene regarding the realizability interpretation of
intuitionistic number theory when he states “[t]he analysis which leads to this
truth definition is not to be regarded as more than a partial analysis of the
intuitionistic meaning of the statements, since it takes over without analysis,
or leaves unanalyzed, the component of evidence” [Kle45, p. 110].
In what follows I shall be taking the notion of warrant or verification as
primitive and assuming, moreover, that a naive extension of a constructively
acceptable semantics to empirical discourse is one which replaces proofs as
semantic values with warrants (perhaps with other necessary modifications
2Taking proof as proof-in-L, for some formal theory L, has been thought to be prob-
lematic for constructivism for reasons having to do with Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems
which seem to show that there would be verification- or proof-transcendent truths. See e.g.
Martin-Lo¨f’s [Mar84, p. 11].
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made as well).34 The verification of a statement A might be taken to be the
holding in principle of sufficient empirical evidence in support of A, where
what counts as evidence is either contextually determined or domain-specific.
For instance, seemings to John might count as evidence for ‘John is hungry’
whereas they may not, e.g. because John has a fever, for ‘The temperature is
above twenty degrees celcius’. In other words, a number of factors may serve
to determine what counts as evidence for a given class of propositions. In the
case of mathematics, proof then turns out to be a species of warrant.5
It is easy to see why the usual notion of constructive negation does not
by itself suffice for expressing negation in empirical discourse. Suppose we
wish to express that Goldbach’s conjecture is undecided at present. According
to the arrow-falsum definition, this statement is equivalent to ‘If Goldbach’s
conjecture is decided (i.e. proved or refuted) at present, then 0 = 1’. But this
is far too strong: it states that it is refutable that Goldbach’s conjecture is
decided when all that is meant is that the conjecture has not yet been decided.
To express such claims the constructivist needs a weak negation that, when
appended to a statement, expresses that the statement lacks warrant at present.
Such a negation has been referred to as ‘empirical’ in [Wil94]) and [DS06] and
as ‘factual’ antecedently in [Hey71, p. 18].
Dummett proposes that for empirical discourse we treat verification and
3Williamson [Wil94] makes this suggestion regarding the BHK clauses in order to show
that a semantics so extended cannot make sense of empirical statements of the form ‘A may
be undecided’. I briefly discuss his argument in section 3.7.
4While I have taken the notion of warrant as primitive, so that one may fill in their
favorite theory of warrant in the discussion to follow, one should keep in mind that the
following discussion reveals what basic properties warrant must have, i.e. not just anything
goes for warrants. For instance, in a constructivist setting the notion of warrant is regarded
as monotonic in the sense that if A is warranted by a particular state a and b stands in the
relevant “inclusion” relation to a then A is warranted also at b. This does not entail that
warrant is defeasible. That would only be justified on an implausible reading of the inclusion
relation between states.
5What counts as constructively acceptable is unclear. For instance it is not clear that
disjunction ought to satisfy the disjunction property, viz. that if A∨B is warranted (recalling
that the A and B may be empirical) then either A is or B is. Indeed one might question the
tenability of the whole project of extending constructivism beyond mathematics. Even if the
project is not tenable across the board, there is an interesting fragment of empirical discourse
for which the project does appear tenable, viz. that which includes only mathematical
statements and statements of the form ‘There is no proof (or there is proof) of A at present’
where A is mathematical. It is worth investigating the inferential role negation has even in
this and similarly restricted settings.
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falsification on a par by taking them as sui generis notions. However, if we do
so then we must give up a uniform treatment of the conditions under which a
sentence is verified or falsified. On this, Dummett remarks:
[w]e might regard the meanings of negations of numerical equations
as being given directly in terms of the computation procedures by
which those equations are verified or falsified: a proof of the nega-
tion of any arbitrary statement then consists of an effective method
for transforming any proof of that statement into a proof of some
false numerical equation. Such an explanation relies on the under-
lying presumption that, given a proof of a false numerical equation,
we can construct a proof of any statement whatsoever. It is not
obvious that, when we extend these conceptions to empirical state-
ments, there exists any class of decidable atomic statements for
which a similar presumption holds good; and it is therefore not ob-
vious that we have, for the general case, any similar uniform way of
explaining negation for arbitrary statements. It would therefore re-
main well within the spirit of a theory of meaning of this type that
we should regard the meaning of each statement as being given by
the simultaneous provision of a means for recognizing a verification
of it and a means for recognizing a falsification of it, where the only
general requirement is that these should be specified in such a way
as to make it impossible for any statement to be both verified and
falsified. [Dum96, pp. 71-72]
A semantics which treats verification and falsification symmetrically along
the lines just sketched by Dummett has been proposed by Thomason [Tho69]
for the strong negation of [Nel49]. Gurevich [Gur77] motivates his semantics
for strong negation by observing that “[i]n many cases the falsehood of a simple
scientific sentence can be ascertained as directly (or indirectly) as its truth. An
example: a litmus-paper is used to verify sentence [sic] “The solution is acid” ”
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([Gur77, p. 49]) by which he means ‘verify the falsity of’ when he says ‘verify’.
In the context of constructivism we see that symmetrical treatments of truth
and falsity have been around for quite some time.
Williamson [Wil94] suggests, but ultimately rejects, using strong negation
as an empirical negation. I will not discuss the details of the argument here,
but concerning his unargued claim that “anything recognizable as a negation
operator in intuitionistic logic. . . will satisfy [∼A → ¬A (where ∼ is any in-
tuitionistic negation and ¬ the usual intuitionistic one)]” (p. 141), which he
believes to be problematic for extending intuitionistic semantics to empirical
discourse, I remark only that it flies in the face of the obvious fact that no
negation at least as strong as intuitionistic negation is suitable for expressing
claims (considered by Williamson in [Wil94]) such as ‘Goldbach’s conjecture
is undecided at present’. This alone provides overwhelming reason to reject
Williamson’s claim concerning the strength of empirical negation.6
How ought an empirical negation behave? If we take the following quote
of Dummett seriously then, at least relative the class of statements we have in
mind, empirical negation ought to look classical or very nearly so:
Our reluctance to say that pi was not transcendental before 1882,
or, more signicantly, to construe mathematical statements are sig-
nicantly tensed, is not merely a lingering effect of platonistic mis-
conceptions; it is, rather, to speak in this way would be to admit
into mathematical statements a non-intuitionistic form of negation,
as will be apparent if one attempts to assign a truth-value to ‘pi
is not algebraic’, considered as a statement made in 1881. This is
not because the ‘not’ which occurs in ‘. . . is not true’ or ‘. . . was not
true’ is non-constructive: we may reasonably view it as decidable
whether or not a statement has been proved at a given time. But
6The foregoing discussion applies equally well to an alleged solution of Wansing [Wan02]
for evading Fitch’s paradox since we have that the strong negation of a statement con-
structively implies the usual intuitionistic negation of that statement. Thus if intuitionistic
negation is too strong to express the empirical negation of KA (where K is a knowledge
operator used in expressing Fitch’s paradox) then a fortiori so too is strong negation.
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though constructive, this is an empirical type of negation that oc-
curs in statements of intuitionistic mathematics. [Dum77, p. 337,
my emphasis]
If it is decidable whether or not a given statement A lacks warrant at present
(or any given time more generally), it will always be true, for example, that
‘either A is (now) warranted or it is not’.
Empirical negation cannot simply be classical negation as there is no straight-
forward way of introducing classical negation to intuitionistic logic without
having the two negations collapse into classical negation. So on pain of col-
lapse, empirical negation must forgo certain classical principles. The same issue
arises within the setting of classical relevant logic (see [MR73] and [MR74]),
where the familiar law of contraposition in “arrow-form” fails (though it holds
in rule form), again, on pain of collapse. Precisely which principles our account
of empirical negation forgoes is discussed in section 3.4.
However, besides collapse, there is a host of other objections against clas-
sical and classical-like negations that any proposal for a constructively or rel-
evantly acceptable negation will have to avoid. In the next section I look at
these objections in turn and show that none of them are a problem for the
empirical negation to be introduced in section 3.3.
3.2 Constructivist objections to classical (and like)
negations
Conservativity
If L and L′ are logics in the respective languages L and L′ with L ⊆ L′, then
L′ is a conservative extension of L just in case for every sentence A in L, if A is
L′-provable then it was already L-provable. Conservativity has been thought
to be a necessary condition on meaning coherence in the sense that the rules
governing a connective can only confer coherent meaning on that connective
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if they conservatively extend a given coherent base.7 There are a number of
reasons for desiring conservativity having to do primarily with anti-holism,
learnability, anti-realism and consistency (against e.g. tonk-like connectives),
but whichever reasons one has in mind, classical negation is going to be prob-
lematic since the usual ways of proof-theoretically extending deductive systems
for intuitionistic logic to include classical negation yield nonconservative ex-
tensions. A famous example witnessing this nonconservativity phenomenon is
Peirce’s law, ((A → B) → A) → A, which is classically but not intuitionisti-
cally provable. As such, classical negation has been deemed incoherent, most
famously by Dummett.
We need not enter the debate about whether conservativity is a necessary
condition for coherence, since one can remain neutral on the issue in cases
where a given connective meets the conservativity constraint in the first place.
The empirical negation introduced in section 3.3 yields a conservative extension
to intuitionistic logic, and so conservativity poses no problem for it.
Harmony
If conservativity fails as a requirement for coherence, the inferentialist will
need to appeal to some other requirement to rule out classical negation as
incoherent. Harmony has been thought to fill this role. Harmony is the idea
that introduction and elimination rules must be harmonious in the sense that
the grounds for the elimination of a connective, as given by its elimination
rule, must not outstrip the grounds for introducing the connective, as given
by its introduction rule. Some inferentialists have defended harmony while
rejecting conservativity (e.g. see [Rea00]). Inferentialism is typically restricted
to the view that the meaning of some proper fragment of our vocabulary is
7Dummett is often thought to have held the conservativity constraint. This view is criti-
cized by Read [Rea00] where Dummett is accused of confusing conservativity with harmony,
of which only the latter he seems to have explicitly endorsed. There are a number of criti-
cisms of the conservativity constraint which seem to settle the matter against it. One is that
there may be two connectives each of which can be individually and conservatively added to
a given logic though the addition of both yields a nonconservative extension. Is each of these
connectives individually coherent until present together? That seems an implausible thing
to say.
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given completely by inferential rules. This is sometimes referred to as moderate
inferentialism. One might wish to extend inferentialism to language as a whole,
but it is unlikely that an advocate of any such program would endorse harmony
as a meaning-theoretic constraint since it is far too constraining.
Should we require of empirical negation that it be governed by harmonious
introduction-elimination rules? If empirical negation is non-logical and we
are moderate inferentialists, then the answer is clearly “No”. On the other
hand, if empirical negation is deemed logical on grounds of topic neutrality,
then the familiar intuitionistic negation will not be. For recall that empirical
negation is an operation on warrants of which proofs are a special case, so
in this sense it generalizes intuitionistic negation since it applies to a broader
class of propositions, viz. the mathematical and empirical. Now it is unlikely
that any inferentialist will accept this brief argument denying the logicality of
intuitionistic negation on grounds of topic neutrality in which case they must
hold that, while topic neutrality may be a sufficient condition on logicality, it
cannot be necessary. According to an inferentialist, being characterizable by
rules satisfying certain proof-theoretic constraints (e.g. harmony, purity, etc.)
will be necessary and sufficient for logicality. But whatever conditions end up
being necessary and sufficient for logicality, it is dubious that empirical negation
will turn out logical on those grounds in which case the issue of harmony is
irrelevant to empirical negation.8
This is not to say empirical negation fails to satisfy proof-theoretic con-
straints necessary and sufficient for logicality. Indeed one might hold that the
burden of proof lies on the opponent to show that empirical negation cannot be
given harmonious rules, an extremely strong claim to establish. But it is also
debatable whether the rules given in section 3.5 for empirical negation are not
harmonious. Read [Rea08] argues that labeled natural deduction systems for
a variety of normal modal logics provide a way of furnishing harmonious rules
8From a semantic perspective, empirical negation likely will not be counted logical either.
For example, consider permutation invariance as a criteria of logicality. On the semantics
of section 3.3 empirical negation is not permutation invariant, but neither is intuitionistic
negation.
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for intensional connectives and if he is right then empirical negation, and a
good deal of other connectives including non-logical ones, satisfy the harmony
constraint.9
Heredity
Meyer and Routley have shown that relevant logic, once touted as a fierce
rival to classical logic, can be viewed rather as an extension to classical logic
with additional intensional (relevant) implication and (De Morgan) negation
operators. One need only collapse the ordering ≤ on states, defined by
a ≤ b iff R0ab
for 0 the “base” state, by requiring that a ≤ b iff a = b. Collapsing the ordering
to identity is required in order to ensure that the Heredity condition,
(Heredity) If M,a |= A and a ≤ b then M, b |= A,
is preserved when defining boolean negation ∼ by
(3.1) M,a |= ∼A iff M,a ,|= A.10
The formal semantics of relevant logic has taken a fair amount of crit-
icism from its inception for not having an adequate informal interpretation
and the collapse of the ordering that allows for boolean negation worsens that
9Read’s approach is controversial for two reasons. The first is that while the rules are
harmonious, the proof language makes explicit use of an “accessibility” relation and formula
labels. Indeed, there are rules specifically for the accessibility relation. The question, then,
is whether such proof languages presume a prior understanding of the relational semantics
of modal logic and are thereby anti-inferentialist in spirit, or whether they undermine the
inferentialist programme of completely determining the meaning of connectives by just the
introduction (and possibly elimination) rules for the connective, and not partly by rules
governing other connectives or (accessibility) relations. It is unclear whether labeled systems
could be motivated along inferentialist lines independently of the semantic conception from
which such systems arose.
10The literature on relevant logic refers to the negation defined by (3.1) as ‘boolean’ rather
than ‘classical’, so I have stuck with this terminology. In a sense boolean negation is a natural
characterization of classical negation for relational semantics, but I don’t think it is the only
natural one. Fixed negation seems to me to be just as natural.
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criticism.11 For the ordering is supposed to represent an intuitive notion cor-
responding to something like information gathering, so that a ≤ b just in case
b is an informational extension of a. The restriction requiring that a ≤ b iff
a = b claims that states have no proper extensions and embodies the unfounded
Leibnizian optimism that each state is itself the best (in terms of informational
content) amongst all possible ones.
The point is that states are not perfect—i.e. complete and consistent. More-
over propositions, construed as sets of states, are not just any such sets: they
are the hereditary ones. Now it is clear that boolean negation defined accord-
ing to (3.1) is not an operation on propositions in the sense that the class of
propositions is closed under that operation. For there are states a and b with
a ≤ b such that a does not support a proposition A, and hence supports its
boolean negation, while b supports A. But then the boolean negation of A is
not preserved ≤-upward, and so the boolean negation of A is not a hereditary
set (read ‘proposition’). As boolean negation is just set-theoretic complemen-
tation in disguise, another way of putting this is to say that complementation
is not an operation on propositions.
Notice that the same objection may be leveled against classical negation
by any intuitionist who takes seriously a semantics on which boolean negation
fails to be an operation on propositions intuitionistically conceived. In Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic logic, propositions, being ≤-closed (for ≤ a pre-
order), are not closed under complementation, i.e. boolean negation. Now the
intuitionist might attempt the same move as the relevantist by collapsing the
preorder to identity (obtaining the class of “sheer reflexive” frames), but then
the resulting logic is classical. So this move, available to the relevantist, is not
available to the intuitionist. The intuitionist must reject boolean negation as
a genuine propositional operation.
DeVidi and Solomon [DS06] work around this problem by introducing an
empirical negation, defined in the context of Kripke semantics, that satisfies
11B. J. Copeland has been a main critic of relevantist semantics, charging them with being
merely “pure” rather than “applied”. See e.g. [Cop79], [Cop83] and [Cop86].
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Heredity. Roughly the idea is this. The intuitionistic negation ¬A of A is
supported at a state iff A is not supported at any (≤-) later state. We might
think of some subset of states as having a property special to empirical negation,
call this property being “actualized” (as put in [DS06]) at some time, and define
negation relative to this property. Then we might think the empirical negation
∼A of A is supported at a state just in case it is not supported at any later
state that is actualized. To be precise, let M = (W,A,≤, V ) be a usual Kripke
model for intuitionistic logic with A ⊆W an additional set of actualized states.
Define the truth conditions for ∼ by
• M,a |= ∼A iff ∀b, if a ≤ b and b ∈ A then b ,|= A.
It is easy to see that Heredity holds for the language extended with ∼, that is,
∼ is a genuine propositional operation.
There are two serious problems with this “negation”. The first is that it
is too weak. Almost no properties thought characteristic of negation hold for
it. In particular, the law of excluded middle, a property we should think holds
for empirical negation if we follow Dummett’s remark quoted earlier, fails as
does the law of non-contradiction and various directions of the De Morgan
equivalences (e.g. ∼(A∧B) |= ∼A∨∼B). Second, it does not get things right
at the level of models for there will be states supporting ∼A for every A, i.e.
states at which trivialism holds, a thesis rejected by any constructivist. This
will be the case, e.g., when no later state is actualized in which case the truth
conditions for ∼A will be vacuously satisfied for arbitrary A.
For these reasons the empirical negation to be defined in section 3.3 is better
motivated from a philosophical point of view and it also fairs much better in
terms of getting correct the inferences that ought to intuitively hold of empirical
negation.
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Implicit vs explicit information
Relevantists (e.g. Greg Restall) have argued that there is a “difference between
claims about states, and claims supported by states” [Res99, p. 71]. A state a’s
failing to support a proposition A should not imply that a supports some other
proposition⇁A expressing a’s lack of support for A—for this other proposition
is about a. That is, it should not be assumed generally that a state supports
all the information about itself. An intuitionist who even only weakly endorses
Kripke semantics could file the same charge against empirical negation if in-
troducing it into the semantics requires making the unjustified identification of
implicit and explicit information.
Of course some states might support all the information about themselves,
but to say that all do is to make an unfair assumption about states. It would,
however, be just as unfair to assume that states never support some or all of
the information about themselves. Moreover, why not think that every model
ought to possess at least one such state intended to represent a privileged state
of the model, for example, the present state of available evidence (or warrant)?
Such states will be complete in the sense that every statement will be either
warranted or not.
Given Dummett’s remark claims of the form ‘A is warranted’ are in principle
decidable, we should think that the present state of available evidence either
warrants or fails to warrant the assertion of a given proposition. That is, the
present state of available evidence is complete relative to empirical negation ∼
in the sense that A ∨ ∼A holds good at it. In modeling empirical negation,
then, we should include at least one state representing the present state of
available evidence for any claim of the form ∼A asserts that, at present, A
lacks sufficient evidence to be warranted. Such a state will form a classical
model in the sense that the set of sentences in the language involving only the
connectives ∧ and ∼ will be maximally classically-consistent.
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3.3 The semantics of fixed negation
Since we will be interpreting a connective ∼ to be read ‘There is insufficient
evidence at present12 to warrant the proposition that. . . ’ (¬ will continue to
be read ‘It is refutable that. . . ’) we must distinguish one state in each model
as the present moment. Such a state will be further singled out by the truth
conditions given to our empirical negation ∼. These informal ideas motivate
the semantical clauses for the connectives of our language, to be specified in a
moment, the only novel one being that for ∼.
Our language L∼ is a usual language L for IPC (Intuitionistic Propositional
Logic) augmented with the logical symbol ∼.13 Let F = (W,≤) be a Kripke
frame for the language L of IPC. That is, W is a non-empty set of states and
≤ is a partial order (reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric relation) on W .
We denote by W↑ the set of all upsets in W , i.e. sets X s.t. y ∈ X whenever
x ∈ X and x ≤ y. An L∼-model M is a tuple (F,@, V ) where @ ∈ W is a
distinguished element representing the state of available evidence in M (other
modally inequivalent states representing substates or states containing evidence
unavailable in M) and V : Prop → W↑ is a propositional valuation assigning
propositions (i.e. upsets in W ) to propositional letters.14
We arrive at the following truth conditions (writing M,a |= A to mean A
is supported by a state a in the model M):
12The usual intensional semantics for temporal indexicals such as ‘at present’ (i.e. ‘now’)
treats such expressions as non-indexical propositional operators, and this is how we have
chosen to treat them here. (The same is true of non-temporal expressions such as ‘actually’
which is taken, by e.g. Lewis, to be indexical.) I do not find any concern, from a formal point
of view, in semantically treating indexical expressions non-indexically. That is, we should
not think that the formal semantics should be such that ∼A is true at a state a just in case
A is not true at a because ∼, being an indexical, should refer back to the state of evaluation.
In other words, being an indexical does not imply being treated as an operator that cannot
cause a state-shift away from the state of evaluation.
13For definiteness, the set of logical symbols is {∧,∨,→,∼,⊥}, and Prop is a denumerable
set of propositional letters (constants) whose members we denote by p, q, etc. We define
¬A := A→ ⊥.
14We may read ≤ in a number of different ways. My preferred is in terms of informational
containment so that a ≤ b reads ‘b contains all of the information contained in a’. Even
though @ is to be thought of as the present state of evidence, we need not read ≤ temporally,
e.g. by reading a ≤ b as ‘b is a state of evidence arrived at temporally later than a which
contains all the information contained in a’ for we might just think of each state in the model
as representing a possible present state of evidence.
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• M,a |= A ∧B iff M,a |= A and M,a |= B;
• M,a |= A ∨B iff M,a |= A or M,a |= B;
• M,a ,|= ⊥ (i.e. it is never the case that M,a |= ⊥);
• M,a |= A→ B iff ∀b ≥ a(M, b |= A⇒M, b |= B);
• M,a |= ∼A iff M,@ ,|= A.
It is easy to verify by induction on formula complexity that (Heredity),
M,a |= A and a ≤ b imply M, b |= A,
holds, as in the case of IPC, since M,a |= ∼A iff for all b ∈ W , M, b |= ∼A.
One may immediately notice the similarity of ∼ to the satisfaction operators
of hybrid logic, the “actually” operator, and the “now” operator of temporal
logics.
Truth in a model is truth at @, validity on a frame is truth in every model
based on that frame, and validity “simpliciter” is validity on every frame. We
say that a sentence A is an L∼-consequence of set Γ of sentences, in symbols
Γ |= A, iff for every model M , A is true in M whenever every member of Γ
is true in M . We denote the set of valid consequences {(Γ, A) : Γ |= A} by
IPC∼.
We might have required that all models be rooted, i.e. that there be a min-
imum with respect to the partial order, or, perhaps more in line with common
informal interpretations of intuitionistic models, that the models be tree-like.
In any case, one obtains the same semantic consequence relation so we have
chosen not to restrict our models in any of these two ways. It is interesting to
note, however, that there are differences immaterial to consequence: e.g. if @
is always the root then A ∨ ∼A holds at every point of every model, whereas
this is not true otherwise.
There are two notions of truth in a model we may distinguish: (i) actual
truth which is truth at the distinguished element, and (ii) global truth which
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is truth common to all points in the model. A sentence is actually true in
M = (W,≤,@, V ) just in case it is true at @, and a sentence is globally true
in M just case it is true at every state a ∈ W of M . These notions of truth
are obviously quite distinct. We may also distinguish between two types of
consequence: local and actual consequence. A sentence A is a local consequence
of a set Γ of sentences just in case for each model M = (W,≤,@, V ) and every
b in M , if every member of Γ is true at b then so is A. And A is an actual
consequence of Γ just in case A is true at @ whenever every member of Γ is.
For the base intuitionistic language L, the distinction between actual and local
truth is one without a difference.15 However, this is not true for L∼ since now
the distinguished element plays a significant role, where before it did not.
I wish to quickly settle a possible objection with the proposed semantics.
Hossack writes
[i]f a sign is to be regarded a negation of p at all, it must be used
in such a way as to be incompatible with the assertion that p. The
semantic rule has to hold, which Dummett calls Exclusion, that p
and its negation cannot both be true. [Hos90, p. 216].
One possible objection to the semantics for negation introduced here is that
we have states at which both A and ∼A are true (supported) in violation of
Hossack’s necessary condition on being a negation operation. That’s so, but
never is it the case, in accordance with Hossack, that A and ∼A both be true,
for truth (relative to a model) as we have defined it is truth at @.
One interesting application of ∼ is that it may also be seen as providing an
alternative, but inequivalent, characterization of boolean negation in the setting
of relevant logic. If we confine ourselves to the simplified semantics for R then
we may introduce ∼ by letting @ be the sole base world. Valid consequence
15A proof showing local validity implies actual validity is easy; the converse is not much
harder. L-models are L∼-models and the truth conditions for L-sentences are the same
as those for L∼-sentences restricted to L, where L ⊂L ∼. For reductio, suppose A is an
actual but not local consequence of Γ. Then there is a model M = (W,≤,@, V ) and a ∈ M
s.t. M |= Γ but M,a &|= A. But then the model M ′ = (W,≤,@′, V ), where @′ = a, is
s.t. M ′,@′ |= Γ and M ′,@ &|= A, which contradicts our supposition that A is an actual
consequence of Γ.
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on the simplified semantics for R is already defined in the same way we have
defined valid consequence for IPC∼, viz. in terms of truth preservation at @.
It would be interesting to compare ∼ and boolean negation in the setting of
relevant logic, a curiosity I mention only to set aside.
Before moving onto the next section, it is worth discussing an issue that has
been raised concerning monotonicity and warrant. Tomassi [Tom06] states:
. . . non-monotonicity naturally suggests itself as a logical charac-
teristic definitive of [defeasible warrant]. At least, it is difficult to
see how warrant could genuinely be defeasible if it is not the case
that further information could be obtained to defeat an assertion
so warranted. To allow that defeating information can turn up
however is precisely to allow the possibility that while X defeasibly
warrants Z, the conjunction of X and Y might warrant the nega-
tion of Z. . . there is no obvious way of capturing the non-monotonic
character of defeasible warrant within the framework provided by
Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic. [Tom06, p.37-38]
While I agree that defeasible warrant introduces an element of non-monoto-
nicity, I do not think it manifests at the level of logical consequence. Defeasible
warrant is non-monotonic over the progression of time relative to some partial
ordering on states of evidence. That is, if a and b are states of evidence such
that a ≤ b, where ≤ is some monotonic ordering of strength of evidence, and
A is warranted at a, then A is warranted at b. What we do not have is that if
A is warranted at some time t and t < u then A is warranted at u. One has
to distinguish between the orderings over which empirical truth is preserved.
A statement A is warranted, in our sense, at a particular time t if and only
if all the available evidence at t warrants A; i.e. statements are warranted
relative to bodies of evidence. We should not want statements to be warranted
relative to sets of statements, as they would be if reasoning with a defeasible
warrant operator were non-monotonic. If we know that A,2 B but A,C ,2 B,
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and both A and C are warranted, then B is not warranted relative to {A}—
it is simply not warranted. Ideally one should distinguish in the model two
separate orderings, one ≤ over evidence and another 9 over temporal states,
and introduce a future or past temporal operator $ into the language governed
by 9 such that A may hold according to some body of evidence at a moment
t even though $A may not hold according to that same body of evidence and
moment because A fails at the relevant 9-successors of t.
3.4 Validities and invalidities
The following lists some validities and inferences involving ∼ and shows a
significant number of similarities between empirical and classical negation, most
notably the holding by the former of all of the De Morgan equivalences, DNE,
LEM and LNC, rule-form (EFQ), and classical reductio ad absurdum (RAA).
A ∨ ∼A ∼∼A→ A
(∼A→ A)→ A ¬A→ ∼A
∼(A ∧B)↔ (∼A ∨ ∼B) ∼(A ∨B)↔ (∼A ∧ ∼B)
∼(A→ B)→ ∼B (A ∧ ∼B)→ ∼(A→ B)
¬∼A→ A ∼(A ∧ ∼A)
A ∧ ∼A |= B A→ B |= ∼B → ∼A
The following lists some notable exclusions to the above list, in particular
all of the →-forms of contraposition.
(∼A→ ∼B)→ (B → A) (A→ B)→ (∼B → ∼A)
(A ∧ ∼A)→ B ∼(A→ B)→ (A ∧ ∼B)
¬(A ∧ ∼A) ∼A→ ¬A
Nearly all of the rule-forms of contraposition fail as well, a feature familiar to
relevant logicians who have observed these sorts of failures for boolean negation
in the setting of classical relevant logic.
It is worth noting that IPC∼ is not closed under substitution of provable
equivalents, though it is obviously closed under uniform substitution. A logic
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is closed under substitution of provable equivalents when Γ 2 A, B 2 C and
C 2 B imply Γ 2 A(B/C), where A(B/C) is the result of replacing some
occurrences of B in A with occurrences of C. A logic is closed under uniform
substitution when Γ 2 A implies Γ 2 A(p/q) for p, q atoms. For example
p∧∼p 2 p∧¬p and p∧¬p 2 p∧∼p, but 2 (p∧¬p)→ ⊥ while ,2 (p∧∼p)→ ⊥.
This is not a particularly uncommon phenomenon. For example, compare
logics with “actually” operators16, temporal logics with “now” operators, and
paraconsistent logics with non-truth-functional negations such as those of de
Costa 1974, each of which fails to be closed under substitution of provable
equivalents.
More importantly, A |= B is weaker than |= A→ B since the latter implies
the former but not conversely—in other words, conditional proof fails. This
explains, e.g., the →-form failure of EFQ; → may take us to states at which
both A and ∼A hold, and hence states where an arbitrary A (e.g. ⊥) need not
(or in the case of the example, must not) hold. Often it is the implication from
|= A → B to A |= B that fails. For instance, this is the case with Tennant’s
relevant logics CR and IR (see [Ten97]). In particular, |= (A∧¬A)→ B holds
but A,¬A ,|= B which is quite the opposite from IPC∼.
Remarks
Given the failure of conditional proof, IPC∼ is not an axiomatic extension of
IPC in the sense that the former is obtainable from the latter by the addition
of axioms. For any axiomatic extension of a system satisfying conditional
proof, i.e. the deduction theorem in the context of axiomatic systems, satisfies
conditional proof. However, IPC∼ is a conservative extension of IPC. This
is easy to see semantically, a self-evidence not usually exuded on the proof-
theoretic side. For if A does not contain ∼ then it receives the truth conditions
it has in IPC-models and so if it were IPC∼-valid then it would have already
16For instance, see [Hod84] and his notion of “weak” consequence according to which A
and @A, the latter read ‘actually A’, are provably equivalent but not intersubstitutable salva
veritate.
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been IPC-valid. As a final remark we note that IPC∼ is Tarskian in that it
satisfies the structural rules of Reflexivity, Thinning and Cut.
Digression: It should not be surprising that the disjunction property, if Γ 2
A∨B then Γ 2 A or Γ 2 B, fails for IPC∼. This sort of failure is notorious for
extensions of IPC. (So notorious in fact that it was conjectured by $Lukasiewicz
that IPC is the strongest intermediate logic to have the disjunction property.17
Kreisel and Putnam proved this conjecture false by showing that the system
obtained by adding (¬A → (B ∨ C)) → ((¬A → B) ∨ (¬A → C)) to IPC
has the disjunction property.) However, given our intended interpretation of
the language it is not hard to justify the failure of conditional proof and the
disjunction property. The justification for the failure of the latter rests on the
assumption that it is decidable whether or not a proposition is supported by
the evidence available at present in which case we expect 2 A∨∼A for arbitrary
A without either of 2 A or 2 ∼A holding. So we focus our attention on the
failure of conditional proof. End of digression.
There are two things to say about the failure of conditional proof. The first
is that if we are to take seriously Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic and
if adding empirical negation is semantically acceptable then there is reason to
reject conditional proof. After all, it falls out of an acceptable semantics for
the language. Now most intuitionists do not find Kripke semantics acceptable
primarily on the grounds that it is usually couched within a classical metathe-
ory. But at the propositional level, this should not matter since IPC and its
extension IPC∼ to fixed negation are complete with respect to a recursive set
of finitely recursive models (i.e. models with a finite set of states and a recursive
accessibility relation and valuation defined on that set). Indeed, if Γ ,2IPC A
then, via a filtration technique, one can construct a finite countermodel from
the set of subformulae of Γ ∪ {A} (assuming Γ is finite). Restricting the class
of models so, the metatheory being classical or intuitionistic then come to the
17Technically, IPC∼ is not an intermediate logic since its language is not L but a proper
extension of it. It might be more appropriate to call it a ‘superintuitionistic’ logic though
some authors use these terms synonymously.
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same thing.
While this fact does not generalize to quantificational theories, one may still
furnish such theories with a constructive metatheory employing Kripke mod-
els even though certain results classically provable will not be provable in the
constructive metatheory. This will not be problematic for a constructivist who
finds something appealing with an informal interpretation of Kripke structures
for intuitionistic logic and who wishes to make use of those structures in provid-
ing a semantics for her constructive language while sticking to a constructively
acceptable metatheory. I shall therefore suppose that there are constructively
acceptable versions of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic.
Despite the failure of conditional proof for →, we may introduce other im-
plication connectives satisfying conditional proof. One natural way to do this
is to define A as being a consequence from Γ, where Γ is finite, just when
|= ∧Γ → A. (Alternatively we could allow infinite sets of premises and in-
finitary conjunction, but this is unnecessary given compactness for IPC∼.)
Under this definition of consequence, consequence and implication coincide
but the definition looks ad hoc. Moreover we lose important theorems that
were motivated by our original concerns. For example EFQ for ∼ fails (since
now ⊥ would not be a consequence of A∧∼A) as do a number of other impor-
tant consequences involving the conditional that were valid under the original
definition. So the revised definition of consequence does not speak well to the
informal interpretation we had originally given to the language.
A more interesting conditional that satisfies conditional proof exploits the
fact that (the theory of) @ is essentially a classical model with an additional
intensional connective→. Notice that all the classical connectives are definable
at @ in a straightforward way, e.g. A ⊃ B := ∼A → ∼∼B (or equivalently
∼A ∨ ∼∼B) says that at an arbitrary point, either A fails to be supported at
@ or B is supported there, i.e. that A materially implies B at @. Then Γ 2 A
(under the original definition of 2) iff 2 ∧Γ ⊃ A for finite Γ. One with a
strong liking for conditional proof might then think of material implication as
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the correct notion of implication for empirical discourse.
3.5 Tableaux
Several complications present themselves on the side of proof theory. The first,
which we have already encountered, is that conditional proof fails. This means
that in the setting of natural deduction, a →-introduction rule would, in our
case, turn out quite cumbersome. (This of course is not true for any system
for which conditional proof fails.) The second, more troubling, difficulty is
that since A,∼A |= ⊥ which, in a natural deduction setting, we might call
∼E, and ¬A |= ∼A, it follows that any of the usual presentations of natural
deduction would generate a consequence relation satisfying both ¬A 2 ∼A and
∼A 2 ¬A (the latter following by ∼E and ¬I) which is clearly bad (in respect
of the latter); for ∼ is supposed to be strictly weaker than ¬. Exactly the same
problem emerges when adding classical negation to intuitionistic logic in the
usual systems of natural deduction.
For this reason we have chosen to give a signed and labelled tableau system
for IPC∼. The system is standard for IPC for this style of tableau system and
adds two additional rules for sentences of the form S∼A where S is a sign in
{T,F} representing the truth or falsity of a sentence at a state (e.g. ‘TA∧B, i’
expresses that A ∧ B is true at state i). For tableaux there are two types of
sentences.
Definition 3.5.1.
• A signed labelled sentence has the form SA, i for S ∈ {T,F}, A an IPC∼-
sentence and i ∈ {@} ∪ N = Labels (the set of labels).
• A relational sentence has the form i ≤ j for i, j ∈ Labels.
A tableau for an argument A1, . . . An ⇒ B, with Ai the premises and B
the conclusion, starts by listing the TAi,@ in their natural order proceeded by
FB,@. More precisely we have the following definition of a tableau.
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Definition 3.5.2 (Tableaux).
• A tableau T = (X,≤) is a partially ordered, finite set of sentences (la-
belled or relational) with a minimum (root) such that for each α ∈ T the
set of predecessors of α under ≤ forms a linear order. If ≤ is a partial
order on a set X then α is a minimum in X w.r.t. ≤ iff for all β ∈ X,
α ≤ β.
• A branch of a tableau T is a maximal chain in T .
Definition 3.5.3 (Closure).
• A branch closes iff there is an i ∈ Labels and sentence A such that both
TA, i and FA, i occur on the branch.
• A tableau closes iff each of its branches closes.
• A branch (tree) is open if it is not closed.
A closed tableau for an argument is a proof of that argument. An argument
A1, . . . An ⇒ B is provable just in case there exists a closed tableau for it, in
which case we write A1, . . . An 2IPC∼ B, sometimes suppressing the subscript
when it is clear.
We have the following rules, a pair for each connective ⊗ indicating how to
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The parenthetical ‘(new j)’ indicates that the label j must be new to the
branch; i.e. it must not occur as the label of any formula on the branch besides
those introduced by the rule. In the second to last rule of the second row,
governing the transitivity of r, jrk does not need to immediately follow irj on
the branch. All that is required is that each occur on the branch. The same
may be said about the conclusions of the other rules, though it need not be.
For definiteness we understand the other rules to be read in the same light.
3.6 Completeness
The proof of completeness for the tableau system is given according to the usual
recipe. We confine ourselves to systematic tableaux, which means that the rules
are to be taken as “musts” rather than “cans”: if a rule can be applied, it must
be applied. A systematic tableau is one in which every branch β is downward
saturated (defined below). The goal then is to show that every open branch
of a systematic tableau forms a Hintikka set (defined below), and that every
Hintikka set is satisfiable. Completeness then follows almost immediately.
Definition 3.6.1. A branch β is downward saturated provided the following
hold.
1. If TA ∧B, i occurs on β then TA, i and TB, i occur on β.
2. If TA∨B, i occurs on β then either TA, i occurs on β or TB, i occurs on
β.
3. If T¬A, i and irj occurs on β then FA, j occurs on β.
4. If TA→ B, i and irj occurs on β then either FA, j occurs on β or TA, j
occurs on β.
5. If T∼A, i occurs on β then FA,@ occurs on β.
6. If FA∧B, i occurs on β then either FA, i occurs on β or FB, i occurs on
β.
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7. If FA ∨B, i occurs on β then both FA, i and FB, i occur on β.
8. If F¬A, i occurs on β then for some j, irj and TA, j occur on β.
9. If FA→ B, i occurs on β then for some j, irj, TA, j and FB, j occur on
β.
10. If F∼A, i occurs on β then TA,@ occurs on β.
11. For all i occurring on β, iri occurs on β.
12. If irj and jrk occur on β then irk occurs on β.
Definition 3.6.2. A set H of formulas is a Hintikka set if it satisfies the
conditions of Definition 3.6.1 by replacing ‘occurs on’ by ‘is a member of’ and
‘β’ by ‘H’, and the further condition that for no propositional letter p and
i ∈ Labels are both Tp, i and Fp, i in H.
Lemma 3.6.3. Every open branch β forms a Hintikka set. i.e. the set of
formulas consisting of the nodes of β is a Hintikka set.
Proof. Immediate by Definitions 3.5.2 and 3.6.2.
Lemma 3.6.4 (Model existence). Every Hintikka set H is satisfiable in an
IPC∼-model MH = (W,≤,@, V ) defined as follows. Let label(H) be the set of
labels in H, i.e. label(H) = {i : SA, i ∈ H ∧ S ∈ {T,F}}. Set
• W = label(H)
• i ≤ j iff irj ∈ H
• @ = @
• V (p) = {i ∈W : Tp, i ∈ H}.
Proof. We do two things. The first is to verify that MH is indeed a model.
The second is to show that the Fundamental Lemma 3.6.5 holds.
We claim that ≤ is a partial order. Clearly for all i ∈W , i ≤ i by definition
and the fact that for each i ∈ label(H), iri ∈ H by the “reflexivity” rule.
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Transitivity follows similarly by the definition of ≤ and the fact that irj, jrk ∈
H only if irk ∈ H by the “transitivity” rule and downward saturation. Anti-
symmetry is vacuously satisfied since the rules never allow that irj, jri ∈ H
for i ,= j.
To finish verifying that the structure defined above is an IPC∼-model we
have only left to show that for no i ∈W and A ∈ L∼ do we have i ∈ V (A) and
i ∈ V (A), where X is the W -complement of X. As the result follows trivially
by the definition of V (as the reader may wish to verify), our verification that
MH is a model is concluded.
All that is left is proof of the following “Fundamental Lemma”.
Lemma 3.6.5 (Fundamental Lemma). If TA, i ∈ H then MH , i |= A, and if
FA, i ∈ H then MH , i ,|= A.
Proof. We proceed by induction on formula complexity.
Base. A is an atomic letter p or ⊥. The case for ⊥ is trivial, so suppose
Tp, i ∈ H. Then i ∈ V (p), so MH , i |= p.
Now suppose Fp, i ∈ H. Then i /∈ V (p), so MH , i ,|= p.
Now assume the induction hypothesis (IH) holds for all formulas of com-
plexity less than A’s.
Case 1. A is B ∧ C. Suppose TB ∧ C, i ∈ H. Then (TB, i), (TC, i) ∈ H, so
By IH MH , i |= B and MH , i |= C. Hence MH , i |= B ∧ C.
Now suppose FB ∧ C, i ∈ H. Then either FB, i ∈ H or FC, i ∈ H. By
IH either MH , i ,|= B or MH , i ,|= C, whence MH , i ,|= B ∨ C.
Case 2. A is B∨C. Suppose TB∨C, i ∈ H. Then either TB, i ∈ H or TC, i ∈
H. By IH either MH , i |= B or MH , i |= C, whence MH , i |= B ∨ C.
Now suppose FB ∨C, i ∈ H. Then both FB, i, C, i ∈ H. By IH MH , i ,|=
B and MH , i ,|= C, whence MH , i ,|= B ∨ C.
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Case 3. A is ¬B. Suppose T¬B, i ∈ H. Then for all j s.t. irj ∈ H and
FB, j ∈ H. By IH, for all j s.t. i ≤ j, MH , j ,|= B. Hence MH , i |= ¬B.
Now suppose F¬B, i ∈ H. Then there is a j s.t. irj ∈ H and TB, j ∈ H.
Then i ≤ j and by IH MH , j |= B. Hence MH , i ,|= ¬B.
Case 4. A is B → C. Suppose TB → C, i ∈ H. Then for each j s.t. irj ∈ H,
either FB, j ∈ H or TC, j ∈ H. By IH either MH , j ,|= B or MH , j |= C
for each j ≥ i. Hence MH , i |= B → C.
Now suppose FB → C, i ∈ H. Then there is a j s.t. irj ∈ H, TB, j ∈ H
and FC, j ∈ H. Thus i ≤ j and by IH MH , j |= B and MH , j ,|= C.
Hence MH , i ,|= B → C.
Case 5. A is ∼B. Suppose T∼B, i ∈ H. Then FB,@ ∈ H, whence by IH
MH ,@ ,|= B, so MH , i |= ∼B.
Now suppose F∼B, i ∈ H. Then TB,@ ∈ H, whence by IHMH ,@ |= B,
so MH , i ,|= ∼B.
This concludes the proof that every Hintikka set is satisfiable.
Theorem 3.6.6 (Completeness). If Γ 2 B then Γ |= B. (Recall that Γ |= B
means that for every model M , if M |= Γ then M |= B.)
Proof. Suppose Γ ,2 B. Then there is a systematic tableau T with open branch
β s.t. for each γ ∈ Γ, Tγ,@ occurs on β and FB,@ occurs on β. Let H be
the Hintikka set whose elements are the nodes of β. Then by the fundamental
lemma, there is an IPC∼-model MH s.t. MH ,@ |= Γ and MH ,@ ,|= B, thus
Γ ,|= B. Contraposing, if Γ |= B then Γ 2 B.
3.7 Final remarks
We have considered an operation ∼ such that the truth of ∼A at an arbi-
trary point of evaluation is determined completely by the truth of A at a
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distinguished point representing all evidence available at present. When con-
sequence is defined as preservation of truth in a pointed model, ∼ looks nearly
classical. Moreover, it seems plausible that any semantics defined with respect
to a class of models which distinguishes a point according to which truth in
that model amounts to truth at that point, solicits the characterization of a
family of connectives defined in terms of the distinguished point.
If verificationism is a theory about ordinary discourse, then any intuitively
coherent connective used in such discourse ought to admit of a constructively
acceptable semantics where expressive adequacy is a concern. A theory T is
expressively adequate with respect to a connective ♣ picked out by natural
language expressions if there is a connective ⊗ in the language of T which
corresponds, in an intuitive sense given the 2T -rules governing ⊗, to ♣. For
instance, IPC is expressively adequate with respect to conjunction to which
∧ corresponds. IPC is clearly not expressively adequate with respect to weak
and empirical negations, just as certain theories of truth (of e.g. Kripke) are
not expressively adequate with respect to “exclusion negation” (as opposed to
“choice negation”), the operation which takes an intermediate truth value to
truth in a three-valued semantics such as Kleene’s.
This expressive inadequacy sometimes brings with it predictable paradoxes
of an impoverished language as noted e.g. in [Wil94], where Williamson gener-
ates a Fitch-like paradox for an intuitionistic language enriched with an addi-
tional warrant operator K read ‘at some past, present or future time someone
possesses a warrant to assert A’. The argument runs as follows. The claim
that A will never be decided may be formalized as ¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A. But ¬KA
implies ¬A (shown below) which, together with ¬KA∧¬K¬A, yields the con-
tradiction ¬A∧¬¬A. Here is the argument Williamson gives, a mild variation
of Fitch’s original, to show that ¬KA implies ¬A.
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1. A ∧ ¬KA supposition
2. K(A ∧ ¬KA) 1 BHK interpretation
3. KA ∧K¬KA 2 distribution
4. KA ∧ ¬KA 3 axiom T
5. ¬(A ∧ ¬KA) 1,4 ¬I
6. ¬KA→ ¬A 5 intuitionistic propositional logic
If in line (1) we replace ¬ with∼ we can obtain everything up to the penultimate
line (even with intuitionistic negation out front), but we can not obtain the
conclusion, line (6).18
18Actually the paradox is blocked in a Kripke semantics for IPC with a standard-going
S5-like epistemic operator K since A ∧ ¬KA will then be consistent.

Chapter 4
Consequence relations for speech
acts and propositional attitudes
Abstract
Rationality applies to a broad range of speech acts and propo-
sitional attitudes. The problem is that such acts and attitudes
may not be rationally constrained by any of the usual notions
of consequence-as-truth-preservation (for some given understand-
ing of truth, e.g. truth as provability). In this chapter I consider
some other notions of consequence required in formulating rational-
ity constraints on doubting and denial in both classical and non-
classical settings. A complete labelled natural deduction system is
given for a logic of doubt which coincides with Strong Kleene logic.
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4.1 Introduction
A unary operator ∇ in a language L (also the concept ∇ is intended to repre-
sent, if there is one) is closed under an implication or consequence relation 2
(between sets of L-formulae and L-formulae1) when
(Closure) ∇A and A 2 B imply ∇B.
∇ is closed under converse implication when
(C-Closure) ∇B and A 2 B imply ∇A.
Typically one thinks of consequence in terms of truth preservation, so that
for a set Γ of sentences, Γ 2 A precisely when, relative to some class C of
models or interpretations for L, A is true under any M ∈ C whenever each
member of Γ is true under M . Some examples of operators closed under im-
plication are epistemic (knowledge) and doxastic (belief) operators when the
agents intended to be modeled are suitably idealized (e.g. they may be taken
to be “perfectly rational”). When the implication relation is representable by
an object-language operator ⇒ (i.e. an operator of L), we may state weaker
forms of closure such as closure under known or believed, etc. consequence.
For instance, when the agents are not perfectly rational (yet still ideal in a
weaker sense) it is more plausible that an epistemic operator K be closed un-
der known consequence rather than consequence unrestrictedly. That is, it is
more plausible that whenever KA and K(A ⇒ B) then KB, as this does not
imply what has come to be called “logical omniscience”—that an agent know
every consequence of whatever she knows.
It is quite familiar by now that a number of philosophically central inten-
sional operators fail to be closed under consequence or even naturally weakened
forms (e.g. known consequence), including deontic operators (“It ought to be
1Set-theoretic braces are omitted on the left of # according to the usual convention, and
the comma denotes set-theoretic union.
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the case that”), epistemic and doxastic ones and, as a paradigm case, nega-
tions. With regard to the latter, any such instance of closure might be seen as
committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent, and so no instance ought to
hold. This is a consequence of the fact that negation is closed under converse
implication (and also supposing that it is not a trivial operator satisfying ∇A
for all A) and the same is typically thought to hold for denial (taken as a speech
act) and rejection (taken as a propositional attitude).2
However, there are a number of interesting cases where denial fails to be
closed under converse implication because it fails to preserve falsity (though
it will always preserve untruth assuming consequence preserves truth) and,
moreover, falsity and denial are closely linked. (On some accounts it is not
falsity but untruth that is closely linked with denial.) For example, the usual
notions of superconsequence in supervaluationism fail to anti-preserve superfal-
sity, so if one thinks that whatever is superfalse ought to be denied, and perhaps
nothing else, then she cannot formulate this ought as a (possibly weakened)
closure condition along the lines of (Closure). In these cases consequence as
truth-preservation plays little to no role in defining suitable constraints on ra-
tional denial and rejection, whereas consequence as falsity-preservation does.
Thus one must distinguish two notions of consequence where the usual notion
as truth-preservation, the notion par excellence, regresses into the shadows.
In short, consequence as truth preservation is often not what we should or
do care about, especially in the larger context of theories of speech acts and
propositional attitudes.
There are many other cases where consequence as truth-preservation plays
no role in closure constraints. Some of these involve attitudes such as doubting,
wondering, entertaining, desiring, and so on. In these cases there may be no
close connection between the attitude and either truth or falsity. Consider
doubt. Should it be closed under consequence—or even any suitably weakened
candidate—or its converse? The former is answered with a resounding “No”.
2e.g. see [Res05] and [Res08] for an endorsement that denial and rejection are closed
under converse implication.
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Mundane counterexamples abound: I may doubt A but I do not doubt A→ A
for any A. Notice that this has nothing to do with ‘S doubts that. . . ’ being an
‘intensional’ operator which typically do not satisfy straightforward closure-
under-consequence principles. Closure under converse implication is a more
complicated matter, but on certain notions of doubt, e.g. as neither believing
nor disbelieving, this fails too. There are, however, notions of consequence
that do constrain doubt, though the semantic value which they preserve will
be something like the intermediate value of a three-valued semantics such as
Kleene’s.3
In this chapter I wish to discuss the connections between three things:
(i) the semantic values of a given semantic theory, (ii) consequence relations
defined as preservation of those various semantic values, and (iii) plausible con-
straints placed on rationally performing certain speech acts (such as denials)
or rationally possessing certain propositional attitudes (such as doubtings) ac-
cording to (Closure). One might think that there is no tight connection between
doubt and consequence, for one may doubt nearly anything they like (though
recalling a lesson learned from Descartes, not everything), even if they believe
it to be true. This intuition seems to be, in general, misguided as section 4.3
hopes to show.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 4.2 I discuss plausible philosoph-
ical motivations for rejecting the closure of denial under converse consequence-
as-truth-preservation. One involves semantic paradoxes, another supervalua-
tionism (which may arise from issues concerning vagueness or tense), and an-
other involving intuitionism. In regard to the semantic paradoxes, I take up an
argument which rejects any motivation the gap theorist might have for denying
the liar on the purported grounds that the liar is gappy. This supports a general
closure constraint on rational denial that mirrors analogous constraints placed
on both assertion and doubt. Section 4.3 provides a constraint on doubt anal-
3I should mention that there are two interesting limit cases according to which doubt is
closed under consequence as truth-preservation, viz. those of the trivialist and the “radical
skeptic”. The trivialist doubts nothing and the radical sceptic doubts everything, so each
doubts whatever follows from whatever she doubts.
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ogous to those for assertion and denial. A notion of doubt as agnosticism (and
hence one that excludes disbelief as a sufficient condition for dubitability) is
motivated by a close connection between (i) what may be asserted, denied and
doubted in mathematical discourse and (ii) Kleene’s three-valued semantics.
A natural deduction system for consequence as indeterminacy preservation is
given in section 4.6 and proved strongly complete.
4.2 Denial
It is typically thought (e.g. by Restall in [Res05] and [Res08]) that denial is
constrained by implication in the following way mentioned above:
(4.1) If A 2 B and B is deniable then so too is A,
where 2 denotes some relevant notion of consequence as truth-preservation.
But this constraint holds only on a particularly weak notion of denial, a notion
according to which A is deniable if it is not true. (Recall that something’s
being deniable does not mean it ought to be denied. It means it may be
denied.) There is, however, a stronger sense of denial whereby knowing or
having good reasons to believe a sentence is untrue does not always suffice
for its being deniable. Certain gap theorists will require that the denial of
a statement expresses a strong attitude toward it, namely the rejection of
that statement as being false. Since being untrue is not equivalent to being
false for a gap theorist, the untruth of a statement will not always suffice
for its being deniable. It would be indefensible for an intuitionist—and even
a classical mathematician—to deny Goldbach’s conjecture simply because it
is presently undecided and perhaps even undecidable (recalling that for an
intuitionist, truth is provability). She should remain agnostic instead, and
deny the conjecture only if she has a refutation of it; for all she knows, it may
be proved in the future. Since intuitionistic consequence does not anti-preserve
refutability, denial cannot be constrained by provability-preserving consequence
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as required in (4.1).4 We must instead distinguish two notions of consequence,
consequence as falsity-preservation and consequence as truth-preservation, and
formulate the constraint in terms of the former.5
For present purposes I wish to focus on the strong sense of denial because
of its close association with consequence relations that do not anti-preserve
some relevant notion of falsity, such as supervaluational consequence (as it is
usually formulated as preservation of supertruth) and its failure to anti-preserve
superfalsity. This is not to say that the weak notion of denial is not a sensible
one or one that is often employed in ordinary language. To be sure, it is.
One finds it featuring prominently in the literature on the liar paradox. Take
the gap theorist’s usual response to the liar sentence λ (‘λ is untrue’), holding
that it is neither true nor false. If they assert that λ is untrue then they are
asserting what, by their own lights, is untrue. But (most claim) it is a platitude
of assertibility that one ought to assert only what they take to be true (or at
least warranted in some sense), and since the gap theorist does not take the
liar to be true, she should not assert it. A typical response for the gap theorist
is to deny that his utterance of λ is not an assertion of any kind but rather a
denial, a denial that λ is true. Since λ is untrue and one ought to deny what
is untrue—on our present weak account of denial—the gap theorist’s denial of
λ seems correct.
So it appears the gap theorist has a reason for endorsing weak deniability.
But actually I think this is not the best response for her to make for two
reasons. The first is that, on a weak account of assertion and denial, the two
are no longer symmetric. There are two distinct grounds for the deniability of
a statement, that it be true or false, and only one for its assertibility, that it
4A caveat: intuitionistic logic IL anti-preserves refutability when arguments are restricted
to a single premise, but not otherwise. (Conjoining a finite number of premises doesn’t help
if we identify the denial of a conjunction of premises with the denial of at least one of the
conjuncts, as we should.) For if #IL ¬B and A #IL B then #IL ¬A. Yet we do not have (like
we do for classical logic), for Γ a set of sentences, that if Γ #IL A and #IL ¬A then there
is a γ ∈ Γ such that #IL ¬γ. That is, we don’t have generally that if some set of premises
implies a conclusion that is refutable then the premises are refutable too in the sense that at
least one of its members is.
5There is a familiar and important distinction between a statement being provable and
a statement having been proved. I have ignored them here but return to them in section 4.3.
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be true. But what grounds are there for breaking the symmetry? Why should
we not hold that the only grounds for deniability are falsity? The main reason
for denying whatever is gappy is that the liar is gappy in a way that warrants
its denial. But notice that not all gappy sentences are like this. According to
certain theories such as Kripke’s, the truthteller is also gappy (e.g. it is gappy
in the minimal fixed-point), but it is not clear that one ought to deny it, for
it is at least consistent (e.g. there are fixed-points in which it is true).6 One
might hold that only gappy paradoxical sentences should be denied, but this
response seems ad hoc. In any case, I think the gap theorist has a much better
response than to argue that an utterance of λ is really a denial that λ is true
rather than an assertion that λ is not true.
Suppose A is gappy. Then on certain widely held views about the ontology
of propositions (e.g. a Russellian one), A does not express a proposition, for
every proposition is either true or false and gaps occur only at the level of
sentences when they fail to express propositions. (I shall come to the gappy
propositions view below, endorsed by Milleans (about proper names) who hold
that some names fail to refer.) We may hold, quite sensibly, that A nevertheless
is meaningful (supposing it is well-formed or grammatical). There is no reason
to think that a sentence is meaningless if it fails to express a propositions or
that propositions ought to do the work of “meanings”.7
Now consider an alleged denial of our gappy A. Exactly what is one denying
when she allegedly denies that A? It cannot be a proposition since A does not
express one. But on most counts, denials are precisely denials of propositions
and only derivatively of other things insofar as those things (e.g. sentences)
express propositions.8 A denial is a judgment about a content, and where
6This assumes that there are no independent grounds for maintaining that the minimal
fixed-point is the right model or has priority over others in modeling truth.
7Unfortunately, this has often been the view, but it seems philosophers are starting to
tend away from it. For example, if one holds a truth-conditional theory of meaning then
a sentence can be meaningful, in the sense of having truth conditions, without expressing
a proposition. Of course, one need not endorse a truth-conditional theory of meaning to
uphold the distinction between meaning and proposition.
8This view—that the object of denials are propositions—is endorsed by e.g. Frege, Priest
in [Pri06], Smiley in [Smi96] and Parsons in [Par84].
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there’s no content, there’s no denial. The same goes for assertion, belief, and
so on (assuming propositions are the contents of these attitudes and acts).
Thus when the gap theorist utters the liar, she is neither asserting nor denying
anything. And to reemphasize, that doesn’t mean he isn’t saying anything
meaningful.
This may seem counterintuitive but it is a simple consequence of two basic
assumptions: (i) speech acts act on contents; (ii) gappy statements do not ex-
press contents. So if one holds that statements that fail to express propositions
may be denied in some sense, she will need to spell out precisely the sense she
has in mind. It will have to be a sense according to which at least one of (i)
or (ii) is given up, and I do not think this leaves one with a plausible sense of
denial.
One way of giving up (ii) and defending the view that gappy statements
express contents is to hold a gappy view of (Russellian) propositions according
to which what is expressed by a statement containing an irreferential expression
(e.g. a singular term or even a predicate—though we will consider only gaps
resulting form the former) is a gappy proposition. As an example, ‘Pegasus is
winged’ expresses the gappy proposition 〈∅, being winged〉, where ∅ represents
the denotation of ‘Pegasus’.9
Now let us consider the sentential liar, ‘This sentence is untrue’. Is it
gappy? We are supposing that the predicate ‘is untrue’ expresses a property
of propositions, so if the liar is gappy it must be because its subject term ‘This
sentence’ fails to refer. But it does refer. It refers to a sentence (type), viz. the
liar. So the sentential liar does not express a gappy proposition. What about
the propositional liar, ‘The proposition expressed by this sentence is untrue’? If
one believes that propositions just are set-theoretic objects or that propositions
are best represented by set-theoretic objects and that there are no non-well-
founded sets, then the propositional liar does not express a proposition. For if
9Other accounts simply put a blank or empty placeholder in for ∅. I prefer the use of ∅
since then propositions continue to be well-defined sets, on a par with non-gappy propositions.
Braun in [Bra93] gives precisely this account as well.
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it did, it would have to be a non-well-founded set.
Indeed, no self-referential statement expresses a proposition on this account.
The fact that self-referentiality is ruled-out at the propositional level, and on
well-motivated grounds arising from considerations of the ontology of proposi-
tions, I take to be an advantage of the standard Russellian account of propo-
sitions. Those who feel there is some draw to Russellian propositions but also
that self-referentiality ought not be barred at the level of propositions might
wish to allow for non-well-founded sets, as is done in [BE87]. I think to endorse
non-well-founded propositions is to confuse representation (e.g. cyclic graphs)
with the represented (i.e. non-well-founded sets). I can see no philosophical
grounds for thinking that non-well-founded sets exist.
One standard objection to holding that propositions are self-referential asks
how we can account for the truth of ‘This sentence is English’ which I assume is
true. That sentence is certainly self-referential but the proposition it expresses
most certainly is not, for the proposition refers to a sentence rather than a
proposition, let alone itself. How about the proposition expressed by ‘This
proposition is English’? It fails to express a proposition and even if it did, it
would be false, since propositions on most accounts are not in a language such
as English.
The only option left is to give up (i) and thereby hold that denials (and
assertions and the like) act on something other than contents, such as state-
ments. I find this rejoinder highly implausible. Statements are either meaning-
less, abstract syntactic expressions, and hence not the object of speech acts, or
otherwise they are syntactic expressions endowed with things that are meaning-
like or content-like. But these latter things just sound like propositions to me.
Alternatively one might think that when one asserts A what she intends to
express is something like ‘A expresses a true proposition’ and when she denies
A what she intends to express is something like ‘A either expresses a false
proposition or no proposition at all’. But again, I see no reason to deny ev-
ery statement that fails to express a proposition and so there is no reason to
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think that a denial of A amounts to expressing that A either expresses a false
proposition or no proposition at all.
So it seems the best thing for the gap theorist to say concerning the liar—
supposing she endorses a Russellian account of propositions and a well-founded
hierarchy of sets—is that she neither asserts nor denies it, and that when she
utters ‘λ is not true’ (where λ denotes that very sentence), she really asserts
something—not whatever is the purported content of λ since there is none, but
rather that λ fails to express a proposition and is hence untrue.
The consequence constraint and denial
Frege held that the denial of a statement amounts to no more than the assertion
of its negation, or at least that the content of a denied statement is always
equivalent to the content of an asserted one. He thus concluded that we may
reduce the number of judgment primitives to but one—assertion. Of course by
symmetry he could have argued the other way around—that the assertion of
a statement can be defined in terms of the denial of its negation, but ignoring
issues of conceptual priority, the point is simply that, out of the two notions,
we need only one of them to do the required work.
The problem with Frege’s equivalence thesis is that it fails according to any
glut theory in which assertion and denial, or more plausibly assertibility and
deniability, are mutually exclusive. Since a glut theorist both asserts A and
¬A for certain A (e.g. the liar), she cannot maintain that the assertibility of
¬A implies the deniability of A.
Actually she could maintain this since she is a glut theorist—it would con-
stitute just another glut in her theory. But if she wants to express genuine
disagreement with anyone she should not posit any gluts in her theory of as-
sertion and denial. For if the two are not exclusive then I see no way for the
glut theorist to express disagreement with others; asserting the negation will
not do and neither will denying what the other asserts, and there is no point in
positing other exclusive speech acts to do the work. It is worth noting that on
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a normative theory about what one ought to (rather than may) assert, Priest is
fine with conflicting obligations (e.g. see [Pri06]), so what one ought to assert
and what one ought to deny are not exclusive. Priest does, however, believe
that the attitudes of acceptance and rejection are exclusive. If we think as-
sertion merely expresses acceptance and denial merely expresses rejection, as
likely most do (e.g. see [Smi96]), then correctly asserting and correctly denying
will come to the same thing as accepting and rejecting, and so the two will
be exclusive. From hereon I assume a notion of assertibility and deniability
according to which the pair is exclusive, a property I take to be something of
a platitude.
The equivalence thesis also fails for gap theories in which being gappy suf-
fices for being deniable. If A is gappy then so too is ¬A (assuming negation is
choice negation), so both are deniable and hence neither is assertible. But not
all gap theories allow denial to come so easily as from a mere lack of truth value,
and those that do not will in general need to distinguish falsity-preserving con-
sequence from truth-preserving consequence when formulating a constraint on
deniability along the lines sketched above.
4.3 Doubt
Jim and Max are having a conversation about their plans to attend the theatre
tonight:
Jim: I doubt Sarah will be at the theatre tonight.
Max: But Paula won’t be there unless Sarah is.
Max: So you must doubt that Paula will be there too.
The inference made by Max seems prima facie valid. Indeed it looks like an
instance of modus tollens where ‘It is doubted that. . . ’ replaces negation, ‘It is
not the case that. . . ’ The reason the argument looks valid is that if Jim doubts
B and believes A implies B then he certainly cannot believe A (supposing
104 CHAPTER 4. CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS FOR SPEECH ACTS. . .
belief is closed under believed implications and Jim is rational). (One might
recognize this principle as a thesis of Richard Kilvington.) But then he knows
he must hold that A is false or dubitable, and if he holds that A is false—i.e.
he disbelieves A—then, on certain accounts, it is dubitable. So in either case
Jim ought to doubt A (or at least he may, though in this case the stronger
obligation seems more appropriate). It looks then as if doubt, just like denial,
is closed under (believed) converse implication: if B is dubitable and A implies
B then A too is dubitable.
An account of doubt according to which disbelief implies dubitability is
reasonable on some ordinary uses of the term, but not on all. There is a no-
tion of doubt as agnosticism according to which disbelief rules out doubt, for
if one disbelieves a statement she cannot also be agnostic with respect to it.
(By being agnostic with respect to A I mean that neither A nor its negation
is believed, i.e. that neither A is believed nor disbelieved.) I shall fix on this
latter notion of doubt since it seems to be one that arises naturally in con-
structive mathematics or more generally theories in which assertion and denial
are epistemically constrained.10 A natural interpretation of the conditions un-
der which a statement is assertible, deniable and dubitable—in the context
of mathematics—is that the statement be proved, refuted or neither, respec-
tively. That is, the following conditions plausibly constrain assertion, denial
and doubt:
(Assert) A is assertible iff A is proved;
(Deny) A is deniable iff A is refuted;
(Doubt) A is dubitable iff A is undecided.
10In [Sal95], Salmon defines doubt in A disjunctively as either disbelief in or agnosticism
with respect to A. This notion of doubt is weaker than doubt as agnosticism and, on the
assumption that agents are consistent in their beliefs, equivalent to (modulo the usual normal
modal logics of belief, e.g. K4) doubt as non-belief. For the most part I shall, but needn’t,
make this consistency assumption (typically encoded by the schema “D”, $A → ♦A), and
so Salmon’s disjunctive account turns out not very plausible.
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We need not think these constraints apply only to constructivists. Pre-
sumably they ought to apply to classicists as well. It would seem irrational
for a classicist to assert (deny) Goldbach’s conjecture without having actually
obtained a proof (refutation). And without a proof that the conjecture is ei-
ther provable or refutable one would not be warranted in asserting that that
is assertible either. Of course that does not amount to denying an instance
of excluded middle so the classicist is not in any trouble, and she may even
still hold that the conjecture is either assertible or deniable if she holds that a
sentence is assertible (deniable) iff it is true (false). But being assertible hardly
seems equivalent to being true for truth seems at most a necessary condition
on assertibility and not a sufficient one, and likewise for deniability and falsity.
Doubt as agnosticism is not closed under (believed) converse implication.
Looking back at the example conversation we can see why. Jim might doubt
that Sarah will be at the theatre while disbelieving that Paula will be. Since
disbelief is incompatible with doubt in the present agnostic sense, Jim cannot
doubt that Paula will be at the theatre. (Sometimes in contexts like the one
Max and Jim are in, ‘I doubt A’ means ‘I disbelieve A’. e.g. consider ‘I doubt
you can hit the bullseye!’ uttered during a game of darts. In these cases doubt
as disbelief is closed under converse implication.) So if the agnostic sense of
doubt is neither constrained by implication nor converse implication, by which
notion of consequence, if any, is it constrained?
In answering that question let us consider again the properties of being
proved, refuted and undecided. Clearly they are pairwise mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive over the set of all statements, i.e. every statement has
precisely one of the properties. Suppose we take these properties as semantic
values in a theory of assertion, denial and doubt. Perhaps surprisingly we find
that they behave just like the values in a strong three-valued Kleene matrix.
We have:
• ¬A is undecided iff A is;
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• A ∧ B is undecided iff both A, B are, or if just one is then the other is
not refuted;
• A ∨ B is undecided iff both A, B are, or if just one is then the other is
not proved.
(Implication would be the only tricky case under a constructive notion of proof,
but under a classical notion of proof we can simply define A → B in one of
the usual ways, e.g. by ¬(A ∧ ¬B), whereupon A→ B would be undecided iff
both A and ¬B are, or if just one is then the other is not refuted. If one is
inclined to think constructively about proof, then implication will be left out of
the analogy between undefinedness in Kleene semantics and being undecided.)
Clearly the following constraints on assertibility and deniability hold.
(Assert-Cl) If A is assertible and it has been proved that A implies B then
B is assertible.11
(Deny-Cl) If B is deniable and it has been proved that A implies B then A
is deniable.
That is, assertion and denial are closed under proved implications and the
converse of proved implications, respectively. Now what sort of analogous con-
straint could we place on dubitability? When the relevant notion of implica-
tion is the same for each assertibility, deniability and dubitability, then no such
analogous constraint exists. We need a notion of implication as preservation of
undecidedness.12
11It is important to note that ‘assertibility’ means ‘may be asserted’ and not ‘has been
asserted’ or ‘must be asserted’. Obviously one may assert A without having any sort of obli-
gation, even rational, to assert B when A implies B and even when he knows the implication
holds, for in the former case maybe he has never even considered A, or in the latter case
maybe it would take more than a lifetime to assert it.
12Suppose we had decided to opt for provability rather than provedness and likewise for
refutedness and undecidedness. Then even for intuitionistic logic, the general case of con-
dition (Deny-Cl) requires a consequence relation preserving refutability (in a multi-premise
setting) that differs from the converse of the provability-preserving relation, since provability-
preserving consequence does not anti-preserve refutability.
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4.4 Doubt in Kleene logic
Let 〈0, 1, 2〉 be the order of truth values of the three-valued strong Kleene
matrix K3, where 0 is falsity, 1 undefinedness and 2 truth. Then let us call
2-consequence (or 2-implication) the relation of 2-preservation from sets of
formulae to formulae defined over K3, and 1-consequence and 0-consequence to
be the relations of 1-preservation and 0-preservation similarly defined. I denote
these relations respectively by 22K3 , 21K3 and 20K3 . Since 22K3 is well-known I
refer to it also as simply K3. The use of the term ‘consequence relation’ to
apply to these relations is justified since each of them satisfies overlap (Γ 2 A if
A ∈ Γ), dilution (Γ′ 2 A if Γ 2 A and Γ ⊆ Γ′), and cut (if Γ 2 A and ∆, A 2 B
then Γ,∆ 2 B). Sometimes such relations are called Tarskian. If we require
also structurality for being Tarskian, then these relations are Tarskian in this
stronger sense too. I am omitting set braces for singletons on the left of 2 as
is standard, and the comma ‘,’ is to be read as set-theoretic union on both the
left and right of 2.
Given the above conditions (Assert), (Deny) and (Dobut), the following
three constraints are each plausible:
(Assert-Cl) If A is assertible and A 2-implies B then B is assertible;
(Deny-Cl) If A is deniable and A 0-implies B then B is deniable;
(Doubt-Cl) If A is dubitable and A 1-implies B then B is dubitable.
There are a number of benefits of distinguishing a consequence relation
2sK3 for each truth value s. The first is that each constraint can be given in
a uniform way: each of the conditions is subsumed under a general schema
which we might call (X-Cl) for X a speech act or attitude. Second, if 2 is a
truth-preserving consequence relation, it does not follow that its converse is a
falsity-preserving consequence relation. In general it does not follow that it is
an s-preserving consequence relation for any distinct semantic value s. This
is true of 22K3 which anti-preserves either falsity or indeterminacy, but never
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always one or the other. Thus distinguishing various notions of consequence
may in fact be a necessity when specifying constraints for certain speech acts
or attitudes.
However, it will not always be a necessity. In certain cases, e.g. in classical
logic, it is not a necessity since consequence anti-preserves falsity, but many
logics are not like classical logic in this respect. For example, supervaluation-
ist consequence fails to anti-preserve superfalsity (when consequence is taken
“globally”), intuitionistic logic fails to anti-preserve refutability (in the general
multi-premise case), the logic of paradox LP fails to anti-preserve falsity, and
so on. This is why many non-classicists have been forced into distinguishing
denial as a sui generis speech act that is not reducible to assertion of negation.
They have had to give up what might be called ‘Frege’s thesis’, viz. that de-
nial just is the assertion of a negation, and they have had to give up the tight
connection between negation, denial and falsity. For example, a gap theorist
can deny A because it is gappy without asserting ¬A. Dually, a glut theorist
can assert ¬A because it is glutty without denying A.
So dubitability as undecidedness is constrained by 1-consequence. For a
presentation of what 1-consequence looks like the reader is deferred to sec-
tion 4.6 where a natural deduction system is given and then proved strongly
complete with respect to its intended semantics.
While Doubt-Cl provides a plausible constraint on doubt in mathematical
discourse, on the assumption that doubt is in these circumstances epistemically
constrained, does it also provide a plausible constraint for doubt as it occurs in
other discourses where it may not be epistemically constrained? In general it
does not, and the reason for this is tied to the reason “classical gap theorists”,
for whom doubt is not epistemically constrained, opt for supervaluationist se-
mantics over strong Kleene semantics since only on the former do all classical
principles come out valid.
On the last remark there is a caveat. Consequence may be defined in a
number of ways. The standard is the truth-preservational definition according
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to which A is a consequence of Γ just in case every model in which each member
of Γ is true, A is true too. Another is to define consequence as the impossibility
of the truth of each of the premises together with the falsity of the conclusion.
On this definition of consequence over K3, all classical principles come out
valid. I do not think consequence as truth-preservation has any priority over
the “never true premises and false conclusion” definition. The fact that the
two coincide for classical logic may be seen as showing that neither has priority.
There is then an argument to be made for the strong Kleene semantics as a
gappy semantics that a classical gap theorist could accept since it admits of
formulae taking an intermediate truth value while holding that the tautologies
are the formulae that are never false rather than those that are always true.
4.5 Doubt in modal logic
Atheists do not doubt that God exists, they disbelieve it. Suppose we wish to
model this sense of ‘doubt’ so that ‘I doubt God exists’ comes out false when
uttered by an atheist. A natural definition in a doxastic language with belief
operators is given by
>A := ♦A ∧ ♦¬A.
It is easy to see that doubt, in this sense, is also not closed under converse
implication. So, again, we need another notion of consequence under which
doubt is closed.
Notice that > is just a contingency operator. Logics in which > is taken
as primitive rather than definable in terms of a doxastic $ have been studied
in the literature under the guise of logics for “contingency” or, equivalently,
“non-contingency” where non-contingency ∇ is defined by ∇ := ¬>. They
were first investigated in [MR66] (though only for logics extending KT, i.e.
non-doxastic logics), and later in [Mor76], [Cre88], [Hum95] and [Kuh95] (the
latter two for logics not necessarily extending KT). Suppose our doxastic base
for $ is K4. Then the logic K4> of doubt (or contingency, as it were) is the
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consequence relation 2K4% generated by the following axioms and rules.
• >A ≡ >¬A
• ∇A ∧>(A ∧B)→>B
• ∇A ∧>(A ∨B)→ ∇(¬A ∨ C)
• If 2 A then 2 ∇A
• If 2 A ≡ B then 2 ∇A ≡ ∇B
• If 2 A and 2 A→ B then 2 B
K4> is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke structures with
a transitive accessibility relation.
The logic of > turns out interestingly similar to the logic of U in the signed
proof system for 21K3 (given below). For example the following characteristic
principles hold:
• From >(A ∧B) and >(A ∨B) it follows that >A and >B;
• >A is interdeducible with >¬A;
• From >(A⊗B) (for ⊗ ∈ {∨,∧}) either >A or >B.
One crucial difference is that we no longer have that from >A and >B infer
>(A ⊗ B). A classicist (or supervaluationist) might rejoice—for just because
both A and its negation are dubitable it does not follow that A∨¬A is, as 21K3
would have it.
So contingency logics can do double duty as logics of dubitability. Although
this connection between contingency and dubitability has gone unnoticed in
the literature, its application to the area of imposing rational constraints on
propositional attitudes akin to doubting is certainly compelling. One should
not be too surprised as a quick comparison of metaphysical and epistemic
modalities reveals the same. Indeed, S5 necessity has been doing double duty
as an alethic and an epistemic operator for quite some time.
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4.6 Consequence as 1-preservation
The following natural deduction system for Kleene’s strong three-valued logic is
a signed system in the sense that the formulae of the proof language are signed
formulae of the object language, where intuitively each sign represents an as-
signment of truth value to the formulae to which it is appended. It is worth
briefly remarking as to why a signed, rather than unsigned, natural deduction
system was chosen. Typically the notions of consistency and satisfiability are
equivalent, where a set is j-satisfiable if there is a model (valuation) in which
each of its members is assigned the semantic value j, and a set is consistent if
it does not contain some special subset of formulae (e.g. {⊥} or the set of all
formulae). In the case of 1-satisfiability there is no interesting notion of con-
sistency, since every subset of formulae is 1-satisfiable (e.g. under a valuation
which assigns to the atomic constituents of each member of the set the value
1). The problem of proving completeness for a logic in which every subset is
consistent can be quite elusive.
Another nice feature of the signed system below is that, for the entire
range of semantic values j, a consequence relation as j-preservation is easily
determined. In the case of the Kleene matrix K3, one may easily determine
consequence as 0-, 1-, and 2-preservation defined over K3. Such is done for
1-preservation in Definition 4.6.1 and can be easily adapted to j-preservation
for each 0 ≤ j ≤ 2.
We begin with some notational conventions. Signs F , U and T are also
denoted by S0, S1 and S2 respectively and i, j, and k denote integers in {0, 1, 2}.
We let A, B, etc. range over unsigned formulae of the object language, and φ,
ψ, etc. range over signed formulae of the proof language. Similarly, Γ and ∆
range over sets of unsigned formulae and Σ and Θ over sets of signed formulae.
SjΓ is the result of replacing each A ∈ Γ with SjA, i.e. SjΓ = {SiA : A ∈ Γ}.
The system KI has the following rules.
















































In RAA and ()I the indices j, k and l are pairwise distinct and () is an expres-
sion exclusively of the proof language which plays the role of absurdity. Thus
it occurs only in applications of RAA and ()I and nowhere else.
We define a relation 2UK3 (to correspond to |=1K3) between sets of unsigned
formulae and unsigned formulae in the following natural way:
Definition 4.6.1. Γ 2UK3 A iff UΓ 2K3 UA.
The relations 2TK3 and 2FK3 are defined in parallel fashion, substituting T and
respectively F everywhere for U .
Completeness
Definition 4.6.2. Let Σ be a set of signed formulae. We say Σ is consistent
if Σ ,2 () and Σ is maximal if for all formulae A, SjA ∈ Σ for some j ≤ 2.
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Lemma 4.6.3. Every consistent set of signed formulae can be extended to (i.e.
is included in) a Lindenbaum set (also called ‘maximally consistent set’).
Proof. Suppose Σ is consistent and let A1, . . . be an enumeration of all unsigned
formulae. Let Σ0 = Σ. Define recursively
Σn =

Σn−1 ∪ {TAn} if it is consistent;
Σn−1 ∪ {FAn} if it is consistent;




That Σ′ is consistent follows immediately by construction. For maximality
suppose for reductio that Σ′ is not maximal. Then there is an An s.t. SjAn ,∈ Σ′
for each j ≤ 2. By construction Σn−1 ∪ {An} is inconsistent for each j ≤ 2.
By RAA, Σn−1 2K3 SjAn for each j ≤ 2. Whence by ()I, Σn−1 is inconsistent
contra construction.
Lemma 4.6.4. If UΓ ,2K3 UA then either UΓ ∪ {TA} or UΓ ∪ {FA} can be
extended to a Lindenbaum set.
Proof. Suppose UΓ ,2K3 UA and, for reductio, that neither UΓ ∪ {TA} nor
UΓ ∪ {FA} is consistent. Then UΓ, TA 2K3() and UΓ, FA 2K3(). By RAA,
UΓ 2K3 UA contra hypothesis. Whence either UΓ ∪ {TA} or IΓ ∪ {FA}
is consistent, so by Lemma 4.6.3 at least one of them can be extended to a
Lindenbaum set.
Lemma 4.6.5 (Model existence). Let Σ be a Lindenbaum set. Then there is
a K3-valuation v s.t. for each A, SjA ∈ Σ iff v(A) = j for j ≤ 2.
Proof. Suppose Σ is a Lindenbaum set. Define an assignment α : Prop →
{0, 1, 2} by
α(p) =

0 if Fp ∈ Σ;
1 if Up ∈ Σ;
2 otherwise, i.e. if Tp ∈ Σ.
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It is easily verified by the maximal consistency of Σ that α is well-defined
(i.e. total and functional). We extend α to a unique valuation v : Form →
{0, 1, 2} to arbitrary formulae according to usual recursive clauses for K3. The
rest of the proof proceeds by induction on formula complexity. The base case is
trivial, so assume the inductive hypothesis (IH) holds for formulae of complexity
less than A’s. We do only the cases for ¬ and ∧.
Case 1. A := ¬B. We have T¬B ∈ Σ iff FB ∈ Σ iff, by IH, v(B) = 0 iff
v(¬B) = 2. Moreover, F¬B ∈ Σ iff TB ∈ Σ iff, by IH, v(B) = 2 iff v(¬B) = 0.
Finally, I¬B ∈ Σ iff IB ∈ Σ iff, by IH, v(B) = 1 iff v(¬B) = 1.
Case 2. A := B ∧ C. We have TB ∧ C ∈ Σ iff TB, TC ∈ Σ iff, by IH,
v(B) = v(C) = 2 iff v(B ∧ C) = 2. Moreover, FB ∧ C ∈ Σ iff FB ∈ Σ or
FC ∈ Σ. W.l.o.g. suppose the former. Then FB ∈ Σ iff, by IH, v(B) = 1 iff
V (B ∧ C) = 0. Finally IA ∧ B ∈ Σ iff either (i) IA, IB ∈ Σ, (ii) IA, TB ∈ Σ,
(iii) IB, TA ∈ Σ. If (i) then by IH v(A) = v(B) = 1 iff v(A ∧ B) = 1. If
(b) then by IH v(A) = 1 and v(B) = 2 iff v(A ∧ B) = 1. If (iii) then by IH
v(B) = 1 and v(C) = 2 iff v(A ∧B) = 1.
Theorem 4.6.6 (Completeness). If Γ |=1K3 A then Γ 2UK3 A.
Proof. Suppose Γ ,2UK3 A. Then either UΓ ∪ {FA} or UΓ ∪ {TA} can be
extended to a Lindenbaum set Σ by Lemma 4.6.4 and by Definition 4.6.1. In
either case it follows immediately by Lemma 4.6.5 that there is a valuation v
s.t. ∀γ ∈ Γ, v(γ) = 1 and either v(A) = 0 or v(A) = 2. Whence Γ ,|=1K3 A.
Contraposing, completeness follows.
4.7 Final remarks
We saw how to formulate rationality constraints on speech acts and attitudes,
and in paritcular doubting, in a uniform way by distinguishing consequence 2s
defined in terms of s-preservation for some given semantic value s. Thus if one
has a particular attitude toward A and A 2s B then one ought to have the
same attitude toward B. With regard to denial and rejection, s is often taken
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to be a given notion of falsity, e.g. superfalsity of supervaluationism, which
may or may not be anti-preserved by consequence defined in terms of truth
(e.g. supertruth) preservation as in the case of supervaluational consequence
or consequence relations defined over an n ≥ 3-valued semantics. What this
highlights in the broad context of formulating rationality constraints on speech
acts and propositional attitudes generally is the importance of, not just truth
and truth-preserving consequence, but other truth values and consequence re-
lations preserving just these values.

Chapter 5
On the nature of truth values
Abstract
Truth values are commonly employed in formal semantics for both
logic and natural language, but if we suppose that correct seman-
tical theories ought to be broadly representational then questions
concerning the precise nature of truth values arise: Just what are
they (representing)? I provide an answer to this question within
a truthmaker framework. One surprising consequence of the ac-
count is that there is but a single truth value, truth. I finally
consider some results of Suszko, Routley and Thomason adapted
to the present case to show that every logic has a one-valued se-
mantics, thereby vindicating the present philosophical defense of a
single truth value.
5.1 Introduction
Truth values play a central role in contemporary semantical theories. If we
suppose semantical theories ought to be broadly representational then ques-
tions concerning the precise nature of those values arise: just what are they
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(representing)? Frege took them to be the referents of sentences but besides
their role in semantical theory, he said nothing (besides a vague remark) about
their nature. In this paper I wish to elucidate their nature within the frame-
work of truthmaker theory. One surprising consequence of the account is that
there is but a single truth value, truth. If truth is the only truth value then
false propositions do not refer to anything and it follows that a semantics, if
it is to be genuinely representational, must be one-valued (or “monovalent”).
This entails, again surprisingly, widespread semantic gappiness: i.e. the (in-
tended) semantics for most logics, and this includes classical, intuitionistic
and relevant logics, is gappy. In 5.4 I consider results of Suszko, Routley and
Thomason adapted to the present case to show that every logic has a one-
valued semantics, thereby vindicating the present philosophical defense of a
single truth value.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 5.2 I discuss Frege’s view of
truth values as sui generis objects. I then give a philosophical defense of
widespread semantic gappiness in section 5.3 backed up by the formal results
of section 5.4. Finally I give an account of truth values in section 5.5 which
rejects truthmaker maximalism (on which see section 5.6) in favor of a version
restricted to positive propositions, a characterization of which is given in section
5.7. While negative truths fail to have truthmakers, the account of truthmaking
given here is otherwise very inclusive, covering both universal and intensional
positive propositions (sections 5.7 and 5.7) as having truthmakers of the most
plausible sort.
5.2 Frege on truth values
Frege was the first to argue for truth values as sui generis objects rather than
e.g. properties of sentences (or propositions and derivatively of sentences). He
believed there to be precisely two of them, ‘the true’ and ‘the false’:
By the truth value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that
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it is true or false. There are no further truth values. For brevity I
call the one the true, the other the false. Every declarative sentence
concerned with the referents of its words is therefore to be regarded
as a proper name, and its referent, if it exists, is either the true or
the false. [Fre48, p. 216]
The view that sentences refer to truth values follows naturally on Frege’s view
because he treated sentences on a par with proper names, each referring to
saturated entities, unlike function expressions and (open) predicates which refer
to unsaturated entities such as functions or concepts. Since proper names have
both a sense and a referent, so too must sentences.1 Now there are many
candidates available to play the role of sentence referents, and Frege’s choice of
truth values or senses (the latter, e.g., in indirect speech reports) to play that
role was based on two principal arguments. The first is that, he claims, “It is
the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the
referent” [Fre48, p. 216].
The second argument he states thus:
“The thought that 5 is a prime number is true” contains only a
thought, and indeed the same thought as the simple “5 is a prime
number.” It follows that the relation of the thought to the true may
not be compared with that of subject to predicate. Subject and
predicate (understood in the logical sense) are indeed elements of
thought; they stand on the same level for knowledge. By combining
1There is likely more to the story than this. For one, Frege held a principle of compo-
sitionality whereby sentences must have semantic values if they are to play any semantic
contribution to the sentential wholes of which they form a part. Frege took these values to
be truth values and senses. But the fact that the semantics requires sentences to have a se-
mantic value does not lend compelling argument for the view that natural language sentences
refer to truth values. In modern semantic theory for natural languages, the semantic value
of quantifiers are, e.g., functions from properties to truth values or (in generalized quantifier
theory) relations between relations defined over the domain. It does not follow, however,
that we should take serious the idea that quantifiers refer to anything let alone relations
between relations defined over the actual domain. We might instead favor broadly truth
conditional (e.g. Tarskian) semantics which endow sentences with meanings, not in virtue
of assigning each of their subsentential parts semantic values as referents, but in virtue of
their having truth conditions. The meaning of (non-sentential) subsentential expressions is
the contribution they make to the truth conditions (or determination of such conditions) of
sentences of which they form a part.
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subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes
from sense to reference, never from a thought to its truth value.
One moves at the same level but never advances from one level to
the next. A truth value cannot be a part of a thought, any more
than say the sun can, for it is not a sense but an object. [Fre48, p.
217]
These arguments are not persuasive to establish what Frege wanted, viz. that
truth and falsity are objects rather than properties and, moreover, that sen-
tences refer to them.2 But I do think that Frege was right about the kind of
thing truth values are—they are circumstances or states of affairs of a very
particular sort, viz. the maximal sort (on which more later).
I wish to fill a major gap in Frege’s argument by specifying what the cir-
cumstance that a sentence is true should mean, not according to Frege, but
according to a truthmaker theorist. I follow Frege in holding that truth may
be regarded as an object in its own right, but I am not wedded to the view
that truth must be an object rather than a property (where properties are not
themselves taken as objects in the relevant sense). If truth is an object—and
this would require some argument—then the account given here provides a
reduction of its status from primitive to something more intelligible, indeed
something completely ordinary in kind.
If truth is an object and sentences are true in virtue of referring to or being
assigned truth, then a truth property can be derivatively defined by saying that
2One obvious problem with Frege’s argument for discounting truth as a property is that
it begs the question; it presupposes that truth is an object referred to by sentences and that
knowing that a sentence is true just comes to knowing the referent of the sentence. Another
problem is that taking truth values as primitive does not tell us anything substantive about
the nature of those values. While Frege does say that truth values are circumstances of a
certain kind, this gloss is of little help in understanding what he meant. For the circumstance
that a given truth (falsity) is true (false) is precisely the same circumstance that any other
given truth (falsity) is true (false). A circumstance, in this sense, could only be something like
a maximal state of affairs. But there is only one such state of affairs (assuming it is actual
rather than merely possible) and there are two truth values, so a circumstance in Frege’s
sense cannot even be a maximal state of affairs unless there is, quite dubiously, something
like a negative maximal state of affairs. Allowing for merely possible states of affairs will
not help since there will be more than just two maximal ones—indeed there will be infinitely
many—making any given sentence true or false. If one accepts Frege’s distinction between
concept and object (see [Fre92]) then the claim that sentences refer to truth values becomes
more plausible.
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a proposition has the property just in case it refers to or is assigned the object
truth. (Moving in the other direction, from the property to the object, is not
always guaranteed; i.e. there may be a property of truth without any derivative
sense of truth as an object.) So even taking truth primarily as an object, it still
makes sense to speak of truth derivatively as a property of truthbearers. Truth-
as-object talk does not rule out truth-as-property talk. Concerning whether
sentences refer to anything, let alone truth values, will not concern me here.
5.3 Every logic is gappy
The notions of a gappy theory and a gappy logic (where a logic is understood as
a multiple- or single-conclusion consequence relation and a theory is understood
as a set of sentences closed under a given logic) vary greatly in the literature.
On my favored conception of gappiness, every logic is gappy. But before moving
to such a conception, first consider some of the usual frontrunners. (I will, for
the moment, concentrate only on gappy theories rather than logics but a lot of
what is said about theories can be said about logics as well, and in particular
everything about semantic accounts of gappy theories discussed below.3) On
one view a gappy theory contains, for some sentence A, neither A nor its
negation ¬A—i.e. gappiness is incompleteness. But then incomplete theories
containing excluded middle, viz. A ∨ ¬A for every A, turn out gappy and
this seems counterintuitive especially if the intended semantics of the theory is
bivalent. In the least, an account of gappiness should not rule out that theories
for which excluded middle holds be gapless. Ideally it should be at least neutral
with respect to such cases.
Another account takes a gappy theory to be one that does not contain
A∨¬A for some A. Accordingly, certain intuitionistic theories are gappy. But
this is incompatible with plausible intuitionistic theories of truth. For let T be
a truth predicate for the language of such a theory. Then granting plausible
3One may also take logics to be a species of theories if logics are defined as sets of
sentences which are, by definition, closed under themselves. However, such a definition of a
logic is not sufficiently discriminating.
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properties of the truth predicate, there is a sentence A such that ¬T ("A#) ∧
¬T ("¬A#). By an intuitionistically acceptable De Morgan’s law, ¬(T ("A#) ∨
T ("¬A#)), and by T ("¬A#) → ¬T ("A#) and closure under substitution of
provable implications we have ¬(T (A)∨¬T (A)), an intuitionistic contradiction.
So intuitionistic logic is not gappy assuming some very plausible assumptions
about truth.
Finally should we say a gappy theory is one couched in a language L whose
semantics (intended or not) does not assign a semantic value (under some
interpretation) to some sentence of L? Such an account renders any n ≥ 3-
valued semantics employing total valuation functions, such as the semantics
for theories based on strong Kleene logic, gapless contrary to such theories be-
ing considered paradigm cases of gappy theories. An obvious modification to
this account requires that the semantics be intended ; i.e. a theory is gappy if
its intended semantics (supposing it has one) has a value that is intended to
represent a gap. But what does it mean for something to represent a gap if
there is nothing to be represented? A piece of mathematics does representing
according to whether there is something in the world it suitably matches with
respect to certain relevant structural characteristics. A truth value gap does
not exist so it does not have structural characteristics and things that do not
exist cannot be represented. There just is no way to represent—and here I
do not mean just model—a truth value gap.4 The only plausible reworking
of the last formulation of gappiness is to require that there be some intended
representational semantics (I do not assume uniqueness of intended semantics,
and it is important here that the semantics be both intended and representa-
tional) according to which some sentence fails to receive a value (under some
interpretation). In the case of strong Kleene semantics, the total three-valued
assignments ought to be replaced by partial two-valued assignments and the
truth conditions of complex formulae modified in the obvious way. One then
gets an equivalent semantics that is gappy in what I take to be the correct
4There is some debate about this when ‘gap’ means something like ‘hole’ and not ‘truth
value gap’. See e.g. [VC09].
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sense.5
(There are other accounts of gappiness that I will not discuss here, such
as one which deems a theory gappy just in case it is not prime, i.e. in case it
contains, for some A and some B, A ∨ B and yet it contains neither disjunct.
Such an account is arguably much too inclusive. Another account, endorsed
by Field [Fie08], deems a truth theory (e.g. KFS) gappy (distinct from his
“paracomplete”) just in case it contains ¬(T ("A#) ∨ T ("¬A#)) for some A.
The account is plausible but limited since it applies only to truth theories
couched in languages containing their own truth predicate. Also limited is an
account that regards a theory as gappy if for some A neither A nor its (or
a) negation ¬A fail to receive a value for it requires of the language that it
contain a suitable negation having certain properties. A semantic conception
of gappiness is, thus, more flexible.)
But it is not just a reification of gaps that undermines the “semantics as
representational” project. A reification of falsity is just as troubling, for there
is nothing in reality which corresponds to falsity—not absences, lacks, negative
facts or states of affairs or polarities. In particular, classical logic is gappy, for
sentences that are not true should not be assigned any semantic value since
falsity does not exist. Wittgenstein [Wit21, 4.43] made the observation that
classical logic could make do with a one-valued semantics but it is not clear
whether he drew any significant ontological consequences from the observa-
tion.6 I shall draw such consequences here by arguing for an account of the
nature of truth values from which it follows that only truth exists.
One might think the existence of a single truth value would seriously jeop-
ardize the enterprise of working out representational semantics for non-classical
5Kripke [Kri75, footnote 18] appears to take this view regarding his intended interpre-
tation of the fixed-point construction, here being different from the semantics he actually
employs, which he regards as not involving a truth value in addition to truth and falsity.
6Black [Bla64] calls the ‘P-theory’ one on which false propositions “picture” merely pos-
sible situations and true ones picture actual situations. If Wittgenstein held the P-theory
then he could not have been considered an atomist in the sense most have in mind. On the
other hand, if he rejected the P-theory, as Read [Rea05] argues, then he may be interpreted
as having rejected a reification of falsity and having endorsed a gappy conception of classical
truth-functional logic.
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logics that are typically characterized by semantics which posit more than one
truth value. But, in the spirit of Suszko [Sus76] (or more accurately, a close
cousin), we can think of the values assigned to sentences other than truth, not
as truth values, but as mere “algebraic” or “semantic” values such as credences
of belief. Whatever one thinks about Suszko’s thesis restricted to a single log-
ical value, every logic has a one-valued semantics.7 This result follows from
some trivial consequences of results found in [Sus76], [Tho76] and [Rou75], the
philosophical upshots of which are defended in section 5.7.
5.4 One-valued semantics
Most semantics for formal languages are given in terms of an n ≥ 2-valued se-
mantics. It is not always clear that for such languages there exists an equivalent
one-valued semantics. In general for any language given an n-valued seman-
tics, it is not clear that there is an equivalent m < n-valued semantics, where
equivalence means identity of consequence relations defined in the same man-
ner, e.g. as preservation of a certain kind of semantic value, e.g. the designated
ones. For instance, it is not clear that a finitely-valued semantics can be given
for the usual continuum-valued $Lukasiewicz logic.8 It is clear that we can do
so for classical logic by replacing the total assignment functions from atomic
formulae to two truth values by partial assignments from atoms to a single
truth value. We then get a gappy semantics for classical logic. To be specific,
let Prop = {p1, . . . } be the set of atomic formulae of the language and let the
class of assignments be the class of partial functions f : Prop → {1}. Define
recursively the class of valuations v : Form→ {1} from arbitrary formulae to
truth as follows:
7As section 5.4 illustrates, all that is required of a relation to be a logic (i.e. consequence
relation) is that it be reflexive (on which more in section 5.4).
8Semantics are, strictly speaking, for languages, not logics. Sometimes one speaks loosely
as logics having semantics. The reason for this is that the semantics, with respect to which a
notion of consequence is defined, may be (constructed particularly for the purposes of being)
sound and complete for a given logic. In that sense we may speak of a semantics for a logic.
Sometimes I speak in this way for the purposes of brevity.
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• v(A) = 1 iff f(A) = 1 for A ∈ Prop
• v(¬A) = 1 iff v(A) ,= 1
• v(A ∨B) = 1 iff v(A) = 1 or v(B) = 1
with the other connectives being defined in the usual way. (The metatheory
is, importantly, classical rather than e.g. intuitionistic.) Presented with truth
tables, we could simply replace all the 0s with blanks to show that the cor-
responding formula is not assigned a value, an idea that Wittgenstein had in
mind in [Wit21, 4.43]. The same applies to a first-, or even higher-, order
language given a truth-value semantics in the sense of [Leb76].
That the standard and “gappy” or partial semantics are equivalent is trivial.
Obviously the same method can be extended to any Kripke semantics invoking
two-valued valuations. In fact, when one takes valuations to be assignments of
sets of worlds to atomic formulae, the semantics is effectively partial. (Truth
at a world being membership in a set and falsity being lack of membership.) So
one-valued semantics can be given for any Kripke logic characterized by a two-
valued world semantics. The question is whether we can extend this method
to n ≥ 2-valued logics of any sort. For many-valued modal logics the result
already follows trivially from [Tho76] (again by replacing the total two-valued
functions by one-valued partial ones), but the following discussion highlights
substantially more general results.
Suszko proposed the rather bold thesis that “$Lukasiewicz is the chief per-
petrator of a magnificent conceptual deceit lasting out in mathematical logic
to the present day” [Sus76, p. 377]. The conceptual deceit was to pretend
that there was anything more than two truth-values taken in an metaphysi-
cally or logically significant sense. Other values besides truth and falsity are
what Suszko called mere “algebraic values”.
Suszko’s claim is supported by some very interesting formal results. He was
the first to establish that every structural Tarskian consequence relation 2, i.e.
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any relation (between sets of formulae and formulae) closed under the following
properties
Reflexivity. Γ 2 A if A ∈ Γ
Transitivity. Γ ∪ {A} 2 B if Γ 2 A and A 2 B
Monotonicity. Γ 2 A if ∆ 2 A and ∆ ⊆ Γ
Structurality. Γ 2 A only if Γ′ 2 A′ where Γ′ and A′ result from Γ and A
respectively by replacing each occurrence of some atom in each member
of Γ and in A by an arbitrary formula,
has a two-valued semantics. A proof of Suszko’s theorem may be easily adapted
to show that every structural Tarskian relation has a one-valued semantics.
Theorem 5.4.1. Every structural Tarskian consequence relation has a one-
valued semantics.
Proof. Let L be a structural Tarskian relation in a language L. It was first
proved by Ryszard Wo´jcicki (1970) that L is characterized by its Lindenbaum
bundle ΦL defined by
ΦL := {(L,D = {A ∈ L : ∆ 2 A}, O) : ∆ ⊆ L}
whereO is a set of operations and each structure in ΦL is similar to the language
L.9 For suppose Γ 2 A and ∀B ∈ Γ, h(B) ∈ D for h : L→ φ a homomorphism




Γ 2 A, by cut we have
∆ 2 A. So h(A) ∈ D as desired.
Let C be any class of algebraic structures M = (M,D, f1, . . . , fn) similar
to L which characterizes 2, where M is the set of algebraic values and D ⊆ A
the set of designated values. (In particular C may be the Lindenbaum bundle
9An algebraic structure is similar to a language if there is a bijection between the opera-
tions of the structure and the constants of the language which preserves arity. A class C of
structures characterizes a consequence relation # (i.e. any relation between sets of formulae
and formulae) if Γ # A iff h(A) ∈ D whenever h(B) ∈ D for each B ∈ Γ and homomorphism
h from the language of # to C.
5.4. ONE-VALUED SEMANTICS 127
of 2 which we know characterizes 2.) Let H be the class of homomorphisms
h : L → M from L to (the carriers of) each M. Define the class V = {vh :
L→ {1} : h ∈ H} of one-valued valuations by
vh(A) =
 1 if h(A) ∈ Dundefined otherwise.
We show that Γ 2 A iff vh(A) = 1 whenever vh(B) = 1 for each B ∈ Γ and
each vh ∈ V .
Suppose Γ 2 A and that vh(B) = 1 for each B ∈ Γ. Then h(B) = 1 for
each B ∈ Γ. Since M characterizes 2, it follows that h(A) = 1. By definition,
vh(A) = 1 as desired.
Now suppose that for each vh ∈ V we have that vh(A) = 1 whenever
vh(B) = 1 for each B ∈ Γ. Given the definition of V , h(A) ∈ D whenever
h(B) ∈ D for each B ∈ Γ. As M characterizes 2, we have that Γ 2 A. This
concludes the proof that every structural Tarskian relation is characterized by
a one-valued semantics.
Suszko’s result can be significantly strengthened. It was proved in [CCCM01]
that the assumption of structurality is not needed, and in [Tsu98] that transitiv-
ity and monotonicity may be further dropped. Thus every consequence relation
satisfying just reflexivity has (i.e. is characterized by) a two-valued semantics,
so by replacing the total two-valued valuation in the proofs of [CCCM01] and
[Tsu98] by partial one-valued ones, every such consequence relation has a one-
valued semantics.
We can generalize even further. Routley [Rou75] showed that every λ-
categorial language has a two-valued world semantics. By replacing in that
proof the total valuations with partial one-valued ones it once again follows
that every such language has a one-valued world semantics.
So we have seen that an exceptionally broad class of logics can be given
one-valued semantics which, from a formal point of view, vindicates the Fun-
128 CHAPTER 5. ON THE NATURE OF TRUTH VALUES
damental thesis (see section 5.6) that there is but a single truth value, truth.
It is at least true from a formal point of view that only truth matters and the
following sections aim to show the same is true from a philosophical point of
view.
Truth is to be defined as the maximal truthmaker and negative propositions
are taken care of by recursive truth conditions similar to an atomist account
of truthmaking. The general strategy endorsed here for dealing with negative
propositions is familiar by now but the details, to which we now turn, provide
a plausible account of why and how negative truths should be dealt with in
this manner, something most accounts which give up unrestricted maximalism
fail to adequately address.
5.5 Truthmaking
The main idea behind truthmaking is that truth supervenes on, or is grounded
in, reality. A proposition is true because something in the world necessitates
its truth. (Some (e.g. [Rea10], [Dod02], and [Lew01]) think it is better to
formulate truthmaking in terms of supervenience on how things exist rather
than on what things exist. That seems plausible for a good number of proposi-
tions ordinarily considered, but it seems wrong for existential propositions (e.g.
〈Hesperus exists〉) and identities (e.g. 〈Hesperus is Phosphorus〉. Probably it
is best to formulate truthmaking in terms of both supervenience on what and
how things exist, but I shall ignore this issue here.) What the necessitation
condition (called ‘Necessitarianism’ in [Arm04] and ‘truthmaker essentialism’
in [Par99]) amounts to may be easy or difficult to specify depending on one’s
view of (i) truthmaking and (ii) propositions. For example, if propositions make
essential reference to worlds and times, then necessitation comes easy. For if
the true proposition expressed by ‘Fluffy is brown’, relative to a given time t
and world w is at least as discriminating as 〈Fluffy is brown at t in w〉 (where
〈A〉 refers to the proposition that A) then that particular slice of Fluffy, the
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t-slice-of-Fluffy-in-w, trivially necessitates the truth of the proposition. On the
other hand, if propositions do not make explicit reference to worlds and times,
as Kaplan and others have forcefully argued, spelling out what necessitation
amounts to becomes an important problem in truthmaker theory.10
For a taste, here are the most popular proposals on the table. One takes the
notion of x’s necessitating the truth of a proposition 〈A〉 as primitive, another
as equivalent to $(E!x⇒ A) (possibly without the $ if ⇒ already has strong
enough modal force) where ⇒ is an entailment operation, e.g. relevant entail-
ment, and E!x is a formalization of ‘x exists’, sometimes defined as ∃yy = x
(though this definition is inadequate in a number of formal semantics for modal
languages), and another as being reducible or explainable in terms of other,
arguably non-modal, notions such as intrinsic properties or (more arguably
non-modal, but see [Fin94]) essences. Significant worries arise for each of these
accounts. Ultimately I reject Necessitarianism for the reasons discussed in
section 5.7.
A given truth may have many truthmakers, always a maximal one and
sometimes a minimal one. A truthmaker α is maximal for 〈A〉 when it is a
truthmaker for 〈A〉 and no proper part of α is also a truthmaker for 〈A〉, and
it is minimal for 〈A〉 when it is a truthmaker for 〈A〉 and nothing of which it is
a proper part is also a truthmaker for 〈A〉 (e.g. see [Arm04, pp. 19-20]). One
equivalent way of formulating maximality is to say that α is a maximal truth-
maker for 〈A〉 when it is one that makes true any proposition made true by any
other truthmaker for 〈A〉. This definition does not rely on mereological prop-
erties of parthood. However, no dual formulation of minimality is equivalent
with the one initially given except, perhaps, for atomic propositions.11
10One such argument, essentially due to Kaplan [Kap78], is that there would be no con-
tingent propositions if propositions make essential reference to worlds and times. For it is
true at some world that ‘φ is true at w’ iff (if and only if) it is true in every world, and
likewise it is true at some time (and a given world) that ‘φ is true at t’ iff it is true at
every time. Alethic and temporal operators would then have no effect on the truth value
of propositions and every proposition would be necessarily and always true. Typically no
precise formulation of necessitation is given and instead the more cautious tactic of taking
‘necessitate’ as primitive is taken (see e.g. [Arm04]).
11The dual formulation of minimality would be: α is a minimal truthmaker for 〈A〉 when
it is a truthmaker for 〈A〉 and any other truthmaker for 〈A〉 is a truthmaker for any truth
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Some propositions have many minimal truthmakers and others may have
none (under the assumption, e.g., that matter is indefinitely divisible). But
every truth has a maximal truthmaker on the assumptions that (i) we have a
suitably strong notion of mereological fusion at our disposal and (ii) Maximal-
ism holds, i.e. that
Maximalism. For every true proposition 〈A〉 there is an object α that makes
it true.
I reject Maximalism but accept a version restricted to positive truths.12 We will
suppose for the moment that Maximalism holds since, for our purposes, what
follows from Maximalism follows also from the version restricted to positive
propositions.
Not only does it immediately follow that every truth has a unique maximal
truthmaker, it follows that there is a unique maximal truthmaker that makes
every truth true.
Proof. Consider all the true propositions. By Maximalism each such proposi-
tion, 〈A〉, has a truthmaker. Take all and only the truthmakers αi (with i ∈ I
for some index I, e.g. I the class of all ordinals) for 〈A〉. Then the αi taken
collectively is a maximal truthmaker for 〈A〉, so there is a maximal truthmaker
Φi for each truth 〈Ai〉. Take the fusion % of each Φi. Then % is a maximal
truthmaker for each truth. For uniqueness, suppose β is also a maximal truth-
maker for 〈A〉 that is distinct from %. Then β is one of the αi, so it is a proper
part of %. This contradicts the maximality of β, so % is unique.
made true by α. To see that the two formulations of minimality are not equivalent consider
the proposition that cats exist. Then Fluffy and Blackie are both truthmakers for that
proposition, and on the original formulation, minimal truthmakers, though on the second
formulation neither is a minimal truthmaker since Fluffy makes true 〈Fluffy exists〉 while
Blackie does not.
12Lewis [Lew03, p. 29] says “[s]ome philosophers hold [Maximalism]: they say that every
truth must have a truthmaker. That is, all propositions are positive.” So he thinks Max-
imalism is equivalent to the claim that all propositions are positive. But Lewis does not
think positivity and negativity are mutually exclusive, whereas I (and most) do. In fact, he
thinks every proposition is both positive and negative. That is why Maximalism restricted
to positive propositions does not amount to “Maximalism unrestricted” on my picture.
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(The proof does not go through if ‘taken collectively’ does not mean ‘fused’
so that ‘the αi taken collectively’ may refer to a plurality rather than a single
individual. This would require giving up maximal truthmakers and revising
Maximalism to state that for every true proposition there are some objects,
rather than always a single one, that make it true. One might also reject the
principle of unrestricted fusion—viz. that for any things x there is a (unique)
fusion of those things—either because the principle is claimed to bear onto-
logical weight, restricted or not, or because it ought to be restricted for other
reasons, e.g. out of considerations of the individuation of ordinary objects. In
regard to the former, it is not clear the principle does indeed bear ontological
weight. Weak composition-as-identity theses, one version of which is defended
in [Lew91], support the “ontological innocence” of the principle. If we assume
unrestricted fusion, as I shall from hereon, Maximalism and its pluralized ver-
sion (viz. for every true proposition 〈A〉, there are some objects αi that make
it true) turn out equivalent in which case the proof goes through regardless of
whether Maximalism or the pluralized version is assumed.)
That there is a unique maximal truthmaker for every truth does not imply
what Restall [Res96, p. 334] calls ‘truthmaker monism’, viz. that every truth-
maker makes every truth true, for that requires further assumptions such as the
classical entailment thesis. Nor does it trivialize the truthmaking enterprise.
One of the main interests of truthmaking is to ground truth in minimal—or at
least sufficiently small—truthmakers, the existence of which are not ruled out
by the existence of maximal truthmakers. Similarly the fact that every expla-
nation can be embedded in a stronger explanation (just conjoin a truth to the
original explanation) does not trivialize explanations. Finally there is nothing
like a slingshot argument available as an immediate consequence of UMT if
the conclusion of that argument is that there is precisely one proposition. For
propositions on the present account are structured entities, not truth values.13
13If the conclusion of the slingshot argument is that every truth corresponds to the same
fact and ‘fact’ is understood as ‘maximal sum’ then the slingshot argument follows. But
the slingshot argument is not typically understood this way because facts are not typically
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On many accounts of propositions and truthmakers there is at least a proper
class of propositions but far fewer truthmakers. If one is a nominalist about
abstract objects, then there are only as many truthmakers as there are concrete
objects and compositions of those objects.14 So we do not need to come up
with an incredible amount of truthmakers for so many true propositions. Even
fewer truthmakers may be posited if “the ‘logical constants’ are not represen-
tatives” ([Wit21, 4.0312]), i.e. if one holds an atomist theory of truthmaking.
There is nothing problematic about providing truthmakers for certain com-
pound propositions, such as conjunctions. The only problematic case involves
negative propositions. One conclusion to draw from all of this is that the only
constant that must not be a representative is negation and that one may, if one
wishes, remain neutral as regards the others (assuming that from the others,
taken together, negation is indefinable).
From what has been said about truthmaking so far, a proposition is true
iff it has a truthmaker, iff it is made true by the maximal truthmaker. Thus
being true and being made true by the maximal truthmaker are extensionally
equivalent. If we restrict maximalism to positive propositions, there will be
more to truth than being made true by the maximal truthmaker; in particular,
negative truths will be true in virtue of lacking a truthmaker (or equivalently,
lacking the maximal truthmaker). On the other hand suppose 〈¬A〉 is a nega-
tive truth. Then 〈A〉 is a falsity on a standard-going definition of falsity. So if
we discard all talk of negative truths in favor of talk of falsities then it remains
true that all there is to truth is being made true by the maximal truthmaker
(and all there is to falsity is lacking the maximal truthmaker).
Now if there is nothing more to truth than being made true by the maximal
truthmaker, it follows that
understood this way; they are not mere sums of objects, they are more like structured
propositions.
14Whether or not the fusion of some objects is to be counted as an additional object is often
thought to be a matter of whether certain forms of composition-as-identity hold. However,
Baxter [Bax88] provides an argument against fusions counting as additional objects over
their parts without even invoking composition-as-identity.
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Fundamental thesis. There is but one truth value, truth, i.e. the maximal
truthmaker.
Truth is what Frege called the circumstance that a truth, any truth, is true.
Having sympathies with Frege, we may think of ‘α makes true 〈A〉’ meaning
nothing more than ‘α is the circumstance that 〈A〉 is true’ or even (and less
circularly, since no reference to truth is made) ‘α is referred to by A’.
Is there anything analogous to the circumstance that a falsity is false, such
as the maximal falsitymaker? It is often supposed that α is a falsitymaker for a
proposition iff it is a truthmaker for its contradictory. On the present view this
must obviously be rejected since then the maximal falsitymaker is identical to
the maximal truthmaker, in which case the absurdity that a sentence is true
iff it is false follows. But that is what we would expect on the present account:
there are no such things as falsitymakers and a negative proposition 〈¬A〉 is
not made true by 〈A〉 having a falsitymaker, it is made true wholly in virtue
of lacking a truthmaker.15
I have sketched a view of the ontology of truth values which requires a
rejection of Maximalism and an account of positive propositions. I take up
each task in turn.
5.6 Maximalism
Truthmaker theory is typically restricted to contingent, or at least non-logically
true, propositions.16 The reasons for doing so are twofold: either necessary
truths are made true by anything and everything or they are made true by
nothing. In either case truthmaking for necessary truths becomes a trivial
matter, so the attention has focused on contingent truths.
15Another argument against the existence of falsitymakers is that it assumes that the
existence of certain objects x rules out by metaphysical necessity the existence of certain
other objects y whose existence seem otherwise independent of the existence of the xs. For
instance consider the truthmaker Fluffy for 〈Fluffy exists〉. Now it is not clear what would
count as a falsitymaker for the proposition (assuming that such things existed), but whatever
those things are (e.g. a totality fact fused with some other object, a negative fact, etc.), their
existence is, at least prima facie implausibly, ruled out by the existence of Fluffy.
16For example, see [Lew01], [Smi99], [Mol00], [Dod07] and (less obviously) [MSS84] and
[Tal09].
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Why should we think necessary truths are made true by everything? For
one, it follows straightforwardly from a na¨ıve view of truthmaking according
to which α is a truthmaker for 〈A〉 iff the proposition that α exists implies
〈A〉, where implication need not be classical. (If one does not like to talk
about implication as a relation between propositions, then rephrase everything
just said in terms of suitable sentences expressing those propositions.) It also
follows straightforwardly from Maximalism, even when restricted to contingent
propositions, and the entailment thesis formulated using certain (e.g. classical
or strict), but not all (e.g. relevant), implications. So there are grounds for
holding that necessary truths are made true by everything. However such
a move can also be easily resisted just by taking the truthmaking relation
as primitive and denying that it is in virtue of the nature of any particular
object that a given necessary truth is true. For a popular view is that one
of the distinguishing features of necessary, especially logical, truths is that
they seem not to be grounded in the way any particular world is, i.e. their
truth is independent of “reality”. This view, though popular, seems obviously
fallacious when truthbearers are taken to be propositions, and I suspect it has
become mainstream because what are usually taken to be necessary are not
propositions but rather (interpreted) sentences or the like.
For suppose we grant there are a posteriori necessities such as 〈Hesperus
is Phosphorus〉.17 Since its truth depends on Venus—for if Venus did not
exist neither would the proposition—it seems it has as a (minimal) truthmaker
Venus. The only reason to think that it lacks a truthmaker is to think that
it has the form of the logical (by which I mean schematic) truth x = x, as
17I am supposing the proposition is true even in worlds in which Venus fails to exist
(assuming there are such worlds), otherwise it seems unlikely that there would be any a
posteriori necessities, for they would have to make essential reference to dubious necessary
existents. For if a contingently exists then φ(a) cannot be true at any world at which a fails
to exist, for it would not express any proposition. (Of course one can deny this by denying
the semantic assumption that sentences containing irreferential singular terms are never true,
but this seems highly implausible on a structured view of propositions unless one holds that
there are such things as gappy propositions (see e.g. [Bra93]) or that propositions, construed
or represented as set-theoretic objects, may exist in worlds in which their members fail to
exist.) Most grant a posteriori necessities and, in any case, broadening our use of ‘necessity’
to mean ‘true in all worlds where the individuals referred to by the proposition exist’ would
make precisely the same point, so my assumption serves only to simplify matters.
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it does on a structured account of propositions, and that logical truths lack
truthmakers. But we just noted that the truth of the proposition is grounded
in that part of reality that includes Venus regardless of its being a logical
truth, for if Venus had not existed the proposition would not have existed and
hence could not have been true, let alone necessarily true. So at least some a
posteriori necessities have truthmakers.
Suppose we reject the above argument and maintain that, while the exis-
tence of 〈Hesperus is Phosphorus〉 depends on Venus, its truth does not. Does
it follow, then, that it lacks a truthmaker? In general, what reason is there
for thinking that logical truths lack truthmakers? One is that such truths are
knowable a priori. But that is not good enough reason if there are a priori
contingencies, for certainly those will have truthmakers. And even if there are
no a priori contingencies, there still is not any relevant connection between a
proposition having the form of a logical truth and it being knowable a priori.
For one, it is dubious that what are knowable a priori are things like struc-
tured propositions. There is compelling reason for the view that the objects
of propositional attitudes like knowledge are, not entities like propositions,
but rather hyperintensional entities like structured propositions plus modes of
presentation δ, such as 〈Venus, Venus, identity, δ〉. Sentential contexts involv-
ing propositional attitudes are hyperintensional in the sense that substitution
into them of necessarily equivalent propositions salva veritate fails whereas
propositions and facts seem not to be like this, i.e. substitution salva veritate
of necessary equals into the context ‘It is a fact that. . . ’ holds (see David-
son 1969). This implies that the objects of propositional attitudes cannot be
propositions. So while a proposition such as 〈Hesperus is Phosphorus〉 might
have the form of a logical truth, it does not follow that any hyperintensional
object corresponding to the proposition (such as 〈Venus, Venus, identity, ‘Hes-
perus = Phosphorus’〉) will be knowable a priori—that will rest crucially on
what the mode of presentation is. The fact that a proposition has the form of
a logical truth does not by itself make it any more plausible that it should lack
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a truthmaker simply on the grounds that logical truths are knowable a priori.
Even though the above considerations regarding necessary truths carry over
to logical and analytic truths as well, there are also independent reasons for
holding that the latter have truthmakers just as much as the contingent truths
do. Consider the analytic truth 〈Bachelors are unmarried〉. The proposition
connects or unifies (unification being a metaphysical relation) bachelorhood
and the property of being unmarried. The truth of the proposition is inde-
pendent of the meaning of the words ‘bachelors’, ‘are’ and ‘ummarried’. Now
it is true that the proposition has a special semantic status—some relation
of “containment” holds between the meanings or concepts it involves. But
having such a status tells us nothing about the non-semantic fact concerning
whether the proposition has a truthmaker. So to exclude analytic truths as
having truthmakers strictly on the grounds of their semantic status is greatly
mistaken.
For Maximalism
In this section I wish to look at what I take to be the most persuasive arguments
for Maximalism and show them to be wanting. If I am right, Maximalism is
not well-motivated. But then I see it as no mark against a truthmaker theory
for rejecting Maximalism if the rejection falls out of the account as a natural
consequence. Of course the theory might be criticizable on other grounds.
Armstrong [Arm04] argues for Maximalism by arguing that truthmakers
can be found for all kinds of truths, such as necessary and negative ones.18
But there are a good number of reasons—which I will not rehearse here but see
18He also makes the claim that “One can, of course, simply assert that a proposition such
as 〈There are no unicorns〉 stands in no need of any truthmaker or other ontological ground.
But this seems to be no more than giving up on truthmakers as soon as the going gets hard”
[Arm04, p. 70]. But the aim was not to motivate Maximalism on grounds independent
of whether plausible candidates for truthmakers can be found. The original aim was to
motivate Maximalism by finding said candidates and it is thus very much dependent on
whether plausible candidates may be found for all species of truth. If the task of finding
truthmakers for some species of truth (e.g. negative truths) turns out looking hopeless then
that is reason to give up Maximalism given the Armstrong’s original motivation. Current
accounts of truthmakers for negative truths are not compelling enough to make a strong
enough case for Armstrong’s defense of Maximalism.
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e.g. [Mol00]—for not liking his proposal, especially his “totality facts” solution
to the worry about truthmakers for negative truths. And if his proposal fails to
give plausible truthmakers for all truths, as I think it does, then his argument
for Maximalism collapses with it.
Cameron [Cam08] gives the following argument for Maximalism:
The thought that we do not need truthmakers for negative truths
does not seem much of a runner. But if that is right then the
thought that we cannot have truthmakers for negative truths looks
very serious indeed; for if true it would seem to motivate abandoning
not just truthmaker maximalism, but truthmaker theory altogether.
If we do not get the negative truths for free given the positive
truths, then what possible motivation could there be for accepting
that some truths require truthmakers but that negative truths do
not? That would be to accept that the negative truths are not true
in virtue of anything: but if we allow that then why do we not
allow positive truths that are not true in virtue of anything? It
is one thing to say that certain truths are obtained for free given
our grounding of other truths, and hence that they do not need a
further grounding; it is another thing altogether to say that certain
truths just are not grounded. Either there is something wrong with
accepting truths that do not have an ontological grounding or there
is not: if there is, then every truth requires a grounding; if there is
not, then no truth. [Cam08, pp. 411–412]
Cameron’s argument brings to bear an important distinction between the re-
lation x is true in virtue of y and the relation x is ontologically grounded in
y, a distinction important for atomists and others (e.g. [Mel03] and [Mum05])
who deny that, for example, negative truths are ontologically grounded and yet
accept that they are nonetheless true in virtue of something where that some-
thing may be semantic or logical facts.19 Being true in virtue of something does
19For atomists, the complex truths are not grounded in the world, rather they are true in
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not imply being ontologically grounded in something. Even if one denies any
such distinction between the two relations, Cameron’s argument (which might
be seen as fallaciously inferring a ∀¬A from a ¬∀A, though matters are not so
simple here) would serve as an argument against all kinds of widely held views
across philosophy; in particular any view which endorses a restricted principle.
For instance, it would serve as an argument against non-na¨ıve set theories (if
only some collections are not legitimate then none are), truth theories with a
restricted T-schema (if the T-schema does not hold for all sentences then it
holds for none), and so on. So the argument is obviously far too powerful. It
may not always be ad hoc or unprincipled to restrict a given principle such
as Maximalism. Indeed there are two very compelling reasons for restricting
it: (i) there are no plausible truthmaker candidates for negative truths and
(ii) there is no independent, compelling motivation to accept Maximalism (on
which more in section 5.6). A thorough defense of (i) may be found in [Mol00].
Dodd [Dod07] claims that a rejection of Maximalism “undercuts the moti-
vation for truthmaker theory in the first place” and provides only the following
argument for it:
The intuition that truth must be ontologically grounded in the
sense explicated by [Maximalism] is an intuition concerning (non-
analytic) truth in general: it is one particular way of trying to
explain the intuition that what is true is determined by how things
are, but not vice versa. Consequently, if it really is the case that this
asymmetry can only be adequately explained by adopting a truth-
maker principle, it would seem to be a failure of nerve to depart
from this general principle in the wake of the problem of finding
truthmakers for negative truths” [Dod07, p. 394]
The problem with this argument is that the asymmetry is not explained by
Maximalism—it is explained by the truthmaking relation which is itself eluci-
virtue of the truth value of the atomic propositions which occur in them (and in particular the
grounding of those that are true) plus the churning out of some recursive semantic machinery
on those atomic propositions. See e.g. [MSS84], [Smi99] and [Sim05].
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dated quite independently of whether or not Maximalism holds. The reason we
think the world and its parts make propositions true and not conversely is that
a notion akin to ontological dependence is built into the notion of truthmak-
ing. Indeed, (if one holds a structured theory of propositions then) propositions
themselves depend ontologically on the world since propositions are comprised
of worldly parts and their truth depends on how those parts are unified to form
facts.
Against Maximalism
I briefly mentioned theories of truthmaking based on logical atomism. We may
also list Mellor’s [Mel03] among such theories. He says
Even some contingent truths need no truthmakers, notably true
truth-functions, whose truth follows from the truth values of their
constituents. We may say of course that ‘P & Q’ and ‘P ∨ Q’
are ‘made true’ by the truth of ‘P ’ and ‘Q’; but this is just the
entailment of one proposition by others, not the “cross-categorical”
link between propositions and other entities that concerns us here.
That is what true truth-functions do not need and therefore, I claim,
do not have. [Mel03, p. 213]
Other theorists reject Maximalism without necessarily endorsing atomism.
For instance, Mumford [Mum05] denies that negative truths have truthmakers
using a deflationary argument:
I am tempted to treat all putative cases of negative truths as cases
of falsehood, for example, to understand 〈the door is not blue〉 as:
〈the door is blue〉 is false. We can then say that 〈q〉 is false, f〈q〉,
means that there is no truthmaker for 〈q〉. This seems to me to be
the simplest and most intuitive account of falsehood. [Mum05, p.
266]
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A reinterpretation of Mumford’s view that does away with the ontologically
loaded notion of falsity replaces that notion with deniability. For example,
we might be tempted to understand an utterance of ‘The door is not blue’ as
expressing a denial of the proposition 〈The door is blue〉 rather than expressing
an assertion of 〈The door is not blue〉. Then the denial is correct just in case
the proposition denied has no truthmaker.
Maximalism may be rejected for a number of good reasons, but I think the
most compelling reason is that there simply are no plausible candidates to play
the role of truthmakers for negative truths. Moreover, it just strikes me as more
natural to count negative truths true in virtue of lacking truthmakers than to
count them true in virtue of being made true by some ontological oddity such
as a totality or negative fact.20 Indeed, I should hope it strikes even those
who advocate Maximalism as more natural despite their being theoretically
driven to the opposite conclusion on what I take to be uncompelling grounds,
but ultimately arguments from naturalness are not going to do a whole lot of
convincing in any case.
In the next section I give an account of positive propositions which puts the
necessary flesh on the defense of Maximalism restricted to positive propositions.
5.7 Positive propositions
Many have expressed doubt in the distinction between positive and negative
propositions. For instance, Anderson and Belnap [AB63, p. 304] claim that
“we have no semantic grounds for distinguishing between “positive” and “neg-
ative” propositions” and Ayer [Aye52] considers a number of ways of making
the distinction each of which appears to be faced with insuperable difficulties.
20Jago [Jag10] takes a positive fact to be a non-mereological composition of a thin par-
ticular and a universal. He then says that a “negative fact would be what obtains when the
relevant particulars lack the relevant universal. So we can say, in parallel to what we said
about positive facts: what a negative fact is, is simply the relevant thin particular(s) and
universal, composed in a certain (non-mereological) way” [Jag10, p. 3]. The problem is that
types of facts are traded in for types of composition, the latter being taken as primitive and
the problem of explaining what a negative fact is gets pushed “down” to explaining what the
various modes of composition are. As they are taken as primitive, Jago has nothing to say
about this.
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Certainly if what is negative is a matter of syntax then there is no problem
in distinguishing the positive from the negative. But propositions are not sen-
tences and whether a proposition, not a sentence, is positive or negative is not
a matter of syntax. Yet if we believe that there is a special class of proper-
ties which carve nature at its joints, call these properties ‘fundamental’, and
that a complete description of the world would involve only simple proposi-
tions of this sort, i.e. propositions not involving anything corresponding to
propositional operations such as implication, there appears to be an intuitive
account of the distinction between negative and positive propositions we seek.
A proposition is positive if it attributes a fundamental property to an individ-
ual and it is negative if it denies a fundamental property of an individual. As
it stands the account is incomplete—what do we say about propositions that
do neither?—but as a first pass it is on the right track.
Indeed, Ayer endorses a story along these lines:
. . . we are surely entitled to say that a statement is affirmative if it
refers to some particular individual and ascribes a property to it,
or if it refers to a particular set of individuals and states that they
stand in a certain relationship, or if it asserts that some unidentified
individual, or set of individuals, answers to a certain description.
No doubt there are more complicated possibilities, the existence of
which would make it a laborious matter to give a complete list of
all the forms of affirmative statement. [Aye52, p. 802]
In what follows I undertake the “laborious” task of offering a completely general
account of the distinction between positive and negative propositions which en-
compasses not just truth-functional compounds but quantified and intensional
propositions as well.
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Atomicity
There are two kinds of properties in the world: the fundamental ones and the
abundant ones—at least, let us assume the distinction holds good. If there
are not many simples in the world, e.g. if there are just space-time points,
then there will not be many fundamental properties. Generally an inflation of
simples yields an inflation of fundamental properties. It does not matter to
me how one analyzes fundamentality if he analyzes it all. One may wish, as
I prefer, to take the fundamental-nonfundamental distinction as primitive.21
However one wants to make the distinction, it is the fundamental properties
that underly the account of positivity to be given in what follows.
Molnar [Mol00] claims that “everything that exists is positive”. That de-
pends on what is meant by ‘exist’ and by ‘positive’. We can be quite relaxed
about what we take to exist, for instance, we might think it acceptable to in-
clude properties taken in the abundant sense. After all, I see no reason to think
properties do not come cheap and that, at the very least, every well-formed
predicate in our language corresponds to a property.22 If we take this relaxed
view of existence and of properties then Molnar’s claim is too strong, for there
are obviously negative properties that exist—e.g. the property of being distinct
from oneself—so not everything that exists is positive. (At least distinctness
seems a negative property since, apparently, the only way to define it requires
the use of operators from which negation can be defined.) Molnar’s claim that
everything that exists is positive is incompatible with most theories of proper-
21Sider [Sid96] has objected to taking the distinction as primitive on a class nominalist
view of relations, but that objection relies on identifying properties with sets of ordered pairs,
the latter themselves being identified with sets. I make no such identification even if I think
ordered pairs may be adequately represented by sets only when we are concerned with a
particular class of sentences about or properties of pairs. Such a class would not include e.g.
‘Is the empty set a member of the pair (x, y)?’ which would be sensitive to the set-theoretic
way of representing tuples. Any question which is sensitive to artifacts of the representation
would be barred from the class.
22One may immediately shutter at the thought of paradoxes. Is there really the property
of being a non-self-membered set? I do not see why not. The problem is that forming the
collection of all such sets does not yield a set—it is too big. In any case, if one does not like
the limitation-of-size solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes she can choose her favorite. If
she has no favorite then she can restrict my claim trivially to exclude problematic cases by
requiring that properties only exist when their corresponding predicates are not only well-
formed but also consistently axiomatizable relative to a given (accepted) background theory.
Even with such a restriction in place, abundant properties will still come cheaply.
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ties which allow for properties of the abundant type, a class of theories that
should not be ruled out from one’s account of existence or positivity. As such,
an account of positivity, in the very least, ought to remain neutral on whether
everything is positive.
However, we can weaken Molnar’s claim to the claim that everything that
is simple or fundamental is positive, and this will be true even with abundant
properties around. Moreover, we can simplify a little by saying that an indi-
vidual, rather than property, is positive only if it it exemplifies a fundamental
property, since on many accounts composites do not exemplify fundamental
properties. Thus
Simple non-propositional positivity. Something is positive only if it is a
fundamental property or exemplifies a fundamental property.
The formulation of positiveness just given is precise but lacks detail. A filling
in of the details requires giving an account of what constitutes simples and
their fundamental properties. I will not be doing any such filling in here so
that one is free to choose her theory of simples and fundamental properties as
she wishes.
Now that we have a precise formulation of positivity (for individuals and
properties), it is not difficult to give one for atomicity:
Atomicity. A proposition is atomic iff it (is represented by) a tuple whose
form is (α1, . . . ,αn, P ), where each of its elements are positive or, in other
words, the αi are simples and P is an n-place fundamental property.
(I am not using ‘property’ to mean ‘monadic property’—properties may be
of any arity. Moreover, I am assuming a structured view of propositions as
structured entities to be represented by—but not identical to—set-theoretic
objects. Whether or not anything hinges on this depends on whether a plausible
account of positivity can be given to unstructured propositions, a question I
leave open for another occasion.) We may extend the notion of atomicity to
cover composites and their properties, e.g. by allowing the αi to be composites
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and P to be “nearly fundamental” assuming fundamentality admits of degree
(see e.g. [Arm89] and [Lew86]), but for present purposes I prefer to relax the
notions of a simple and a fundamental property. For instance, we may wish to
grant physical atoms as being simple and the property of having atomic mass
n as being fundamental and we may even get carried away and allow things
and properties of the garden variety to count as simples and fundamental if
we wished to extend atomicity to propositions including things of the garden
variety. Such an extension would count e.g. 〈This table is red〉 as atomic
without having to complicate the notion of atomicity by extending it beyond
genuine simples. Such complications would only distract from the present point
here so the notions of simplicity and fundamentality should be understood in
a relaxed sense.
On the most austere conception of simples and fundamentals, not many
propositions count as atomic on this account. On the usual atomist picture
there is a close relationship between atomic propositions and atomic sentences
as they are typically construed in formal languages. But I doubt any such
relationship exists unless the structure of propositions very closely matches
the structure of (formally regimented) sentences which represent them.23 This
seems unlikely since there are more propositions then there are sentences, in
which case one wonders what the structure of these unexpressed propositions
might be. Moreover it seems unlikely, from a metaphysical point of view, that
the atomicity of propositions, taken as consisting of parts of reality, should
depend essentially on syntax, something which does not appear to determine
how or what things exist (besides, of course, syntactical things).
The account of atomic propositions just sketched is not strictly Wittgen-
steinian. For it is compatible with there being an inconsistent set of atomic
propositions and logical properties, such as entailment, holding between atomic
23Such a view of structured propositions is defended in [Kin95]. One immediate and
forceful objection to the view is that it gives an account of propositions that is too fine-
grained and this raises, among others, issues concerning shared content and disagreement.
For instance the propositions expressed by ‘John likes Sarah’ and ‘Sarah is liked by John’
would be distinct.
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propositions. This is strictly forbidden on Wittgenstein’s picture ([Wit21,
4.211, 5.134]), a picture I do not find compelling. Allowing sets of incon-
sistent atomic propositions does not imply that at least one of the members
of the set must be negative. For example, nothing suggests that one of 〈The
flower is red〉 and 〈The flower is blue〉 is negative simply because the pair is
mutually inconsistent (intuitively or relative to a background theory of color).
In other words, a set of atomic propositions may be inconsistent even though
each member of the set is positive.24
Quantified propositions and necessitarianism
Atomic propositions are positive since they are composed of only positive
things. A broader notion of positivity, which covers not just truth-functional
compounds but compounds more generally, can be given by defining operations
on properties and propositions which form positive properties and propositions.
For example, conjunction forms positive propositions only from positive con-
juncts, disjunction forms negative propositions only when at least one disjunct
is negative, and negation forms positive propositions only from negative ones.
This covers all the truth-functional compounds.
Now if finitary disjunction and conjunction form positive propositions from
positive ones and negative ones from negative ones then there is no reason
to think their infinitary generalizations do not do the same. If (following e.g.
[Wit21]) a universal proposition just is (up to logical equivalence) the possibly
infinitary conjunction 〈∧i∈I P (ai)〉, where the ai exhaust the domain of indi-
viduals at a given world, and an existential proposition just is (up to logical
equivalence) the possibly infinitary disjunction 〈∨i∈I P (ai)〉, then we have an
account of positivity for universal and existential propositions.
24This should not be surprising. In most logics, not theories, any set of atomic propositions
is consistent. However, this is not true for theories. e.g. in Peano arithmetic, the set {0 <
1, 1 < 0} is inconsistent. (Even singleton sets are, e.g. {0 = 1}.) The reason this does
not pose a problem for Wittgenstein when he remarks that any set of atoms is consistent is
that he took atoms to “assert the existence of states of affairs” while he took mathematical
and logical statements to be senseless since they failed to do any representing. Dummett,
contrary to Wittgenstein, thought the set of all atoms (in a suitably interpreted language)
to be inconsistent but for reasons other than those presently considered.
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Universal positivity. A universal proposition 〈∀xA(x)〉 is positive just in
case each of its instances 〈P (a)〉 is positive.
Call this the ‘boolean account of quantification’ or just ‘the boolean account’
for short.
There is a usual worry with this account. Suppose universally quantified
propositions just are infinitary conjunctions and that α is a truthmaker for
〈∀xA〉. One might ask in what sense α necessitates the truth of 〈∀xA〉? It
seems possible that the truthmaker for each conjunct necessitates that con-
junct, and hence that α (e.g. the truthmaker for each conjunct taken col-
lectively) necessitates the infinitary conjunction, without α necessitating the
universal proposition. Supposing that A is not necessary, we could add some-
thing else to the domain whose being such that A is not necessitated by α, the
reasoning goes. But then α does not necessitate the truth of the universal and
hence the truthmaker for the infinitary conjunction need not be a truthmaker
for the universal.
One might attempt to save the boolean account thusly. An infinitary con-
junction is equivalent to the negation of an infinitary disjunction, and the
negation of a disjunction (infinitary or not) is true just in case the disjunction
lacks a truthmaker, i.e. just in case none of its disjuncts has a truthmaker. So
a universal proposition is true just in case a certain proposition lacks a truth-
maker. But this only holds if the disjunction is positive, otherwise we could
rerun the same reasoning for an arbitrary proposition since (classically) any
proposition is equivalent to a negation and we would not need to find truth-
makers for any proposition at all. Though every proposition is equivalent to a
negation, not every proposition is equivalent to a negative one (just consider
the double negation of a positive proposition which is positive). For example,
consider 〈Everything is spatially extended〉. It is positive if each of its instances
is (and we are assuming they are). But then the universal proposition, con-
strued as the negation of an infinitary disjunction, will be the negation of a
negative proposition, viz. 〈¬∧S(a)〉 (where S(x) expresses that x is spatially
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extended), so it will be a positive proposition and a truthmaker for it must
then exist.
I am inclined to just give up on necessitation. When we ordinarily speak of
things making propositions true it is rarely the case that this holds of necessity
in the broadest sense. Consider glass and its fragility. What makes it fragile?
Well that has to do with its physical makeup, and some of us would like to
say that its physical makeup makes it true that glass is fragile.25 But notice
that its physical makeup alone does not necessitate, in the broadest metaphys-
ical sense, the truth that glass is fragile. For we also need, in addition, the
actual laws of nature that make it such that when something has the physical
makeup of glass, that thing is fragile. Now ought we to say that when we first
said that its physical makeup makes it true that glass is fragile, what we said
was, strictly speaking, false and that instead we should hold that the laws of
nature are, along with the physical makeup of glass, part of the truthmaker for
〈Glass is fragile〉? That seems absurd, for we should be able to at least remain
neutral regarding what sort of things can count as truthmakers; in particular
we should not have to posit higher-order entities like laws of nature as truth-
makers. Truthmaker theory ought not commit us to there being extravagant
truthmakers like the laws of nature.26
Mellor also gives up necessitarianism:
If, as David [Armstrong] assumes, truthmakers must necessitate
what they make true, it will take more than the truthmakers of
25The point here about fragility, construed qualitatively (rather than dispositionally), is
merely illustrative. The same point can be made about men and mortality (in place of glass
and fragility) if one prefers.
26I do not deny there are laws of nature, in some sense of ‘are’. I deny that laws of nature
must be taken as objects to be quantified over. For Armstrong and others, laws of nature are
relations between universals. But universals as such are objects that one might not wish to
posit purely for the purposes of truthmaking, e.g. because universals are higher-order entities
or because one does not believe in things such as relational tropes, and so on. Mellor makes
the same point saying “Similarly with truths about David’s beliefs, for example, that he is
an Australian. For even physicalists will admit that it takes more than David’s brain states
to necessitate propositions about what he believes. It also takes laws linking his brain states
to how he behaves, and perhaps his living in Australia and not in some ‘twin Australia’
elsewhere in the universe. Yet given all that, it is an innocuous abbreviation of physicalism
to say that propositions about David’s beliefs are made true by states of his brain” [Mel03,
p. 214].
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‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ to make ‘everything is F ’ true [assuming only a and
b exist], since ‘Fa & Fb’ does not entail this, because it does not en-
tail that there are no other particulars. But as ‘there is no particular
that is neither a nor b’ is a negative truth, it needs no truthmaker.
All it needs is that no truthmaker for its negation exists, i.e. that no
particular other than a or b exists. So if a and b are indeed the only
particulars, whatever makes ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ true will also make true
‘everything is F ’, even though it will not necessitate it. . . In short,
David’s necessitation principle fails for generalizations, which are
not entailed by the conjunction of all their instances, since that con-
junction does not entail that there are no other instances. [Mel03,
p. 214]
Mumford is yet another a rejecter:
Armstrong’s need for totality facts arises from his commitment to
truthmaker necessitarianism, about which misgivings have already
been expressed. If we do not need the facts to necessitate the truth,
then it could be adequate for the truth of 〈every x is F 〉 simply that
〈every x is F 〉. We do not need an additional fact that these are
all the x’s, which then has to be understood as a kind of negative
fact. [Mum05, p.268]
I conclude—and in good company, but that is no argument—that neces-
sitarianism is false: truthmakers need not necessitate their truths. When we
consider ordinary sentences and their truthmakers, eg. 〈Fluffy is black〉, ne-
cessitation holds trivially because the truthmaker is typically taken to be a
trope and a trope necessitates a proposition because of how particularized an
object it is. The blackness-of-Fluffy cannot exist unless Fluffy exists and is
black. But not every proposition and its corresponding truthmakers are like
this. In particular, universal propositions are not always like this. For one,
they are never made true by tropes (though they may be made true by fusions
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of tropes). Second, a very simple and intuitive account of universals is the
boolean account which, if true, implies the falsity of necessitarianism. Third,
and most importantly, I see no good reason to generalize from some cases for
which necessitation holds to all cases unless some independent grounds for ne-
cessitarianism are given. On the latter point, Armstrong attempts to provide
such independent grounds with the following argument:
Suppose that a suggested truthmaker T for a certain truth p fails
to necessitate that truth. There will then be at least the possibility
that T should exist and yet the proposition p not be true. This
strongly suggests that there ought to be some further condition
that must be satisfied in order for p to be true. This condition must
either be the existence of a further entity, U, or a further truth, q.
In the first of these cases, T + U would appear to be the true and
necessitating truthmaker for p. (If U does not necessitate, then the
same question raised about T can be raised again about U.) In the
second case, q either has a truthmaker, V, or it does not. Given that
q has a truthmaker, then the T + U case is reproduced. Suppose
q lacks a truthmaker, then there are truths without truthmakers.
The truth q will hang ontologically in the same sort of way that
Ryle left dispositional truths hanging. [Arm04, pp. 6–7]
However, two main worries immediately arise. The first is that the argu-
ment shows at most that (assuming Maximalism) for every truth there is a
truthmaker that necessitates that truth. It does not show that every truth-
maker necessitates every truth it is a truthmaker for! The second is that the
argument begs the question. For why should we think that because T does
not necessitate the truth of p that “there ought to be some further condition
that must be satisfied in order for p to be true”. That is precisely what the
anti-necessitarian rejects.
If one has any affinity to familiar model theory for quantificational languages—
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e.g. as getting roughly correct the truth conditions for a (fragment of a) regi-
mented natural language—she should also not find necessetarianism attractive.
For such a theory interprets (relative to a model) a universal sentence as the
conjunction (up to logical equivalence) of its instances. Moreover, model theory
may be viewed as modeling a correspondence theory of truth (more precisely,
of satisfaction), where the truth of sentences depends on elements of a given
domain of individuals. Indeed one may view sequences of the domain as truth-
makers for sentences. The intuitive appeal of identifying universal propositions
with conjunctions provides another mark against the necessitarian.
(A legitimate problem is defining, in a given language L, a universal state-
ment, not proposition, ∀xA as the conjunction (up to logical equivalence) of
its instances. For in this case there are models M that satisfy each instance
A(t) in L (for t a closed term of L) without satisfying ∀xA. That is why an
omega rule in a usual first-order language is not sound over the class of all
models. But that is not a problem for identifying universal propositions with
the conjunction of their instances.)
Intensional propositions
If every intensional operation can be given an analysis in terms of restricted
quantification over worlds (or information states, situations, etc.) then inten-
sional propositions are effectively quantified propositions, and we already have
an account that tells us when such propositions are positive. We would thereby
get an account of positivity for intensional propositions for free, so to speak.
Numerous have and do hold that intensionality is reducible to the extensional
via restricted quantification. One might, however, deny the prospects of exten-
sional reduction–though I have not seen any compelling arguments establishing
this (but for an interesting argument to the contrary, see [RM77])—and argue
that the best we might hope for is a laundry list of positive property-forming
operations. This seems to me unsatisfactory for two reasons. The first is that it
denies a uniform treatment of intensionality in terms of quantification without
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giving a general account of intensionality in its place—assuming no such ac-
count has been so given. The second is that it makes difficult a simplified, and
to me highly satisfactory, theoretical analysis of the class of positive proposi-
tions, a theory which has fruitful applications inside and outside of truthmaker
theory.
Suppose then that intensionality can be given an extensional analysis. Then
Intensional positivity. An intensional proposition 〈A〉 is positive iff 〈φA〉 is,
where φA is the extensional reduct of A.
As a concrete case, suppose the intended semantics of the S4-$ is given by its
usual Kripke semantics. Then whether a modal proposition 〈$A〉 is positive
depends on whether 〈∀w(R(@, w) → A(w)〉 is positive, where @ is the actual
world, A(x) means that x is true at A (e.g. in the “standard model” of S5
consisting of all possible worlds) and R is a preorder on worlds (again, e.g.,
from the standard model).
There is much more to say here that will have to be left for another occas-
sion. However I should say, at least, that what I take to be the standard model
is ersatzist—possible worlds are mere constructions whose transitive closures
are such that all of their urelements actually exist. Hence I reject any serious
form of possibilism. Notice that this must be so, since even modal statements
are made true by the maximal truthmaker which is itself the mereological sum
of all actual things: modal truths are ultimately grounded in the non-modal.
Positivity in general
We now have all the essential ingredients for a complete analysis of positivity.
To summarize, we have the following:
• Every atomic proposition is positive;
• 〈¬A〉 is positive iff 〈A〉 is negative (i.e. not positive);
• 〈A ∧B〉 is positive iff both 〈A〉, 〈B〉 are positive;
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• 〈∀xA〉 is positive iff each of its instances 〈A(t)〉 is positive;27
• 〈∇A〉 is positive iff its extensional reduct 〈φA〉 is positive, where ∇ is an
intensional operator.
Given the usual assumptions about (classical) duality and definability (e.g. of
quantifiers and modal operators), the definition of positivity above is extremely
general in character.
The following restricted version of Maximalism is endorsed on the present
account:
Every positive truth has a truthmaker.
On the other hand, a proposition lacks a truthmaker just in case it is negative.
But not all propositions that lack truthmakers are false, so being false is not
to be equated with lacking a truthmaker.
5.8 Final remarks
I have motivated a truthmaker theory whereby only positive propositions have
truthmakers and being made true in the grounded sense is equivalent to being
made true by the maximal truthmaker, and being made true in the ungrounded
sense is equivalent to lacking a truthmaker. Thus if truth values are objects,
truth as the maximal truthmaker is the only truth value. The redundancy
of falsity was always clear from a formal point of view, being there merely to
ensure that assignment functions be total rather than partial, so the present
philosophical rejection of falsity further serves as a reduction of primitives both
conceptually and ontologically.
As a methodological platitude of theorizing, one ought not invoke for those
purposes entities whose natures are mysterious or suspect. In the course of
history, the invocation of truth values without question was a gross violation of
this platitude. Truth being something as wholly unmysterious as the maximal
27There are no restrictions on the language here so that e.g. objects may name themselves.
We thus avoid any loss of generality by not having enough names in the language.
5.8. FINAL REMARKS 153




The definability of negation as
impossibility
Abstract
A strong notion of negation is that of impossibility. Intuitionistic
negation when modally construed is an example of negation as im-
possibility. Negation as “absolute” impossibility, where possibility
is taken in its broadest sense, is not easy to define within the con-
fines of the usual modal languages. We investigate some languages
that are capable of defining negation as impossibility when neces-
sity corresponds to the global modality. The languages considered
include counterfactual operators with propositional quantification
and a bimodal language including a modality and its complemen-
tary. Soundness along with some preservation and translation re-
sults for the bimodal language are given.
Negation as a modal operator has been studied extensively in [Dos86],
[Dos99] and [Dun05]. The present perspective on the situation is much differ-
ent. Its emphasis is on the definability of negation as “absolute impossibility”,
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that is, impossibility in its strongest sense as falsity in every point of a model,
not just those that are accessible from a given point of evaluation (unless, of
course, accessibility is universal).
Typically an interest in negation as impossibility, regarded from a seman-
tic perspective, is coupled with an equally strong interest in obtaining a logic
characterized by the semantics that has certain niceties such as validating for-
mulae regarded to be “characteristic” of negation or some other connectives.1
One such formula might be (A→ B)→ (¬B → ¬A), its rule form referred to
in chapter 2 as IContra (Intuitionistic Contraposition). The interest here lies
not as much in the niceties as the mere definability of impossibility in various
languages that arise commonly in the philosophical literature. Two such lan-
guages to be investigated include a counterfactual operator and propositional
quantification, and another with a modal operator and its complementary. The
complementary modality has been investigated in the literature under various
names; in [GPT87] it is referred to as a “sufficiency operator”, in [Hum83] and
[Gor90] as a “complementary” modality, and in [Gol74] and [Dun93] as a nega-
tion. Since these languages will also include boolean negation, the problem of
defining negation as impossibility is reduced to defining the global modality
whose truth conditions are given by: ‘It is necessary that A’ if and only if ‘It
is true in every point of the model that A’.
The chapter proceeds as follows. We first start with some preliminaries
followed by a brief discussion of the logic of negation as impossibility. Then
two counterfactual semantics with propositional quantification are investigated
and the global modality is defined by placing certain restrictions on the system
of spheres and the selection function. Finally we look at a language with a
modality and its complementary modality. Soundness and some preservation
and translation results are given for this language.
1A number of such formulae are listed and discussed in chapter 2.
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6.1 Preliminaries
We start by getting some preliminaries out of the way. Let L be the basic
propositional language consisting of a set Prop of propositional letters p1, . . . ,
the (atomic) falsum ⊥, implication → and the necessity operator $ with other
connectives defined as usual. L(⊗1, . . . ,⊗n) is L augmented with the n oper-
ators ⊗1, . . . ,⊗n, i.e. L(⊗1 · · ·⊗n) = L ∪ {⊗1, . . . ,⊗n}. We may write L(∆)
for short when ∆ = {⊗1, . . . ,⊗n}. We call an n-ary modal operator ⊗ (se-
mantically) Kripkean if M,a |= ⊗(A1, . . . , An) iff ∀b1, . . . , bn s.t. R⊗ab1 . . . bn,
M, bi |= Ai (0 ≤ i ≤ n).2 Uppercase Latin letters A, B, etc. are metavariables
ranging over sentences of a given language. Expressions are used autonomously
unless quote marks would aid in readability.
A frame F is a pair (W,R) consisting of a non-empty set W of worlds
and R ⊆ W ×W a binary relation W . A model M = (F, V ) (or equivalently
(W,R, V )) based on the frame F consists of a frame together with an assignment
V : Prop→ ℘(W ) of subsets of W (propositions) to propositional letters. The
truth set ‖A‖M = {a ∈ W : M,a |= A} of a formula A relative to a model
M is the set of worlds at which the formula is true. Customarily we drop the
superscript indicating the model when it is clear. It will also be convenient to
talk about “A-worlds” (relative to a model) as worlds that are members of the
truth set of A.
One of the central concepts that concerns this chapter is the definability
of frame properties. For example, if a frame has an alternative relation R
that is universal (i.e. R = W × W ), we call the frame ‘universal’. This is
especially helpful when there is but one alternative relation. In the general
case, when frames have any number of alternative relations, it might be less
helpful to speak this way. (If a frame has a transitive alternative relation and
an non-transitive one, calling the frame ‘transitive’ and also ‘non-transitive’
is awkward, though perhaps not as awkward as calling it ‘transitive and non-
2These sorts of operators are sometimes called ‘universal’ in the literature. This nomen-
clature would no doubt be confusing for our purposes.
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transitive’ in the same breath. Below we will be working with frames with two
alternative relations.) The following gives a precise formulation of definability.
Definition 6.1.1. We say a set Γ of L(⊗1 · · ·⊗n)-formulas defines a property
P on a relation Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n) with respect to the class K of frames F =
(W,R1, . . . , Rn) iff for any frame F ∈ K
F |= Γ iff Ri has P.
Now consider the standard modal language L which fixes for $ the satis-
faction condition
(6.1) M,a |= $A iff ∀b(Rab⇒M, b |= A),
for a, b worlds from M . Then the following holds.
Proposition 6.1.2. Universality is not definable in L, i.e. there is no set Γ
of L-formulas such that for all frames F = (W,R), R =W ×W iff F |= Γ.
Proof. Suppose there were a set Γ in L that defines universality. Take any two
disjoint frames F1 = (W1, R1) and F2 = (W2, R2) with each Ri universal. We
have Fi |= Γ (i = 1, 2) by supposition. By the preservation of formulas under
taking disjoint unions of frames (see [BdRV02, p. 53] for details),
⊎
i≤2 Fi |= Γ
(where
⊎
i≤2 Fi is the disjoint union of the Fi). But the alternative relation of⊎
i≤2 Fi is not universal which contradicts our hypothesis.
This tells us an important fact about L: it is unable to discriminate struc-
tures for necessity from structures for other modalities such as epistemic and
nomological ones which themselves are often interpreted by equivalence frames,
as e.g. in the famous S5 interpretation of ‘S knows that’.3 In the following
section we introduce a quantified propositional language with a counterfactual
3In [HBW08] it is claimed that “the logical system S5 is by far the most popular and
accepted epistemic logic”. Other modalities plausibly interpreted by equivalence relations
are “It is a law that”, “It is metaphysically necessary that”, “It is correctly assertible that”,
and so on.
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conditional in the spirit of Lewis and Stalnaker and determine which properties
of the frames for the language are required for defining the global modality. In
certain cases they turn out reasonably minimal.
In what follows we denote the universal global modality by % whose truth
conditions are:
(6.2) M,a |= %A iff ∀b(M, b |= A).
Its existential dual % is defined by
(6.3) M,a |= %A iff ∃b(M, b |= A).
6.2 Negation as impossibility
The McKinsey-Tarski translation of the language of intuitionistic propositional
logic (IPC) into the language of S4 is a natural one.4 It is also one according to
which intuitionistic negation ¬ is translated as the impossibility modality de-
finable by $∼ where ∼ is boolean negation.5 Kripke semantics for IPC makes
use of the same structures as those for S4, viz. the class of preorders, but differs
from standard modal logics in imposing the following Heredity constraint:
(Heredity) If M,a |= p and a ≤ b then M, b |= p.
The condition, extendable to arbitrary formulae, is equivalent to requiring that
the valuations assign only upsets to atoms.
Suppose we pair the class of structures down to the universal frames and
drop Heredity. Taking the class of arguments valid over such a semantics then
gives us a logic that is a close relative to intuitionistic logic except that nega-
tion now has the interpretation of absolute impossibility. (Notice that if we
did not drop Heredity the resulting logic would be classical, for truth at a
point would be equivalent to truth at every point, i.e. models would contain
4The reader is referred to [MT48, p. 13] for details.
5To be precise, the truth conditions for boolean negation are: M,a |= ∼A iff M,a &|= A.
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pairwise modally equivalent points.) And the logics really are close, especially
with respect to negation. For instance, all the laws characteristic of intuition-
istic negation, in the sense of either holding (e.g. A → ¬¬A) or not holding
(e.g. ¬¬A→ A), either hold or not for negation as S5 impossibility (assuming
implication is strict) depending on what is the case for IPC. Call this logic
strict S5 or SS5 for short. Then what we have just noticed is that a character-
istic negation law A holds in IPC iff it holds in SS5. The notable difference
between the two logics’ characteristic principles do not concern negation. For
example ICP endorses
• A→ (B → C);
• A→ (B → (A ∧B));
• (A→ (B → C))→ (B → (A→ C))
while SS5 does not.
One might expect the negation axiom A→ ¬¬A (DNI) to separate the two
logics since it translates (on the McKinsey-Tarski translation) into the Brouw-
erische axiom B := A→ $ $A characteristic of symmetry, a condition which
is valid only over the frames for SS5 and not IPC. But it is of course intu-
itionistically valid, holding in virtue of Heredity (and reflexivity) rather than
symmetry. We are left hard pressed to find any difference concerning nega-
tion between the two that is not merely an instance of a difference concerning
essentially implication and connectives other than negation.
So from an internal perspective (i.e. from within the logic, looking at the
logical truths) we obtain a kind of constructive negation by just taking the
frames for S5 and giving “intuitionistic” truth conditions to the connectives
(while not imposing Heredity).6 (From an external perspective it might be
thought that certain properties of the logic such as the disjunction property
hold in order that the logic be deemed ‘constructive’ in any suitable sense. We
6We might instead think of the intuitionistic connectives as taking on the Lewis truth
conditions for strict implication and negation defined as implication to absurdity, though
Lewis never thought of negation this way. For him, negation was thoroughly boolean.
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put this issue to the side.) In particular the negation of SS5, like intuitionistic
negation, does not validate the following:
• ¬(A ∧B)→ ¬(A ∨ ¬B);
• ¬¬A→ A;
• A ∨ ¬A;
• (¬A→ ⊥)→ A;
• (¬A→ ¬B)→ (B → A);
• (A→ B) ∨ (A→ ¬B)
each of which has a thoroughly non-constructivist interpretation.
6.3 Extended modal languages
We first look at definability of the global modality in conditional languages,
starting with frames based on (i) selection functions, and (ii) systems of spheres.
Frames of the first type are due to Stalnaker [Sta68] and those of the second to
Lewis [Lew73]. Depending on the semantic constraints one accepts, definability
according to these two different kinds of structures is not obtained in parallel
fashion. We give two versions of the selection function semantics. The first is
a generalization of Stalnaker’s original account, and the second is essentially
the original. In a sense the original seems more natural, but only under the
assumption that selection functions are total (for every world there is at least
one “closest” one) and have as their codomain the set of worlds rather than its
powerset (for every world there is a unique closest one).
The next language we look at in section 6.3 involves a sufficiency (or “win-
dow”) modality. Such modalized statements express that a world w′ is an
alternative of w provided some formula holds at w—i.e. they provide sufficient
conditions for alternativeness (or “accessibility”). Besides its use in perp or
(in-) compatibility semantics as a negation operation, the modality has other
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philosophical applications as well. For instance the holding of a sentence in w
(say, ‘There is a counterpart in w′ of an individual in w’) might imply that
some other world w′ is an alternative of w.7
The modality occurs naturally in the setting of boolean modal operators
where it was originally introduced. Details may be found in [BdRV02, ch. 7].
Conditional logic and propositional quantification
One natural rendering of ‘It is necessary that A’ is ‘For any proposition B, had
B been true, A would have been true too’, or briefly, ‘A would hold no matter
what holds’.8 Such a rendering of ‘It is necessary that A’ involves propositional
quantification, initially introduced by Fine [Fin70]. Logics with propositional
quantification are often referred to as second-order propositional modal logic
(SOPML) and it was shown in [KT97] that SOPML based on S4.2 or weaker
modalities is equal in model-theoretic strength to full second-order predicate
logic (SOL). Fine showed these logics to be incomplete, and in [Gar01] Garson
shows a similar incompleteness result for second-order modal arithmetic based
on S4.3 or weaker modalities.
The impressive strength of SOPML is not surprising as quantifiers have
their expected interpretations: ∀piA is true at a world just in case for every
subset X of worlds, A[V (pi) A→ X] (i.e. the result of interpreting pi as X) is
true. Propositional quantifiers in a modal setting thus allow us to quantify over
arbitrary subsets of a possibly infinite set of worlds. The similarities between
SOPML and SOL are further brought out in translation theory. For example,
[Fin70] translates second-order arithmetic into propositionally quantified S4.2
thereby showing the former to be incomplete.
7Less philosophically, consider nominals again. If i is a nominal naming world wi, then
the truth of $i at w implies that wi is an alternative of w. Clearly this is a general principle
which holds for any i.
8What a proposition is will be left intentionally vague, but one way to think of them is
as sets of possible worlds (or as some might say, in the “UCLA” way). Then each member
of a proposition is a world in which that proposition holds. Sometimes worlds themselves
are called ‘propositions’, being maximally consistent descriptions of the way the actual world
might be.
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If SOPML is so powerful, why can we not define the global modality in
the basic modal language L extended to include propositional quantifiers? The
reason is quite simple: propositional quantification does not give us access to
inaccessible worlds. Consider one plausible definition of %A: ∀pi$(pi → A).9
The propositional quantifier does nothing in allowing us to extend our reach
to inaccessible worlds, though it allows us to say other interesting things not
expressible in L. We will see that things are different when we tinker with
this definition by removing the box and replacing the material arrow with a
conditional one.
While we are defining the global modality in terms of counterfactuals, it
is interesting to note that things may be done the other way around as done
in [vBRvO06]. So in a sense the global modality and certain counterfactuals
are interdefinable. However, the counterfactuals definable in the presence of
the global modality, in the sense of [vBRvO06], are not the sort that figure
in the mainstream philosophical literature, and perhaps for good reason. The
counterfactual of [vBRvO06] interprets ‘Were A, B’ as ‘For any world w in
which A holds, there is a world w′ better than w at which A strictly implies
B’, which seems to us to be a poor interpretation of a “would”-counterfactual
for the following reason. The fact that for every A-world there is a better B-
world at which A strictly implies B does not rule out there also being a better
B-world at which the strict implication from A to ¬B holds. But then while
it is true to say that the consequent would have obtained had the antecedent,
the same can be said of the negation of the consequent, and standardly ‘Would
A, B’ and ‘Would A, ¬B’ are thought to be mutually inconsistent.
One may define the counterfactuals of more interesting logics by the meth-
ods of [Lew73], where e.g. a Lewis counterfactual is defined in terms of propo-
sitional quantification and a “sphericality” operator. One may then go on to
define the global modality in the way set out in the following section, in a
less direct fashion. Obviously there are a number of ways to define the global
9In the relevant systems we have ∀pi$(pi → A)→ $∀pi(pi → A), so it suffices to make
our point with the aforementioned formula rather than $∀pi(pi → A).
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modality and I have merely chosen to focus on three I find interesting.
Selection functions
We work in the language L(∀, >)10 where > is a binary conditional operator.
A frame F for this language is a pair (W, f) where f : W × ℘(W ) → ℘(W )
is a selection function (s-function for short) mapping propositions to world-
proposition pairs. We call such a frame an s-frame. An (s-) model is a pair
(F, V ) where V is as usual. Roughly, one thinks of the antecedent f(a, ‖A‖)
of a counterfactual as the collection of A-worlds closest to a, which intuitively
expresses the proposition that A is entertainable with respect to a. A counter-
factual is to be true exactly when this proposition implies the consequent, in
the sense that A implies B in a model whenM |= A→ B holds, or equivalently
‖A‖ ⊆ ‖B‖. In effect, the s-function picks out the set of worlds that are most
similar to the world of evaluation with respect to the antecedent.
We employ a nearly minimal conditional semantics which places the follow-
ing sole restriction on f :
(6.4) if X is a singleton then for all b, f(b,X) = X
for a, b ∈ W and X ⊆ W . The condition by itself is relatively weak. It says
that if A is true at exactly one world, then that world must be the closest A-
world to any given world. The condition is plausible enough and is reminiscent
of Stalnaker’s uniqueness assumption that a proposition is possible (in the
global sense) only if there is a unique most similar world making it true.11
But notice that we have not placed the uniqueness condition on the s-function
generally. This is what makes the present condition comparatively weak, but
also less motivated. The purpose of first presenting the semantics this way is
10Technically the base propositional language L specified in section 6.1 has no variables
for binding. We assume here the obvious modifications to L, viz. that it contain denumerably
many variables as well as constants.
11There may be cases where we want to say that all worlds are equally remote with respect
to some other world. Lewis allows this on both of his semantics, one involving systems of
spheres and the other comparative possibility. Our restriction prohibits these sorts of cases.
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to see just what is needed in the more general setting. Later we briefly discuss
dropping this restriction in favor of others that get frequently mentioned in the
literature, some combinations of which make quantification unneeded (and are
hence jointly stronger than our present restriction).
The satisfaction clause for propositional quantification is as follows. Let
M = (W, f, V ) be an (s-) model. Then
M,a |= ∀piA iff (W, f, V ′), a |= A
for every V ′ like V except at most in what it assigns to pi. We call V ′ a
pi-variant of V . For the conditional arrow we define
M,a |= A > B iff f(a, ‖A‖) ⊆ ‖B‖.
We read A > B as “Were A, B” in accordance with our intended counterfactual
interpretation of the conditional.12
Since we have quantification over propositions, in particular we have quan-
tification over singleton subsets θ ⊆ W . But if every such θ implies A, by
the restriction on f , that means every world from the model yields A—i.e.
A is globally true in the model. Thus quantification coupled with conditional
implication gives us enough for the following definition of the global modality:
M = (W, f, V ), a |= ∀pi(pi > A) iff M,a |= %A.
We may reason through the definition as follows. The left side holds iff M ′ =
(W, f, V ′), a |= pi > A for every pi-variant V ′ of V , iff f(a, ‖pi‖M ′) ⊆ ‖A‖M ′
iff f(a, {b}) ⊆ ‖A‖M for all b ∈W , iff ‖A‖M =W iff M,a |= %A.
It is clear this reasoning relies essentially on condition (6.4), and there does
not appear to be any weaker restriction we can place in its stead. Here are
12The reading is intended merely as an informal gloss. If f lacks certain properties then the
formulas validated over frames based on f will not contain certain other formulas thought
characteristic of a counterfactual conditional. That is true as it stands here, since f is
restricted only by (6.4).
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three obvious suggestions:
1. f(a,X) ⊆ X;
2. if a ∈ X then a ∈ f(a,X);
3. if X ,= ∅ then f(a,X) ,= ∅.
The first of these is called ‘(id)’ by Chellas in [Che75, p. 142] and corre-
sponds to (is defined by) the identity schema A > A. The second also appears
in [Che75] as ‘(mp)’ and corresponds to (A > B) → (A → B), an expression
of modus ponens for >. Finally, the third condition requires that, unless a
proposition is impossible, there must be some similar world at which it holds.
This is similar to our initial singleton restriction (6.4), and indeed it implies
(6.4) under the plausible assumption that the first condition holds. However,
the first and last conditions make quantification redundant; we can instead
adopt Lewis’ original formulation (in [Lew73]) of global necessity as ¬A > ⊥.
It is also interesting to note that, given the global modality, we can define
the third condition by %A → ¬(A > ⊥). A simple semantical argument
suffices. Suppose the third condition holds and that M,a |= %A. Then ‖A‖ ,=
∅, so by the condition, f(a, ‖A‖) ,= ∅. Whence f(a, ‖A‖) ,⊆ ‖⊥‖, so M,a ,|=
A > ⊥ and thus M,a |= ¬(A > ⊥).
For the other direction, suppose F |= %A → ¬(A > ⊥) and X ,= ∅.
Let V (p) = X. Then (F, V ), a |= %p, so (F, V ), a |= ¬(p > ⊥). Whence
f(a, ‖p‖) ,⊆ ‖⊥‖ iff f(a, ‖p‖) ,= ∅ as desired.
We have taken f to be an s-function from worlds to sets of worlds. But
suppose we take f to be a total function from world-proposition pairs to worlds
satisfying the condition f(a,X) ∈ X. That is, the closest world with respect
to the counterfactual is an antecedent-world. This is essentially Stalnaker’s
original semantics. ForX a singleton {b} the condition reduces to f(a, {b}) = b.
The semantics (and the notions of s-frame and s-model) for the counterfactual
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is adapted straightforwardly to
M,a |= A > B iff f(a, ‖A‖) |= B.
Again ∀pi(pi > A) defines the global modality by the totality and uniqueness
of f .
Systems of spheres
We briefly discuss the definability of the global modality within the conditional
semantics of Lewis, ingeniously developed in [Lew73]. Lewis was aware of a
global modality (which he thought of as the broadest logical modality) and
that the satisfaction of a particular semantic constraint ensures that the outer
modality is global. But he says little more about it. To say that a sentence is
necessary within a particular system of spheres, however, seems to have little
in common with saying that it is necessary simpliciter (i.e. in the global sense
we intend). Lewis seems to agree; he states “a sentence is necessary, possible,
or impossible iff it is true at all worlds, at some, or at none” [Lew76, pp. 299].
For a proposition is hardly necessary in the broadest sense if it is true at some
worlds and false at others, and it is precisely this possibility that is permitted by
the semantical system of [Lew73]. Indeed, the global modality is not definable
in this system; i.e. no formula in the purely counterfactual language defines
the aforementioned semantic constraint. We can get it, as we did above for
s-frames, by adding propositional quantification. We go straight to the details.
Our language is L(∀, >), a frame for which is a pair (W, f) where f maps
a (centered-) system of spheres Sa ⊆ ℘(W ) to each world a. (A model for
the language is a pair (F, V ) where F is a frame for the language and V is as
usual.) We call such frames sphere frames. A system of spheres Sa is a family
of subsets of W closed under the following conditions:
1. {a} ∈ Sa (Sa is centered on a);
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2. for each X,Y ∈ Sa, either X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X (Sa is ⊆-dichotomous)13;
3. Sa is closed under arbitrary (i) unions and (ii) non-empty intersections.
Each member of Sa is called a ‘sphere’, each pair of which is ⊆-comparable
as stated in the second condition. If ∅ ,∈ Sa then the innermost sphere is its
centering, {a}; otherwise it is ∅. The reason for this is that the innermost
sphere is defined as
⋂Sa, and since systems are centered, either ⋂Sa is {a}
or it is ∅. Intuitively, the innermost sphere contains worlds that are the most
similar to a, and surely a is more similar to itself than any other world.14
The satisfaction condition for counterfactuals is disjunctive, one case covers
the vacuous case and the other what Lewis calls the “principal” case:
M,a |= A > B iff
 either
⋃Sa ∩ ‖A‖ = ∅
or ∃S ∈ Sa : S ∩ ‖A‖ ,= ∅ ∧ S ⊆ ‖A→ B‖.
A counterfactual A > B is vacuously true if its antecedent is not true anywhere
in the system of spheres—in Lewis’ words, it is not “entertainable”—otherwise
it is made true by some A-permitting sphere (i.e. a sphere containing some
A-world) in which the material implication A → B holds throughout. By
dichotomy such a sphere will be “minimal”.
Lewis provides the following two equivalent definitions of a necessity modal-
ity:
$A := ¬A > ⊥
¬A > A.
These are analogous to necessity defined in terms of strict implication. Infor-
mally a proposition is necessary if it is true at every world in the system and
13Lewis calls this condition nestedness.
14If we took worlds to be e.g. maximal consistent sets, then there are no indistinguishable
(i.e. modally equivalent) worlds: i.e. there are no two worlds making precisely the same
formulas true. Then clearly each world is most similar to itself. On the present account,
however, it is possible that two worlds be indistinguishable, in which case, each is equally
similar to the other and to themselves. Even in this case Lewis apparently thought they are
not completely indistinguishable: if we call one ‘s’ and the other ‘t’, then only the former
has the property of being identical to s. Despite this, Lewis remained neutral on whether
there really are distinct yet indistinguishable worlds.
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it is possible ( $A ↔ ¬$¬A) if there is a world in the system at which it is
true. Since conditional formulas are evaluated with respect to both worlds and
systems of spheres, the above modality is inherently restricted to the relevant
systems of evaluation and so may not extend in its reach to every world unless
each system of spheres does. Precisely, > extends to every world iff
⋃Sa =W
for each a ∈ W . Lewis calls frames satisfying this constraint universal. It is
easy to verify that the above definitions for $ are equivalent to those for %
over universal frames.
The axioms provided in [Lew73, p. 121] that Lewis cites as “characteristic
axioms” for universality are characteristic in a weak way: they are valid on
any universal frame, though the converse, that their frame validity ensures
universality, need not hold. For instance, there are frames validating schemas
T, 4 and 5 (defined in terms of >) that are not universal. Again, this is due to
the fact that the evaluation of conditionals does not extend to what we might







Lewis calls uniformity. Together with the assumption that frames are centered,
as we have presented them here, uniformity entails universality. For if frames
are centered (and hence totally reflexive in the jargon of Lewis, i.e. ∀a ∈W,a ∈⋃Sa), then every world is contained in some sphere, viz. the sphere with that
world as its center. And if each system of spheres for each world shares the
same stock of worlds, then that stock must include all worlds. If we add
quantification to the language we come close to defining universality by
(6.5) ∀pi $pi,
which states that every proposition is “possible”, including all singletons, and
hence that for every X ⊆ W there is a b in each system such that b ∈ X.
Clearly this is false since there is a valuation assigning pi the empty set, and
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thus under this valuation pi is true at no world in any system of spheres. But
then ∀pi $pi is a full-fledged contradiction, equivalent to ∀pipi and to ⊥.
The above problem can be seen as one among many of a general sort for con-
ditional logics that concerns how to handle impossible antecedents. In Lewis’
system they are vacuously true. In his modified semantics which requires that
there be an antecedent-permitting sphere in order that a conditional be true,
they are vacuously false. But in either case, there is good reason to think
that not all conditionals with impossible antecedents are semantically equal.
For example ‘If there were a largest prime, not every integer would have a
prime successor’ rings true, while ‘If there were a largest prime, there would
not be a largest prime’ sounds necessarily false. To accommodate impossible
antecedents in a more faithful fashion we adopt “impossible” worlds. They
have been used in e.g. [ST70] as a mere technical device for this end.
Impossible worlds are intended to be worlds at which anything goes. In par-
ticular they make ⊥ “true”.15 They may be devised so that not all formulas
are true, just some impossible ones are. This allows a more fine-grained dis-
tinction between the meaning of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.
For simplicity we let impossible worlds make everything true. If we outfit
each system of spheres Sa with precisely one impossible world λ, then (6.5)
defines uniformity. The closest worlds to any given world with respect to an
impossible antecedent will be λ, and so when V (pi) = ∅ we have its possibility
following from its truth at λ, i.e. (F, V ), a |= $pi follows from (F, V ),λ |= pi
and λ ∈ ⋃Sa. The global modality is then defined by
%A := ∀pi $pi ∧$A.
15If this seems philosophically distasteful, another strategy is to define ⊥ by a sentence of
the form A∧∼A where ∼ is a negation operation such that A and ∼A may be simultaneously
true (forced) at a world as in the semantics of certain substructural logics such as the relevance
logic R. Accordingly we can do away with impossible worlds in which the truth conditions
of certain formulas may be non-compositional. Such is the case with λ mentioned below.
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Axiomatics
The basic conditional logic, denoted by CK in accordance with [Che75], is
defined as the class of all formulas valid on every s-frame F = (W, f), where f
is not required to satisfy any restriction.16 It is axiomatized by
1. all classical propositional tautologies;
2. (A > (B ∧ θ))→ ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ θ));
3. ((A > B) ∧ (A→ θ))→ (A > (B ∧ θ));
4. A→ %,
and the rules
1. A,A→ B 2 B;
2. A↔ B 2 (A > θ)↔ (B > θ);
3. (A1 ∧ · · · ∧An)→ A 2 ((B > A1) ∧ · · · ∧ (B > An))→ (B > A).
The second-order basic conditional logic, SOCK, is CK together with the
quantificational axioms
1. ∀pi(A→ B(pi))→ (A→ ∀pi(B(pi))) (pi not free in A);
2. ∀piA(pi)→ A(B),
and the generalization rule
1. from 2 A(pi) infer 2 ∀piA(pi).
It is an open problem whether there is a recursive axiomatization of the
class of L(∀, >)-formulas valid on all s-frames satisfying our singleton restriction
(6.4). One problem is due to the inability to express over arbitrary structures
whether some formula is true in precisely one world. Augmenting the language
16We make no distinction between a logic as (i) a class of formulas L and (ii) a deduction
system which generates precisely L.
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further with a “difference” operator D (see e.g. [BdRV02] and [dR92]) defined
by
M,a |= DA iff ∃b ,= a,M, b |= A
would give us just that ability, but it also smuggles in with it a definition of
the global modality as A ∧ ¬D¬A. Ideally we would like to define singleton
propositions by quantification and the conditional arrow alone and to leave the
smuggling as a means for obtaining other desirable goods.
It is worth mentioning an axiomatization of the logic of s-frames satisfying
the first and third alternative conditions mentioned previously on page 167.
Recall that together they give us the global modality %A := ¬A > ⊥ without
propositional quantification.
An axiomatization is given by CK plus
1. A > A;
2. (A > ⊥)→ %¬A.
The resulting axiomatization is sound and complete with respect to the class
of s-frames satisfying the given conditions. In fact, it is easy to verify these
axioms define their respective corresponding frame properties.
The sufficiency modality
We now look at the sufficiency modality. A completeness proof of an axiom-
atization of this modality can be found in [Hum87]. For definability results,
[Gor90] provides a rich source.
The following modality, which we denote by &, is referred to in [BdRV02] as
a “window” operator and in other places as a “sufficiency” and as a “comple-
mentary” operator. Goldblatt [Gol74] popularized the operator as a negation
∼ defined in [Dun93] by
M,a |= ∼A iff ∀b(M, b |= A⇒ b⊥a),
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for ⊥ the relation of incompatibility. If incompatibility is asymmetric then
there arises both a left- and right-negation.
The satisfaction clause for & is unsurprisingly
(6.6) M,a |= &A iff ∀b(M, b |= A⇒ Rab).
Loosely, a formula &A is true at a world a if and only if a can see every
A-world. It may also be viewed as providing sufficient conditions for R-
accessibility, whereas the standard Kripkean clauses provide necessary con-
ditions. In [Hum87] a primitive modality which is equivalent to &¬A ∧$A is
studied as a providing a logic of “all and only”. With this modality in hand,
it is easy to define universality and the reader should verify that &% does the
trick.
The truth of &% ∧ $A at a world implies the truth of %A in the model,
but it does not quite give us the global modality as the converse implication
does not hold in general. Rather, what we are looking for is
%A := &¬A ∧$A.
The first conjunct tells us that every inaccessible world is a A-world and the
second that every accessible world is a A-world, whence every world is a A-
world.
In the presence of two modal operators, a standard Kripkean one governed
by R and its complementary sufficiency one essentially governed by R, the
sufficiency modality allows us to talk about worlds that are R-inaccessible: the
dual modality 'A says that there is an inaccessible A-world. As such, L(&)
lacks the usual version of invariance under generated submodels. However,
while we are without the notion of generated submodel for L(&), there is
an analog. Informally, M ′ is a generated L(&)-submodel17 of M if M ′ is a
17The reader is referred to [BdRV02] for such notions as (generated) submodel.
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submodel of M and
(6.7) if a ∈W ′ and ¬Rab then b ∈W ′.
Proposition 6.3.1. Let M ′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) be a generated L(&)-submodel of
M = (W,R, V ). Then for all a ∈W ′
M ′, a |= A iff M,a |= A.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A. We do only the case for A = 'B,
supposing the inductive hypothesis holds for all B with complexity less than
A’s. (Working with ' over & in this case is more revealing.)
Suppose M,a |= 'B. Then ∃b ∈ W such that ¬Rab and M, b |= ¬B. By
(6.7), b ∈W ′, whence by IH M ′, b |= ¬B. So M ′, a |= 'B.
For the other direction suppose M ′, a |= 'A. Then ∃b ∈ W ′ such that
¬R′ab and M ′, b |= ¬A. Then ¬Rab, and by IH M, b |= ¬A. Whence M,a |=
'A.
As noted earlier, L(&)-formulas are not preserved under taking disjoint
unions. The problem is that if M = (W,R, V ) and M ′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) are
disjoint models and M,a |= &B, M ′ may have worlds at which B is true that
are inaccessible from a, in which case M unionmultiM ′, a ,|= &B. The only thing we
can do to ensure that formulas involving & are preserved is, after forming their
disjoint union, connect all the worlds from one model to all the worlds in the
others and vice versa for pairwise disjoint models. For simplicity we work in
the language with a single modal operator &.
Definition 6.3.2. Let {Fi = (Wi, Ri)}i∈I be a family of disjoint frames for
L(&). Their disjoint L(&)-union ⊎!i∈I Fi = (W ∗, R∗) is formed by taking their
disjoint union
⊎
i∈I Fi and setting Riaibj for all ai ∈Wi and bj ∈Wj for j ,= i.
That is
1. W ∗ =
⊎
i∈IWi;
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2. R∗ =
⊎
i∈I Ri ∪ {(ai, bj) : ai ∈Wi, bj ∈Wj} for all i, j ∈ I s.t. i ,= j.
The disjoint L(&)-union of a family {Mi = (Wi, Ri, Vi)}i∈I of models is
defined likewise by additionally setting V ∗ =
⊎
i∈I Vi. We obtain the following
invariance results.
Theorem 6.3.3. Let {Fi}i∈I be a family of disjoint frames for L(&). Then
Fi |= A for each i ∈ I iff
⋃!
i∈I Fi |= A.
Corollary 6.3.4. Let {Mi}i∈I be a family of disjoint models for L(&). Then
for each ai ∈Wi and A in L(&),
⊎!
i∈IMi, ai |= A iff Mi, ai |= A.
Proof. We prove only the corollary. The base case is immediate and as usual
we cover only the case for A = 'B, supposing the inductive hypothesis holds
for all B with complexity less than A’s.
Suppose Mi, ai |= 'B. Then ∃b ∈ Wi s.t. Mi, b |= ¬A and not Riaib.
By IH,
⊎!
i∈IMi, b |= ¬A. Since ∀c ∈ Wi, Riaic iff R∗aic, not R∗aib. Whence⊎!
i∈IMi, ai |= 'B.
For the other direction, suppose
⊎!
i∈IMi, ai |= 'B. Then ∃b ∈ W ∗ s.t.⊎!
i∈IMi, b |= ¬A and not R∗aib. By the definition of R∗, bj ∈ Wi and not
Riaib. So by IH, Mi, b |= ¬A, whence Mi, ai |= 'B as desired.
Invariance results for L(&) such as these give us an easy means of proving
indefinability results just as their analogs do for Kripkean languages such as
L. The following is but one example.
Example 6.3.5. Antisymmetry, i.e. if Rxy and Ryx then x = y, is not L(&)-
definable.
Proof. Suppose A ∈ L(&) defines antisymmetry. Let F1 and F2 be antisym-
metric frames. Then Fi |= A for each i ≤ 2. By theorem 6.3.3,
⋃!
i≤2 Fi |= A.
But clearly the alternative relation R∗ of
⋃!
i≤w Fi is not antisymmetric as each
a ∈ W1 is distinct from each b ∈ W2 and yet we have R∗ab and R∗ba by
definition.
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The following theorem establishes the relationship between L- and L(&)-
models and their theories.
Theorem 6.3.6. Let M = (W,R, V ) and M ′ = (W,R, V ) be models, with R
the complement of R (relative to W ), and let ThML(!)(a) be the L(&)-theory of
a′ ∈W ′ (and likewise for a ∈W ). Moreover let t(ThM ′L(!)(a)) be the translation
which substitutes in every L(&)-formula A ∈ ThL(!)(aM ′), & for $ and ' for
$. Then
ThML (a) = t(Th
M ′
L(!)(a)).
Informally t translates an L(&)-theory into an “equivalent” L-theory by
replacing L(&)-boxes for L-boxes and likewise for diamonds. If we were to use
the same symbol for the primitive modal operators of L and L(&), the theorem
would tell us that for every point a ∈ W , its L-theory in M is the same as
its L(&)-theory in M ′. Clearly the theorem holds translating the other way
around, from L-formulas to L(&)-ones. As a concrete example take $A → A
which defines the reflexivity of R. The above theorem tells us that &A → A
defines the irreflexivity of R.
Proof. It suffices to show that M,a |= A iff M ′, a |= A′ where A′ is exactly like
A except that there is an occurrence of & wherever there is an occurrence of
$ in A. The proof is by induction on formula complexity. We do only the case
A = $B. (It is more revealing to work with the diamond case here.) Suppose
M,a |= $B. Then there is a b ∈W such that Rab andM, b |= B. Then ¬Rab.
By IH, M ′, b |= B, whence M ′, a |= 'B.
For the other direction, suppose M ′, a |= 'B. Then there is a b ∈W such
that ¬Rab and M ′, b |= B. Then Rab. By IH, M, b |= B, whence M,a |=
$B.
We may also obtain the obvious analogs of results such as bounded mor-
phisms (also called ‘p-morphisms’) and bisimulations by replacing in them R
for its negation.
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An axiomatization of $ and its complementary modality & in the language
L($&) is provided in [Hum83]. It consists of the K-axioms and necessita-
tion rules for each box, along with modus ponens and the following “meta”-
schema18:
(C) D($A ∧&¬B)→ B(A ∨B),
where D and B range over (possibly empty) strings of diamonds (either $
or ') and boxes (either $ or &) respectively. (Note that D here is not the
difference operator of §6.3.) We call this logic KC, C for ‘complementary’, the
completeness of which is established in [Hum83] by the less familiar method
of Cresswell, rather than the usual canonical models method of Scott and
Lemmon.
Theorem 6.3.7 (Soundness). Let K be the class of all complementary frames
F = (W,R1, R1). Then KC 2 A implies K |= A.
Proof. Let F = (W,R1, R2) be a complementary frame and suppose that M =
(F, V ), a |= D($A∧&¬B). Then there is an R1∪R2-chain of length n (n < ω)
to a b ∈ W s.t. M, b |= $A ∧ &¬B. Thus for all c s.t. R1bc, M, c |= A and
for all c s.t. R2bc, M, c |= B (as R2 = R1). Suppose there is an R1 ∪R2-chain
of length m from a to c. Then either R1bc or not. If so, then M, c |= A so
M, c |= A ∨ B. If not, then R2bc so M, c |= B so M, c |= A ∨ B. Whence
M,a |= B(A ∨B) as m and c were arbitrary.
6.4 Final remarks
If we are not given the global modality for free, a definition of negation as ab-
solute impossibility requires placing rather unfamiliar constraints on a typical
18Humberstone ([Hum83]) calls it a single schema which is somewhat misleading as
schemas are usually understood. In the case of schema (C), one substitutes, not just formu-
las for schematic metavariables ranging over such formulas, but also ill-formed strings of a
special sort for metavariables ranging over such strings.
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modal language including a counterfactual operator and propositional quantifi-
cation. The primary aim of the present chapter was to clarify precisely which
constraints are so needed and to further investigate the definability of the
global modality used in the definition of negation as impossibility in languages
including a modality and its complementary.
As a final reminder, it is worth highlighting again the nearly identical nega-
tions of SS5 of section 6.2 and IPC. Their similarity is not surprising given
their sharing of truth conditions, but similarity to this level becomes surprising
when one sees that it is accounted for by more than their mere sharing of truth
conditions, a fact made evident when we consider that neither does the seman-




We looked at five issues concerning negation. Of those five there are two of an
especially general character that I wish to revisit. The first of those concerns
whether it is at all meaningful or legitimate to engage in revisionary debate
concerning the nature of negation. I think the question has two answers, one
of which was not touched upon in chapter 2. In that chapter I answered with
a resounding “Yes”, revisionary debate is possible, but there is a negative
answer with significant appeal which runs in one of the following two ways.
When the deviant rejects some classical principle or accepts some non-classical
principle regarding negation, she may be seen as denying the universal validity
of classical logic. That is, she may be seen as denying that classical principles
are valid under absolutely every domain of discourse. The classicist might be
happy to agree. He may not think that the domain of classical logic extends
to fiction, for example. For in the world of fiction, anything goes! This kind of
classicist may either reject the subject or domain neutrality of classical logic
or he may demote fiction and other domains as unworthy of logical constraint.
If the former, he may still hold that classical logic holds good relative to this
or that—but not every—domain. So this breed of classicist may deny that
revisionary debate is possible when the domain is “classical logic friendly”,
though he may nonetheless be open to debate concerning precisely on which
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domains classical logic holds good. This classicist is a kind of relativist who
denies that revision is possible relative to some domains D but not relative to
others D′, perhaps because these D′ are not on solid footing.
I have my sympathies with this classicist. After all, would anyone really
deny that classical logic fails to preserve truth when the domain of discourse is
fiction or what is believed, doubted, etc. by Frank to be true? Surely not. Yet
it is not clear that these domains are somehow illegitimate as regards logic so
we should give them their fair due. But to do so is to be open to revising our
theories of what constitutes valid inference, and in particular when those infer-
ences concern negation, in a doxastic, fictional or other setting. Whether such
domains are taken to be legitimate is a deep question regarding the demarcation
of logic—Is the “logic” of fiction logic?—and it is intimately intertwined with
the question of whether revisionary debate is possible. I think it is possible,
but on account of enough shared meaning between the classicist and deviant’s
respective uses of the relevant logical vocabulary such as ‘not’.
The second issue of an especially broad character that we addressed con-
cerns truthmakers for negative truths. On one extreme we have truthmaker
maximalism. The principle strikes me as characteristic of a na¨ıve theory of
truthmaking, one that is bound to get us into hot water if we do no heavy tin-
kering in other areas such as logic. This is a familiar affair with na¨ıve theories;
just consider na¨ıve set theory, na¨ıve theory of properties and predicates, na¨ıve
truth theory and so forth. On the other extreme we have atomism. This view
strikes me as unnecessarily restrictive, analogous to solving the liar paradox by
banishing sentential self-reference. (At the level of propositions I think this is
actually the right thing to say. But it is not at the level of sentences.) So there
is a forceful intuition that it must be some theory in between these extremes
that is the correct one. The hard part is giving a precise account of this in-
termediate theory. I hope to have gone all the way toward this end in chapter
5 by arguing for a version of maximalism restricted to positive truths and by
further providing the essential ingredient that is an account of positivity.
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